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3EXTENDED ABSTRACT
This thesis consists in an analysis of stock splits, and their relation-
ship with dispersion of beliefs and herding.
Chapter 1 introduces the topics that I tackle throughout the the-
sis. In particular, I motivate the interest in herding and stock splits
presenting the unifying interpretation line among each chapter.
Chapter 2 proposes a literature review on stock splits, focusing
on the explanations that the theoretical literature suggests and the
empirical evidence of the market reaction.
Chapter 3 reports the results of an empirical analysis around the
time of a stock split on the relation between the dispersion of beliefs
among investors and the market reaction and future performance of
the splitting company. We provide empirical results on a sample of US
splits which occurred from 1993 to 2004. They show that, at the time
around the announcement of a split, the distribution of the analysts
forecasts changes in mean and dispersion. Moreover, an event study
shows that the di¤erences of opinion have an impact on the future
performance of the splitting rms and on the motivations behind the
event.
Chapter 4 focuses on a literature review of herding, and in particu-
4lar on the empirical investigation of imitative behavior among institu-
tional investors.
Chapter 5 examines the relation between herding and stock splits.
By herding we mean the abnormal correlation of trades among insti-
tutional investors, according to the methodology developed by Sias
(2004). We use data on the buying and selling activity of US insti-
tutional investors, from 1994 to 2005. The results show a signicant
level of convergence in the overall market, both for splitting and non-
splitting companies. We decompose this e¤ect into the contributions
of several types of herding. We observe the signicant impact of in-
formational cascades on the splitting stocks sample, while reputational
herding and characteristic preference have a relevant impact on the
non-splitting sample. The evidence of informational content in the
split event is conrmed by the stabilizing e¤ect of herding we nd in
the future returns of splitting companies.
Chapter 6 concludes, summarizing the main results and contribu-
tions of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Stock splits are still a puzzling phenomenon in the nancial markets.
They are corporate events that increase the number of shares outstand-
ing of a company without direct observable e¤ects on cash ows, owner-
ship basis or risk characteristics. Despite their purely "cosmetic" e¤ect
on companies, the nancial literature still shows no agreement on ei-
ther the managersmotivations behind these events or the validity of
the empirical evidence on the market reaction.
In this dissertation, we aim to investigate the phenomenon of stock
splits in a new light, connecting the market reaction with the presence
of imitative behaviour among institutional investors. The abnormal
reaction of the market to the announcement of stock splits could in
fact be correlated with an abnormal level of herding among the most
professional of investors.
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Herding is a social phenomenon that occurs when a group of in-
dividuals follow each others behavior over a period of time, partly
ignoring their own private information. It is an old concept that dates
back to Keynesbeauty contest (1936), and that has evolved till today,
when imitative behaviour is theorized in nancial markets within fully
rational setups. Furthermore, the research on herding is still divided
into multiple theoretical approaches and, in particular, the empirical
and theoretical literature is hard to reconcile.
As far as my knowledge, the link between the two elds of liter-
ature of herding and stock splits has not yet been investigated, while
an unifying analysis could bring new light on the understanding of
both phenomena. This dissertation, therefore, intends to ll this gap
and to provide new insights on both the motivations to herd and the
motivations behind the underreaction to the announcement of stock
splits. We dene our study as a cross-borders investigation of herding
and stock splits linking the Self Selection hypothesis for stock splits
to informational-based herding. In its essence, our contributions focus
on the hypotheses that stock splits convey noisy but positive informa-
tion to the market, and the investorsbiased reaction could be partly
explained by informational institutional herding around the announce-
ment of the event.
From the empirical literature on the price impact of stock splits,
there are evidence of abnormal trading activities before and after the
announcement of the event. Even if this evidence does not nd full
agreement among researchers, it is consistent with both the hypotheses
that managers use stock splits to realign the stock price to an optimal
trading range, and that the event is recognized by the market as a sig-
nal of positive future expectations. An unifying theory, consistent with
13
underreaction of the market after the event, is the Self Selection hy-
pothesis of Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996). Linking this empirical
literature to the investigation of herding around the event could help
in understanding the motivations to investorsunderreaction after the
announcement of stock splits.1
The empirical literature on herding is even more controversial, as
many are the limitations on the analysis of imitative behaviour on real-
functioning markets. Most of the researchers agree on a level of cor-
related behaviour among investors, that is consistent with institutions
engaging in imitative behaviour in their trading activities. However,
the investigation of the motivations to herd is still an hard task to per-
form. Looking at herding in splitting stocks would help to extrapolate
useful insights on why investors are herding. In particular, because of
the noisy informational content of the split, and the underreaction af-
ter its announcement, such event seems an ideal moment to test for
the presence of herding due to the arrival of new signals. Due to
noisy information to the market and uncertainty on both the occur-
rence and the change in value of the company, investors would tend to
observe each other trades and, to ignore their private signals, engaging
in informational-based herding.2
Moreover, the link between the two empirical investigation is played
by the dispersion of beliefs among analysts. We are going to introduce
the e¤ect of di¤erence of opinions both on the market reaction to splits
and informational herding. On one side, a change in the distribution of
the analystsforecasts in mean and dispersion will help to investigate
the informational content in the announcement of the event. On the
1 The literature on stock splits will be reviewed in Chapter 2.
2 Chapter 4 reviews the empirical literature on herding.
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other side, the dispersion of beliefs is proxy for the reliability of the
new information, and therefore, proxy for an environment prone to
informational-based herding to arise.
The full picture is as follows.
According to the Self-Selection hypothesis (Ikenberry and Ram-
nath, 2002), managers split their shares because they have a preferred
trading range price which they wish to realign their price to, as it is
costly for the company, management and investors to lie in a lower
range. Managers will therefore split their shares if they are optimistic
about the future growth performance of the company, as much as nec-
essary to hold the risk of the share price going below the lower limit of
the trading range.
A positive market reaction to the announcement of a stock split is
consistent with this theory, as the event conveys positive information.
However, the split also conveys the optimism of the managers, which the
market cannot perfectly evaluate. Hence, we observe a timid reaction,
extended in the long run with increasing prices.
According to this theory and connecting it with the di¤erences of
opinion literature, we investigate the impact of the announcement of
splits on market expectations and vice-versa, considering the following
conjectures:
Conjecture 1 Positive changes in mean of the forecasts estimates,
negative changes in dispersion and correction of estimates error after
the event will conrm a signalling model of splits.
Conjecture 2 If the stock split event is signalling positive informa-
tion, we expect the market to react at the announcement with positive
abnormal returns.
15
Conjecture 3 If the event conveys uncertain information, we expect
prices to underreact and the abnormal returns to be related to the quality
of the information, proxied by the dispersion of beliefs.
The presence of informational content in the split event motivates
the analysis of whether an abnormal level of informational-based herd-
ing is present at the announcement of the event. If the event, in
fact, conveys positive information together with the optimism of man-
agers, this is an ideal condition for informational-based herding to arise
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Informational cascades
arise when agents are facing decisions in uncertain environments. Ac-
cording to the model of Avery and Zemsky (1998), in nancial markets,
with an e¢ cient price mechanism, cascades can still incur if there is at
least a two-dimensional uncertainty. If investors are facing decisions
when only uncertainty on the value of the asset is present, the e¢ cient
price mechanism and rational agents are enough to prevent cascades
from forming. If, instead, we add a second dimension of uncertainty,
then the market is uncertain not only of the new value but also whether
the value of the stock has actually changed from the expectations, and
in these conditions herding can arise. In particularly extreme cases, if
we include a third dimension of uncertainty on the average accuracy of
tradersinformation, herding can also result in grave mispricing e¤ects.
We can assume that an event that conveys both positive informa-
tion about a change in value of the company together with the optimism
of managers is introducing at least a two dimensional uncertainty on
the new value of the shares; whether the change in value really oc-
curred or whether it was merely caused by the overcondence of the
management.
With this background, if the dispersion of beliefs can be considered
16
as a proxy for the quality of the information that reaches the mar-
ket, informational-based herding will be detected by a positive relation
between herding and dispersion of beliefs.
Chan, Hwang and Mian (2005) examine the relation between herd-
ing of mutual funds and dispersion of analystsearnings forecasts, show-
ing that the level of herding in individual stocks is positively related to
the dispersion measure. This is due to the fact that dispersion in an-
alystsforecasts is a measure of disagreement among security analysts,
that indicates the level of reliability of the information available to
market participants about the future prospects of a company. Empiri-
cal evidence also shows that forecast dispersion is positively associated
with other measures of a rms fundamental risk such as market beta,
past earnings variability, and stock return variability (Diether, Malloy
and Scherbina, 2002). Forecast dispersion also reveals additional di-
mensions of a rms information risk not captured by other measures
(Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens, 1998).
The last implication is that, if investors herd because there is lack
of reliable information about a rm, as in informational cascades or
reputational herding models, we should observe a positive relationship
between the level of herding and the dispersion in forecasts.3
Conjecture 4 In the presence of informational based herding, we ex-
pect herding to be higher when the dispersion of beliefs among analysts
is higher.
3 On the other hand, if mutual fund managers herd because they observe corre-
lated signals, as is postulated in models of investigative herding (Hirshleifer, Sub-
rahmanyam and Titman (1994)), we should observe a negative relationship between
the level of herding and dispersion in analystsforecasts.
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If all the previous conjectures are veried, we expect a di¤erent level
of herding between companies that split their stocks and companies that
do not, and that this di¤erence has an informational content, explained
by the dispersion of beliefs among analysts.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 2 introduces the main theories on stock splits, connecting them
to the empirical evidence behind their validation. The empirical liter-
ature has observed abnormal behaviour of splitting companies in the
period before the announcement of the event. Evidence of high rates of
returns before the announcement, due to abnormal increases in earn-
ings and dividends (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987) are consistent with the
theory that managers seek to realign the per share price to a preferred
range, given market and industry considerations.
Besides, there is evidence that markets react favorably to the an-
nouncement of the event, reporting positive excess returns (Ikenberry,
Rankine and Stice, 1996). This positive market reaction has motivated
the Signalling hypothesis, according to which, managers split in order
to convey their favorable private information to the market.
Both these ndings, altogether with the evidence that the market
reaction is dragged in the long run, are consistent with the Self-Selection
hypothesis (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).
Chapter 3 is an empirical study on a sample of US stock splits from
1993 to 2005, based on the Self-Selection hypothesis. We investigate
stock splits and the abnormal market reaction in the light of changes
in market expectations. Firstly, we investigate the link between stock
18
splits and market expectations, looking at changes in the distribution of
the analystsearnings forecasts around the announcement or the occur-
rence of stock splits. A positive change in mean and a negative change
in dispersion would conrm the signaling model of stock splits (Bren-
nan and Copeland, 1988b, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996). The
results show an increase in the mean, but also a slight increase in dis-
persion. Moreover, we analyze the link between stock splits and prices,
with an event study on the market reaction after the announcement
and the occurrence of stock splits. Estimating the normal returns with
a four-factor model (Carhart, 1997), we observe signicant abnormal
returns for splitting companies after the events. These results conrm
previous literature, which concludes that the stock split is interpreted
by the market as an event carrying positive but noisy information.
The relation between noisy information and market reaction is ver-
ied by a nal step, examining the link between market expectations
and prices. We regress the CARs on the dispersion of beliefs, nding
evidence of a positive relation between them.
The results of this chapter motivates the next, namely the analysis
of the relationship between stock splits and informational-based herd-
ing.
Chapter 4 introduces the literature on institutional herding. The
primary focus is on the empirical works, looking at the principal mea-
sures developed and the main ndings on herding among institutional
investors. Nevertheless, we briey introduce the most important theo-
retical families of models.
The main question in the literature is whether herding among in-
stitutional investors can have an ine¢ cient impact on the market vari-
ables and leads to excess volatility and market fragility. Most of the
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empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between the direction of
herding and the future short term returns (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999),
which is consistent with a positive stabilizing e¤ect. However, recent
papers show a destabilizing e¤ect on prices, as herding helps to predict
reversals in long term returns (Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo, 2010).
Theoretical and empirical literature on this subject are hard to
connect, due to the lack of data on the private signals of the investors.
In most empirical works, herding is therefore broadly dened in terms of
correlated behaviour across individuals, independent of the underlying
motivations to it and any coordination mechanism among agents. We
will focus on the developments in this eld of research, reviewing two
of the most widely used measures of herding, with their subsequent
improvements and applications: the Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) measure and the beta developed by Sias (2004).
Chapter 5 is an empirical analysis examining whether splitting com-
panies are more susceptible to the herding phenomenon than the rest of
the market and what the motivations are for this di¤erence. Using the
same sample of US splits from 1993 to 2005, we investigate the presence
of market herding, proxied by the level of correlation among investors
decisions, applying the methodology developed by Sias (2004). The re-
sults show positive and signicant correlations between the fraction of
investors buying this quarter and the fraction in the previous quarter,
in any period of analysis. Restricting the analysis to splitting stocks,
we observe a tiny di¤erence in the correlation coe¢ cients. Cleaning
this measure by the inuence of common factors other than intentional
herding, we see an increase in the di¤erence between the two groups.
The last part of the analysis investigates the motivations behind
this level of potential herding, consistently with the theoretical litera-
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ture. In particular, we focus on the investigation of informational-based
herding (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Scharfstein and
Stein, 1990) with respect to positive-feedback models (Gompers and
Metrick, 2001, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995). Imposing and
testing specic hypotheses for each theoretical model, we discriminate
the contributions of the di¤erent types to the overall correlation. We
observe the strong presence of all these theoretical types, in particu-
lar, institutional investors tend to be a¤ected by informational-based
herding when trading on splitting companies and the di¤erence in herd-
ing between the two groups is due, in the most part, to informational
content and the dispersion of beliefs.
These results conrm the previous conjectures, yet, there is a sig-
nicant and relevant part of the correlation that is not explained by
these models.
Chapter 6 draws the conclusion of the thesis.
Chapter 2
A literature review on stock
splits
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the main theoretical and empirical literature
on stock splits. A stock split is a corporate event that increases the
number of shares outstanding in a company, without having a direct
e¤ect on the market capitalization or on the ownership basis.1 Existing
shares are divided into multiple shares distributed in proportion to the
existing shareholders, yet the total dollar value of the shares remains
1 Stock splits and stock dividends are a very old phenomenon, since the East
India Company in the XVII century decided to split its dividend at the height
of its trading success (Angel, 1997). However, except for some notable historical
examples, splitting stocks became very popular at the beginning of the 20th century
after the First World War, and has remained prevalent, especially in periods of boom
markets.
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the same as the pre-split amount. It is therefore dened as a "cos-
metic" event. However, despite its simplicity, there is evidence that
the announcement of a stock split is accompanied by puzzling e¤ects
and disagreement regarding the real motivations. Thus, although it is
not clear why managers are willing to sustain the real costs of these -
nancial manipulations, conversely, the market appears to react to some
hidden information conveyed by the event. Moreover, the apparent
market reaction tends to be incomplete and biased.
The eld of literature that focuses on the "anomalies" of the Ef-
cient Market Hypothesis is particularly vivacious in the analysis of
whether the markets reaction to events-driven information is unbi-
ased. The most fascinating among the self-selected corporate events is
the stock split, because of its apparent lack of directly observable e¤ects
on companiescash ows, ownership structure or risk characteristics.
As such, it appears to be the purest kind of data for event studies on
the e¢ ciency of the markets, starting with the empirical analysis of
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969).
Empirical and theoretical literature is well connected. However,
there is not full agreement, both on the theoretical motivation that
could explain all the anomalies around stock split announcements and
on the methodologies required to investigate such anomalies.
Regarding the pre-split window, there is robust evidence of high
rates of returns before the announcement, due to abnormal increases in
earnings and dividends (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Asquith, Healy and
Palepu, 1989). These price run-ups can be determined by the specic
characteristics of the company or by a general good moment in the
markets. In fact, the number of splits increases in periods of boom and
optimism in the markets. In addition, the announcement is generally
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preceded by high and abnormal trading volumes, especially in the few
months immediately before the declaration.
These ndings in part motivate the development of the Trading
Range hypothesis of stock splits, whereby managers seek to realign the
per share price to a preferred range, which is determined by market
and industry considerations.
Besides, splits can positively inuence the wealth of shareholders.
There is in fact evidence that markets react favorably to the announce-
ment of the event, reporting positive excess returns (Grinblatt, Masulis
and Titman, 1984, McNichols and Dravid, 1990, Bar-Yosef and Brown,
1977). Such behaviour is consistent with an event conveying good in-
formation. Some evidence shows that this abnormal performance does
not only happen at the announcement, when the implicitly good in-
formation should become public and thus incorporated in the prices,
but that there is also a positive reaction around the ex date (Eades,
Hess and Kim, 1984, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986, Grinblatt, Ma-
sulis and Titman, 1984, Lamoureux and Poon, 1987, Nayar and Roze¤,
2001). Moreover, we also observe also future abnormal increases in the
future company earnings (Fama et al., 1969, McNichols and Dravid,
1990), even if there is not agreement on the cause- e¤ect relationship
between splits and earnings (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987, Huang, Liano
and Pan, 2006).
The positive reaction of the market at the announcement of a stock
split is consistent with the Signalling hypothesis, which posits that
managers aim to convey favorable private information to the market
about the positive future performance of a company.
We also report empirical ndings of market reaction in the long
run, which reveals that the market underreacts to the announcement of
24
stock splits, as there is evidence of positive returns in the long run event-
window (Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996, Ikenberry and Ramnath,
2002, Desai and Jain, 1997).2 Their results are not incompatible with
both the trading range hypothesis and the signalling hypothesis, as they
also nd as well both pre-event price run-ups and short term positive
market reactions.
The Self-Selection hypothesis is consistent with all the previous
ndings as it assumes that managers prefer the stock to lie within
a certain trading range price. However, as it is costly for it to lie
below that level, only managers that are optimistic about the future
performance of their companies will opt for splitting as a method of
conveying their private information to the public. The market will
then underreact both to the positive information about the companies,
and also to the optimism of the management.
There is evidence of increasing analysts coverage after the an-
nouncement of stock splits, due to higher prots or promotional ac-
tivities by market makers (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). This result is
consistent with the Attention hypothesis, which states that managers
undertake stock splits in order to attract the attention of analysts and
market makers. However, the documented rise in coverage is not signif-
icantly di¤erent from matching nonsplitting companies (Ikenberry and
Ramnath, 2002).
Other theories are developed by the literature, but with weaker
empirical support. The Tick- Preference hypothesis assume that the
managers aim to maintain the relative tick size within a certain range.
2 See the works of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam (1998) for a theoretical contribution on underreaction, to which
the ndings on splits are consistent.
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Finally, the Tax- Timing option (Lamoureux and Poon, 1987) is based
on the tax opportunities given to rms, that can compensate long term
gains with short- term losses.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 will review the
main theoretical motivations of stock splits. Then, Section 3 will exam-
ine at the empirical methodologies developed by the literature in order
to investigate the market reaction of splits. Finally, Section 4 will re-
view the main empirical results, focusing in particular on the market
reaction.
2.2 Theoretical motivations
There are two main questions which the literature focuses on: why
managers spend e¤ort and resources to manage the unit price of their
stocks and why the market pays attention to it and subsequently re-
acts. There are various proposed theories, although none of them is
able to comprehensively unify the empirical evidence and denitively
answer both questions. In the following, we will briey look at the main
theories, such as: 1) the Trading Range hypothesis, 2) the Signalling
hypothesis, 3) the Attention hypothesis, 4) the Self-Selection hypothe-
sis, 5) the Tick Size hypothesis, and 6) the Tax-Timing hypothesis.
2.2.1 Trading Range hypothesis
The Trading Range hypothesis is one of the explanations most sup-
ported by academics and practitioners. It suggests that managers seek
26
to realign the per share price to a preferred range, in view of market
and industry considerations (Dennis and Strickland, 2003; Dhar, Shep-
herd and Goetzmann, 2004; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Muscarella and
Vetsuypens, 1996; So and Tse, 2000).
At rst, earlier surveys of the managersmotivations to split sup-
port this theory. Among the explicit reasons to split, managers cite
the attempt to balance the preferences of di¤erent classes of investors,
to improve the marketability and liquidity of the stocks (Baker and
Powell, 1993, Baker and Gallagher, 1980), to improve the controllabil-
ity of the company by obtaining a wider ownership by small investors
and to answer to particular industry norms (So and Tse, 2000). An-
gel (1997) shows that the average price per share on the US markets
has not changed on average between 1943 and 1994, which is consis-
tent with the preference of management to remain within an optimal
trading range.
This theory assumes that the announcement of a stock split is pre-
ceded by an abnormal increase in the share price such that it becomes
too costly or inopportune to remain in a too high target of investors.
At this moment, managers decide to optimize the level of their share
price, considering the trade-o¤ between the costs for big investors and
institutions and the benets for small investors. In fact, a lower price
would imply higher brokerage fees for big investors who would be in-
vesting the same large amount of money in a higher number of shares.
Conversely, it could decrease the transaction costs for small investors,
increasing the liquidity and the marketability of stocks.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis investigate both prior-event price
run-ups and the distance between the pre-split price of the company
and the price of comparable rms.
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Lakonishok and Lev (1987) construct a model where the target
price is function of a market-wide average price, an industry-wide aver-
age price and the rm-specic price. The decision of managers then de-
pends on the average level of prices in the market and industry, and the
di¤erence between the pre-split price and the benchmark median share
price of companies with the same characteristics. Another condition
consistent with the Trading Range hypothesis is a high split factor.3 A
small factor would not motivate the costly action by managers to split
in order to move the share price within an optimal range. In particular,
if managers expect prices to continue to rise after the split as well, the
factor has to be su¢ ciently high to maintain the desired range for a
long period of time.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) test this model looking at whether the
post-split price is dependent on the level of comparable environments,
using a sample of splits from 1963 to 1982. At the same time, they
check for signalling on future dividends as a control factor, examining
the growth in earnings and in cash dividends.
Their results show an abnormal positive behaviour in the period
preceding the splits, with statistically signicant di¤erences in the earn-
ings growth rates between splitting and control companies. The di¤er-
ences widen as the date of the announcement approaches. Then they
diminish in the post-split period and remain signicant for only one
year after the event. The same time pattern can be drawn for the price
gap that exists before the split, which also narrows and then vanishes
one year after the event. This conrms the hypothesis that a normal
trading range is reached after the splits and that further abnormalities
stop.
3 The split factor is the ratio between the number of new shares issued for one
old share.
28
In their analysis of the dividend growth rates, they also nd the
same pattern pre- and post-event, although it is less intense. In the
post-split period, the di¤erences in dividend growth rates are signi-
cant for the following ve years, however they do narrow after the rst
period. This is motivated by the fact that expectations of a constant
growth are theoretically unrealistic in a rational market. Taking this
into consideration, splits can then be seen at most as reassuring signals
that the market will stabilize and that there will be no price reversals
in the near future, similar to the conclusions previously drawn by Fama
et al. (1969).
Finally, systematic and signicant di¤erences in trading volumes
appear one year before the split and peak at month zero. Again, these
e¤ects vanish in an event window within two months after the event.
Thus, the announcement of the event generates a rise in trading volume,
which is still abnormal but is lower than in the period preceding the
split, and which is not permanent. This large volume can however be
attributed to the unusual operational performance.
These relations are not universally veried by empirical research,
as we have seen previously, and complications arise when researchers
checked for improved marketability and liquidity, as we will see in the
last section.
2.2.2 Signalling hypothesis
The Signalling hypothesis is based on the existence of asymmetric infor-
mation between managers and investors on the future performance and
perspectives of the company (Brennan and Copeland, 1988b; Huang,
Liano and Pan, 2006; Leung, Rui and Wang, 2005; Louis and Robinson,
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2003; McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Hwang, Keswani and Shackleton,
2005; Titman, 2002).4
Observing the positive reaction of the market at the announcement
of a stock split, the Signalling hypothesis contends that managers aim
to convey favorable private information to the market about the cur-
rent value of the rm and positive expectations regarding future per-
formance. This mechanism works under the assumption that obstacles
exist to the management which signal false positive information, such
as costs for the company or for actual and future shareholders. This
can happen with the presence of costs in holding odd lots or especially
with the presence of transaction costs (Brennan and Copeland, 1988b,
McNichols and Dravid, 1990, Nayak and Prabhala, 2001).
The drawback of this approach is that it is not widely accepted
which costs would deter managers from undertaking a stock split with-
out real and correct positive information.
Brennan and Copeland (1988b) construct a model of signalling in
a two period world, with rational agents and asymmetric information.
The underlying assumption is that a split is costly for shareholders be-
cause transaction costs are a positive function of the stock price, there-
fore the exogenous brokerage fees structure makes it costly to trade in
low-priced stocks. Hence, managers will undertake the decision only if
they truly possess positive information to share with the market. Given
this relationship, there exists an optimal price level which can minimize
the transaction costs for the investors. However, because the split it-
self is costly, this minimization cannot be realized continuously, but
managers nd it opportune to split again when they have true private
information to convey to the investors. In particular, it is both the
decision to split the shares and the size of the factor that signal infor-
4 In fact, it is usually included in the broader category of asymmetric information.
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mation (Brennan and Copeland, 1988b, Brennan and Hughes, 1991).
The model considers an optimization problem whereby managers seek
to maximize their wage, which is dependent on the true value of the
company, the transaction costs and the market assessment of the true
value after the split. So managers must decide whether to split their
share prices and at which split factor, given that they have private in-
formation, compared to investors, on the true value of the rm at the
next period.
The Signalling hypothesis is less strongly supported in literature,
when compared to other explanations, in particular when compared
with the Trading Range hypothesis.
McNichols and Dravid (1990) test both for signalling and trading
range motivations, in a sample of US splits from 1976 to 1983. They aim
to verify the e¤ectiveness of signalling, considering whether the stock
split conveys information about future earnings and whether the split
factor itself is the signal.5 Starting from the notion of signalling from
Spence (1973) and Riley (1979), they test for a fully revealing signalling
equilibrium with perfectly rational agents if three conditions subsist: (i)
the level of the signal (the stock split factor) should correspond to the
unobservable information of the managers, (ii) the agents inferences
about the private information should correspond to the level of the
signal and (iii) the agentsinferences should correspond to the level of
the unobservable information.6
First of all, they test if the split factor e¤ectively reects managers
private information about future earnings. The private information is
5 The underlying assumption is that the better the private information, the
greater the split factor.
6 In order to also check for the Trading Range hypothesis, the authors include
the hypothesis that there exist costs if the pershare price lays in di¤erent price
ranges, and these costs vary inversely with the private information of managers.
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proxied by the analystsearnings forecast error7. If a relation between
the level of signal and private information exists, the explanatory power
of the pre-split price and market value is higher than the private infor-
mation of the manager. Hence, they analyze the unexplained residuals
of the relation between the split factor choice and the pre-split share
price and the market value of the rms equity. From a Tobit regres-
sion model, they nd strong support for the Trading Range hypothesis
compared to the Signalling hypothesis. The ndings are consistent with
rms that set the split factor in order to achieve the median trading
range of the market and the target is greater for larger rms.
Secondly, McNichols and Dravid (1990) test whether the inferences
of the investors correspond to the signal. The former is measured as the
security return prediction errors in the stock distribution announcement
period. They nd evidence of a positive correlation, decomposed into
two components to address both the signal associated with the decision
to split and the signal associated with the split factor.
Finally, the third relation between the inferences and the private
information of managers consists of the opportune revision of beliefs
by the investors after the signal, corresponding to the rms future
earnings. The revision of investorsbeliefs is proxied by security return
prediction error at the announcement of the split and the rms future
earnings are proxied by the earningsforecast errors of analysts in the
pre-split period. It should be noted that this relation is only partly
veried.
7 Analists earnings forecasts error is computed as the di¤erence between the
annual earnings reported after the split and the median analystspre-split earnings
forecast
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2.2.3 Attention hypothesis
Related to the Signalling hypothesis and starting from the same as-
sumption of imperfect information between managers and investors,
another explanation is the Attention hypothesis (Grinblatt, Masulis
and Titman, 1984, Brennan and Hughes, 1991). Here, managers split-
ting their stocks aim to attract the attention of analysts and brokers,
above all, on underpriced rms and on small rms.
Consistently with this explanation, abnormal returns after the an-
nouncement of a split are bigger for small rms, which usually have
lower analysts coverage and less public information available to the
market, and they increase with the post-split price. Besides, as the
new coverage is usually tilted towards positive recommendations, a dis-
tortion can be caused by this structure of incentives.
Brennan and Hughes (1991) develop a model in which rms decide
the unit price of their shares in order to inuence and attract the at-
tention of brokers. Managers with positive private information would
nd it more convenient to have third independent parties produce pos-
itive information about their companies, rather than sharing it directly
with the investors. In actual fact, traders invest more easily in stocks
that have been promoted by brokers (Merton, 1987). A higher number
of earnings forecasts imply higher trading activities and higher broker-
age fees. Because in Brennan and Hughes (1991)s model, brokerage
fees depend on the per-share price, managers can actually inuence the
number of earnings forecasts, and consequently of traders, changing the
price through a split.
Evidence from Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Hau-
gen (1995) supports this theory and also shows that splits are signals
of underpricing to the market, suggesting in fact that the magnitude
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of market reaction should be positively correlated with the book-to-
market ratio.
If the Attention hypothesis is true, any kind of split would cause a
positive reaction given the enlargement of the analystscoverage. Ac-
tually, as evinced by Woolridge (1983) the market reacts negatively to a
reverse split announcements, and in this negative response it is possible
to see the inuence of di¤erent explanations, such as for example a com-
ponent of bad signalling.8 In addiction, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002)
nd an increase in coverage for splitting rms but it is not signicantly
di¤erent from the control non-splitting rms.
2.2.4 Self-Selection hypothesis
The previous hypotheses are not necessarily directly opposing theories,
as illustrated by the contradictory empirical evidence. There is room for
interdependence between them and many authors have tried to create
new unifying theories, in particular between the Signalling and the
Trading Range hypotheses (McNichols and Dravid, 1990, Grinblatt,
Masulis and Titman, 1984, Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).9
The most important of these unifying theories is the so called Self-
Selection hypothesis (Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996), which intro-
duces optimistic managers. Managers prefer the per-share price to lie
within a trading range, but they also have to consider that being below
8 A reverse split is a much more rare case, in which the number of shares is
decreased instead of increased and the price is multiplied.
9 The asymmetric version of the Trading Range hypothesis considers that man-
agers use the private information they own in order to set the split factor and
convey their information to the investors, but that there exist costs in falling below
the lower limit of the preferable range. In this way, investors can make better infer-
ences about the private information by observing the split factor and knowing that
the managers cannot expect the price to stay far from certain inferior support.
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this level is too costly both for the company and for the shareholders.
For this reason, managers that expect a decline in the stock price would
probably not undertake a split operation, whereas optimistic managers
would be more likely to. This means that the positive information con-
tained in the event is actually the optimism of the management about
the future performance of the company.
Evidence of managers being a¤ected by optimism and overcon-
dence can be found in behavioural economics literature and in its psy-
chological background. It is probable that agents with expertise and
professionalism can end up with decisions that are biased in terms of the
inferred probability of success of their decisions or ability. Given this
background, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) and Ikenberry and
Ramnath (2002) assume that managers are more likely to be biased
towards optimism, as they are the experts and professionals in their
company. This bias causes the market to underreact to the announce-
ment of the event. Investors would timidly update their expectations
because although they know that managers are signalling good private
information, they are also aware that they are biased with optimism.
Investors are therefore uncertain as to the weight to put on the event.
Their acting with prudence would cause positive returns of adjustment
would be caused in the long run.
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) analyze a sample of 2-to-1
splits from 1975 to 1990 nding evidence of positive excess returns in
the announcement period and in the long run, consistent with both the
Signalling hypothesis and the underreaction literature.
Some of the results coming from their analysis conrm previous
works, both on the Trading Range and the Signalling hypotheses. They
observe pre-event price run-ups and abnormal returns, and a relation
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between general conditions of the market and the number of announce-
ments. Moreover, they conrm that the post-split price10, is close to
the median of comparably sized rms, consistently with the Trading
Range hypothesis. Besides, they nd a positive reaction of the market
in the post-event window, in accordance with the Signalling hypothesis
and underreaction. More precisely, they nd that favorable informa-
tion is incorporated into the price in the long run, and within one year
the positive excess returns are still not reversed. These results conrm
the Self-Selection hypothesis and underreaction due to the optimism
of the management. This is in contradiction to the ndings of Fama
et al. (1969) that consider the market reaction immediately unbiased
and complete, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) and then Desai and
Jain (1997) support the idea of underreaction.11
Moreover, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) further reinforce these
ndings. Once it is proven that the market underreacts to stock splits,
the next research question is to ascertain what the market is reacting
to. Two possible explanations consider the contribution of analysts. Ei-
ther, investors fail to anticipate new analystscoverage, which is usually
optimistic, or they are slow to revise their expectations about future
performance (which analystsforecasts are supposed to be proxies for).
The rst hypothesis comes from the general suggestion that man-
agers split their stocks in order to draw the attention of analysts and
convey news to the markets. Ikenberry et al. dismiss this explanation
10 Post-split price is measured as the pre-split price divided by the split factor
(as the target).
11 However, there has been some notable criticism regarding the empirical ev-
idence on underreaction. The main objections are concerns about the spurious
results of such analysis, about the joint test hypothesis problem, famously reported
by Fama (1998) and due to the absence of a robust asset pricing model to accurately
compare the abnormal returns.
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of underreaction, because they nd that the increase in the analysts
coverage after a stock split is not so relevant when compared to the rise
in coverage by the benchmark rms.
Actually, the e¤ect of analystsforecasts appears to be more rele-
vant in the creation of expectations, which is consistent with the Self-
Selection hypothesis. This is because, as it is more likely that optimistic
managers would split their stocks than pessimistic ones, they would
also be more likely to want to draw the attention of analysts to their
positive expectations about future returns. On the market side, both
investors and analysts are slow to incorporate these optimistic expecta-
tions into their own earnings forecasts. This causes underreaction. The
evidence of the authors validates this hypothesis. Considering the fore-
cast accuracy, such as measuring the error between the estimation of
the next annual earnings and the actual value, they nd that analysts
tend to underestimate future earnings of splitting rms even up until
three days before the earnings release, when compared with a control
group of rms.
2.2.5 Preferred Tick Size hypothesis
The Preferred Tick Size hypothesis starts from the trading range mo-
tivation, adding a di¤erent and more sophisticated explanation. In the
markets in which the minimum price variation is xed by the exchange
rules, companies nd it advantageous and are able to change their rel-
ative tick sizes in order to optimize it and benet from its advantages
(Angel, 1997, Harris, 1994, Arnold and Lipson, 1997). Mainly, the ad-
vantages of tick size are related to concepts of bounded rationality and
the discreteness, and to the usage of heuristics that simplies decisional
37
problems.
According to Harris (1994), there are four main reasons for the
optimal relative tick size to be di¤erent from zero. To begin with, dis-
creteness reduces the cost of negotiating for investors because it simpli-
es the tradersinformation sets and the possible outcomes, reducing
the time spent for a trade and the possibility of potential trading er-
ror costs. Secondly, a large tick size should encourage market makers
to quote this stock and create liquidity, because of the rise in bid-ask
spread, and should therefore provide incentives to brokers to cover and
promote the company. Thirdly, it attracts the desired clientele. Fi-
nally, investors have incentives to use limit orders, because a high tick
size enforces time and price priority with the advantage of increasing
liquidity.
Schultz (2000) tests the previous assumptions on intra-day data. He
nds that the number of trades cancelled because of errors decreases
after the splits. Moreover, he reports a rise in the shareholder base,
because brokers are incentivized to promote companies with a relatively
higher tick size.
The drawbacks of a higher tick size can be found in the increase in
transaction costs. Copeland (1979) reports a rise in the relative bid- ask
spread after the event. It could have the opposite e¤ect on liquidity and
improve the competition among brokers, eroding the prot margins.
Also, Angel (1997) provides a similar model and an empirical test of
this theory. He argues that an optimal relative tick size helps companies
to balance the benets of increased liquidity and the higher costs paid
by liquidity demanders. However, Lipson and Mortal (2006) run a nat-
ural experiment, looking at any changes in the split activity when the
minimum tick size changes in an exchange. Hence, they investigate the
e¤ect of splits in sub-periods delimited by changes in the absolute tick
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size. They do not nd any signicant di¤erence across the tick-regime
samples in ownership structure or trade size. Moreover, practitioners
do not explicitly cite tick size among the motivations for splits.12
2.2.6 Tax- Timing option
The last theory we will consider is the Tax- Timing option (Lamoureux
and Poon, 1987). This hypothesis is based on the US tax code in the
80s where preferential treatment was given to long term capital gain,
and short term capital losses could be used to o¤set short term gains.
Investors were willing to pay for a tax option component, therefore
higher volatilities had higher values (Constantinides, 1984). Thus, the
increase in volume succeeding a split, can have a positive impact on the
noise and on the non-systematic risk. Because of the tax option, the
rise in volatility from a split would increase the value of the rm and
subsequently reduce the required rate of return. Therefore, stock splits
are a mechanism for the management to raise the tax option value
of stock. Furthermore, the nature of the stock clientele will change
because tax exempt investors will nd the stock less desirable.
However, it is important to note that after the changes in the US
tax code in 1987, the number of splits on the markets did not decrease,
as would have been expected if applying this theory (Dhatt, Kim and
Mukherji, 1997).
12 However, this can be implicit in their behavior and can be confused between
causes and e¤ects of the preferred trading range.
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2.3 Methodology of empirical analysis on
stock splits
We have seen the main explanations proposed by the literature regard-
ing the stock splits phenomenon. However, there is no single hypothesis
that meets the general acceptance of researchers and really answers the
questions as to whether stock splits are informative to the markets and
what kind of information the market reacts to. The explanations are
too broad, and it is di¢ cult to delineate widely acceptable elements
and implications to test, and to directly observe the information to test
them. We have seen many empirical works end up with completely op-
posite conclusions because of noisy proxies, di¤erent sampling decisions
or dissimilar methodologies.
Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) consider the e¤ect of methodological
or sampling di¤erences on the conclusions drawn, particularly in regard
to long term abnormal returns.
Also Byun and Roze¤ (2003) analyze the contradictions among the
empirical ndings, looking at the impact of di¤erent methodologies and
sampling decisions on detecting long run e¤ects.13
We have seen that splits look like a very uncomplicated event for
traders to analyze, because of the absence of direct links to company
or market variables and due to the long history of the econometric
methodology used to study the e¤ects of corporate events, since Fama
et al. (1969). The event study is the methodology developed to ana-
lyze the impact of exogenous events on the performance of the market,
13 We concentrate on the empirical literature on abnormal returns that is the
area of most interest for the following analysis, and not on the debate about risk or
liquidity.
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comparing the returns e¤ectively veried after the splits, with the "nor-
mal performance" as if the splits had not occurred. The choice of the
method and model to better measure these unconditional returns de-
pends on the specics of the analysis to be conducted and its function
is crucial to adjust returns for the risk.
If the objective of the analysis is the short term abnormal returns,
the econometrics of the event studies is well developed and leads to
widely accepted inferences with a satisfactory power of the statistics.14
In fact, the risk adjustment in the short term is not much related
to the choice of the model used to measure the normal returns, and a
standard market model or a constant-mean model are su¢ cient, with-
out the necessity of any sophistication (Brown, Lockwood and Lummer,
1985).
We will now consider some of the methods used by the empirical
research on stock splits to test for unexpected components in returns
in the short period around the announcement or the ex dates.
The rst methodological choice is how to measure the abnormal
performance. Given an event period t, where t = 0 is the date of the
stock split, and a splitting company i, the abnormal return of i can be
measured using market-model abnormal returns or market- adjusted
abnormal returns. According to the former one, the abnormal perfor-
mance is estimated in comparison with the return of a market portfolio.
The expected return of company i at period t is estimated as:
Rit = bi + biRmt (2.3.1)
where Rmt is the return on a market index, usually either CRSP
14 This methodology has its milestones in the works, among others, of Cambpell,
Lo and MacKinlay (1998), Brown andWarner (1980/1985), Barber and Lyon (1986),
Khotari and Warner (2006).
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value- or equal- weighted indexes.
Then, the abnormal return is equal to the di¤erence between the
observed return for company i at time t, Rit, and the expected return,
Rit, as:
ARit = Rit   (bi + biRmt) (2.3.2)
Market- adjusted abnormal returns models focus instead simply on
the di¤erence between the observed returns for security i in period t and
the returns from a market index that represents the market portfolio
performance, such as the CRSP value- or equal- weighted index or an
S&P index for the same event period t, Rmt:
ARit = (Rit  Rmt) (2.3.3)
Once the model to measure the abnormal returns has been chosen,
another methodological choice considers the aggregation of the abnor-
mal returns, whether cross-sectionally and/or in time series. In time
series, there are two aggregation methods that both correspond to the
changes in wealth around the stock split dates given by the strategy
to buy the splitting stocks at the beginning of the event period  1 and
then holding them through to the end of  2.
The Cumulative Average Residual method (CAR), recommended
by Fama (1998) measures the abnormal performance as the sum of the
average abnormal performances for each period in the event window:
CAR( 1;  2) =
2X
t=1
wt  ARt (2.3.4)
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The Buy-and-Hold approach (Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999)) sug-
gests to compound each securitys return in the event period T , mea-
suring the abnormal returns as the di¤erence between the observed
portfolio compounded returns and the normal portfolio compounded
returns:
BHARi =
TY
t=1
(1 +Rit) 
TY
t=1
(1 +Rmt) (2.3.5)
The aggregation then consists of determining the performance mea-
sure BHAR as an average of the compounded abnormal returns:
BHAR =
NX
i=1
wi BHARi (2.3.6)
Fama et al. (1969) were among the rst authors to use an event
study methodology which is very similar to modern methods, analyz-
ing a sample of stock splits in the US markets from 1927 to 1959. They
use a standard market model approach to measure the abnormal per-
formance of the splitting rms in order to separate the e¤ects of market
movements.
They pay attention to the behaviour of the cross-sectional averages
of the estimated residuals in the months surrounding the split dates,
from the 29th month before to the 30th month after the ex date. The
market model regresses linearly the (log) monthly rate of returns on
the individual security j on the corresponding monthly (log) returns
for the market, represented by Lt:
lnRjt = j + j lnLt + ujt (2.3.7)
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They show that the assumptions of a linear regression model are sat-
ised and, in order to eliminate the specication error from the months
in which the residuals are not zero (the months close to the event), the
authors exclude these periods from the estimation window.15
The abnormal returns are then averaged and cumulated for the
event window with the CAR approach, and then compared in groups,
focusing on characteristics of the companies, such as the next increasing
or decreasing released dividends.
The alternative approach is to directly compare the Buy-and-Hold
returns on the splitting companys portfolio with some market indexes,
usually the CRSP equal- or value- weighted indexes or the S&P indexes.
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) analyze the market reaction around
the announcement of a sample of splits from 1975 to 1990. They mea-
sure 5-day market adjusted abnormal returns, as the di¤erence between
the 5-day holding period returns for the splitting rms and the 5-day
holding period return on the CRSP value-weighted index. Signicance
levels are assessed using cross-sectional standard errors.
On the other side, for long run abnormal returns there are no com-
pletely satisfactory methods or well specied test statistics. It is espe-
cially unclear which return model is correct because the risk adjustment
is a very delicate matter when we take into account an event window
longer than one year. In a quite hopeless mood, Fama (1998, pag. 291)
states that "all models for expected returns are incomplete descriptions
of the systematic patterns in average returns." In the recent empirical
analysis, the common choice is to include the asset pricing three-factor
15 No serious serial dependence is found in the residuals, and they also verify for
linearity and homoscedasticity. Instead, the normality assumption is not veried,
because the distribution is closer to a stable Paretian family: in any case, the authors
use the OLS as the estimation technique, which is still unbiased and consistent.
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model from Fama and French (1993) or the four-factor model, with the
addiction of momentum, from Carhart (1997).
Then, there are two main methods to measure the post-event risk
adjusted performance in a modern event study (Khotari and Warner,
2006): the Characteristic- based matching approach (Barber and Lyon,
1997) and the Calendar Time portfolio approach (Ja¤e, 1974, Man-
delker, 1974).
The Characteristic- based matching approach (or buy-and-hold ab-
normal returns approach - BHAR) bypasses the problem of the correct
asset pricing model, because it requires the determination of a bench-
mark of companies with similar characteristics, from which to compare
the results of the splitting portfolio. These similar characteristics are
usually identied by industry, size, book-to-market and momentum.
Abnormal returns for the company i are then calculated as the di¤er-
ences between the total rate of return of the splitting stock i in event
period T and the average of the benchmark portfolio total return for
period T :
BHARi =
TY
t=1
(1 +Rit) 
TY
t=1
(1 +Rbt) (2.3.8)
The aggregation of the individual abnormal returns cross- section-
ally can be measured by an equal- or a value- weighted average:
BHAR =
NX
i=1
wi BHARi (2.3.9)
where wi = 1N in the case of equal weights or at the market value
of stock i in the value- weighted average. On this regard, Fama (1998)
suggests the value-weighted average, because it is a closer reection of
the realistic way that investors judge their portfolios, while Loughran
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and Ritter (2000) prefer the equal-weighted approach to spread the
emphasis across all the companies.
The test statistics are usually constructed with the bootstrapping
approach: the benchmark portfolios are replicated to produce random
bootstrapped pseudo-portfolios in order to obtain the benchmark dis-
tribution (Barber and Lyon, 1997).
The Calendar Time portfolio approach (or Jensens Alpha) instead
requires the assumption of the validity of an underlying asset pricing
model. In recent years, the most common choice has been the market
model or the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), or extended
with the fourth factor as Carhart (1997).
At calendar period t, the average abnormal returns, CTARt; are
calculated for all the sample rms that have announced a split. The
CTARt are equal to the di¤erence between the period returns on the
portfolio of event rms at calendar time t and the expected normal
returns on the event portfolio at the same time t:
CTARt = Rpt   E(Rpt) (2.3.10)
The normal return can for example be estimated using the four-
factor model, therefore, the expected excess return would be equal to:
Rpt Rft = i+1(Rmt Rft)+2SMBt+3HMLt+4PR1Y Rt+"it
(2.3.11)
where (Rmt   Rft) is the excess return of the market portfolio on
the risk free return, SMBt, HMLt, PR1Y Rt are the excess returns
on portfolios mimicking the size e¤ect, the book-to- market and the
momentum e¤ects respectively. After regressing the monthly portfolio
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excess returns on the four variables, the intercept is the measure of
excess performance.
The test statistics are calculated with the estimated parameters
from the time series of monthly standardized CTARs.
As we can see, there are many choices to be made regarding the
empirical research, concerning the asset pricing model to measure nor-
mal returns, the aggregation method and the weights for the average of
abnormal returns, without considering sampling decisions. Byun and
Roze¤ (2003) analyze long historical data about stock splits to give
unity to the methodology and the sampling and in order to test for
market e¢ ciency, trying to solve the contradictory results of previous
analyses. Among others, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), us-
ing a calendar time approach, conrm the absence of any abnormal
behaviour, while Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996), Desai and Jain
(1997) and Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) instead reach the opposite
conclusions using a BHAR approach.
Byun and Roze¤ (2003) use di¤erent approaches and choices to the
sample periods from 1927 to 1996 and nd no evidence of abnormal
reaction. For example, they compare their analysis conducted with
BHAR and value- weighted average abnormal returns with the analysis
of Desai and Jain (1997) that instead use an equal- weighted BHAR
approach.
The problem is even more complex, as Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice
(1996) already positively check the robustness of their results using
both the BHAR method and the Calendar Time approach. Using the
benchmark technique of matching each splitting company with a control
rm which displays the same characteristics of market capitalization,
book-to-market and momentum, they nd a signicant positive drift
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that characterizes underreaction in a sample of splits from 1988 to
1997 (Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996), Desai and Jain (1997) use
the same method). These results are also conrmed by the second
approach, using a Calendar Time method, that applies the three-factor
model of Fama and French (1993) as a normal return model. In this
case, the di¤erence in results reached by Byun and Roze¤ (2003) seems
to be attributed to the construction of the benchmark portfolios, based
solely on a size dimension in order to enlarge the sample.
2.4 Empirical evidence
We have seen that the rst authors to study the phenomenon of stock
splits using modern methods are Fama et al. (1969). Because of the
simplicity of the stock split event, they aim to investigate the E¢ cient
Market hypothesis and the process of price-adjustment after the arrival
of new pieces of information. They nd abnormal pre-event returns in
the months surrounding a sample of US splits from 1927 to 1959, but
they explained that this behaviour could still be consistent with the
market e¢ ciency theory.
In fact, according to their research, splits are usually preceded by
a period of abnormally high rates of return (on both dividends and
capital), which is especially concentrated in the two or three months
before the occurrence. After the events the returns tend to become
randomly distributed again with zero mean. This is consistent with
the motivation felt, as the market interprets splits as good information,
as an anticipation of substantial increases in dividends and then their
stabilization to the new levels. In fact, dividend announcements usually
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occur at the time of, or just after, a split.
When this information takes into account the expectations of in-
vestors, the apparent price e¤ects vanish. In recent years, Nayak and
Prabhala (2001) document that about 54% of split announcement ef-
fects can be attributed to dividend information, however, the puzzling
e¤ect of stock splits also persists in empirical analysis which is clean
of contamination from other distributions (Grinblatt, Masulis and Tit-
man, 1984).
In addiction, but without a robust argument, Fama et al. (1969)
consider that this adjustment process is so rapid that splits can in no
way be used to increase trading prots, conrming the non-systematic-
prots implication of the E¢ cient Market Hypothesis.
Other than Fama et al. (1969), many authors have carefully inves-
tigated the existence of real e¤ects on some market variables around
the announcement and other essential dates of the split, and in the long
run. However, these e¤ects are not exempt from criticism and are not
universally accepted. We report a brief review distinguishing between
pre-split evidence and post-split evidence.
2.4.1 Pre- event window
Regarding the pre-split window, there is general agreement about the
evidence of abnormal activity. Indeed, we observe high rates of returns
in the prices before the announcement, due to abnormal increases in
earnings and dividends (Fama et al., 1969, Asquith, Healy and Palepu,
1989, Lakonishok and Lev, 1987). Fama et al. (1969) analyze 940 stock
splits monthly data between 1927 and 1959, using a market model.
They nd an average excess return of 34% preceding the split. Lakon-
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ishok and Lev (1987) study more recent stock splits, from 1953 to 1982,
which show evidence of a signicant abnormal return (an average of 53%
in the 5 years pre-event and 47% in the year prior to the split). Also,
Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989) uses a market- adjusted approach
nding excess returns of 56.8% in the years 1970-1980.
In addition, the announcement of this event is preceded by high
and abnormal trading volumes. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) evince
a strong monotonic increase in the months closely preceding the an-
nouncement. This result is motivated by a general abnormal opera-
tional performance, but it is not a permanent e¤ect as it dies out in
the few months after the split.
These robust observations of pre-split price run-ups for splitting
stocks, as we have seen, in part motivate the will of managers to realign
the increasing prices to a normal trading range. This run-up can be
determined by specic motivations of the company or by a general good
moment in the markets: it is typical that the number of splits increases
in periods of boom and optimism in the markets (Fama et al., 1969,
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996).
2.4.2 Post- event window
Regarding the empirical evidence on the behaviour of market variables
after the announcement or realization of a split, there is much less
agreement, especially given the issues surrounding the correct method-
ology to employ, on which proxies to use and given the delicate impact
on the E¢ cient Market Hypothesis.16
16 We focus in particular on the market reaction and e¤ects on the performance
of the company, as we did in the previous section. However, we will briey consider
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Splits are considered to inuence the wealth of shareholders. Em-
pirical papers have widely shown how investors in aggregate respond
to splits. After the announcement of the splitting decision, markets
react favorably, presenting positive excess returns (Grinblatt, Masulis
and Titman, 1984, McNichols and Dravid, 1990, Fama et al., 1969, Bar-
Yosef and Brown, 1977), similar to the response to an event conveying
good information.
Fama et al. (1969) nd no abnormal post-event returns in the
months surrounding a sample of US splits from 1927 to 1959. After the
events, these returns tend to be randomly distributed again with zero
mean, and they explained that this behaviour can still be consistent
with the market e¢ ciency theory. In fact, when a split is announced,
the market interprets it as an anticipation of substantial increases in
dividends and of their stabilization at the new levels.
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) use a mean-adjusted ap-
proach to measure the post-event abnormal return in a window of 43
days, for a sample of 244 events. They are clean from the e¤ect of any
other distribution announcements in the same time window. They as-
sume that the mean of the stock returns is representative of the typical
return around the event. They nd average signicant excess returns in
the day of announcement (1.96%) and in the following day (1.33%).17
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) nd market- adjusted abnor-
mal returns around the announcement. However, the market reaction
to stock splits decreases over time (considering sub-periods of 5 years,
from 1975 to 1990, from 4.26% to 2.02%). Moreover, they nd evidence
that the abnormal return is negatively related to the size of the com-
the impact on risk, liquidity and ownership structure.
17 They also nd excess positive returns on the ex-date (0.69%) and the following
day (0.52%).
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pany, the post-split price and the book-to-market ratio. Therefore, low
book-to-market and small capitalization rms benet the most from
the split announcement.
Other evidence shows that this abnormal performance does not only
happen at the announcement, when the implicitly good information
becomes public and is aggregated into the prices, but also that there
is a positive reaction around the ex date (Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986, Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman, 1984,
Lamoureux and Poon, 1987, Nayar and Roze¤, 2001). Lamoureux and
Poon (1987) use a market return model in an estimation window of -250
to -130 days prior to the announcement of the event. They construct
t tests with an estimator of the variance in the window -120 to -60
prior to the announcement. They nd a statistically signicant average
excess return of 0.56% on the split ex-date.
Besides, there is even evidence of negative abnormal returns around
the record date, motivated by the inconvenience of holding non-splitting
shares between the record date and the ex date, as Nayar and Roze¤
(2001).18
The signicant market reaction is also evidenced in case of reverse
splits. In this case, a negative abnormal returns follows the announce-
ment of stock splits in the short run (Woolridge, 1983 reports an average
of -7% return in the days around the event).
Other analyses measure the intensity of this reaction in the long
run, suggesting that markets exhibit long term excess returns after the
announcement.
18 The record date is the day between the announcement and ex dates which
determines the ownership rights to the new shares. Buyers who become possessors
of the shares before the record date are entitled to receive the new ones, whereas
buyers of unsplitting shares after the record date have the obligation to hand in the
new shares to the old possessor.
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Earlier studies reject the hypothesis of long run e¤ects on prices.
Fama et al. (1969) report no signicant abnormality in the monthly
excess returns following the ex-date of the split. Also Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1986) nd no statistical di¤erence between the returns of
splitting rms and a control set of rms after the ex-date of the events.
The rst authors to re-consider the hypothesis are Ikenberry, Rank-
ine and Stice (1996) and Desai and Jain, 1997, who nd evidence of un-
derreaction. Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) use a buy-and-hold
approach for the three years following a split. They compare the re-
turns of an equal-weighted portfolio of splitting rms with a portfolio
of similar non-splitting companies, similar in size and book-to-market.
They use bootstrap to construct the empirical distributions for the sig-
nicance test. They nd a 7.93% signicant di¤erence in the average
returns of splitting companies one year after the split announcement,
and 12.15% in a three-year period post-event. Desai and Jain, 1997 also
nd evidence that justies the hypothesis of an initially timid reaction
by the market, that is slowly corrected, implying long run positive re-
turns. Moreover, they nd the same reaction, but with opposite signs,
for reverse splits.
The evidence of underreaction implies that the information that is
transmitted with the event is positively received. However, the reac-
tion is not immediately complete and unbiased. The news is initially
underweighted and the prices do not aggregate them at once, but they
are adjusted in the long run with a positive abnormal drift.19
This is a very delicate point, because as we have seen, there is no
agreement on the correct econometric methodology. Byun and Roz-
19 See the works of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam (1998) for a theoretical contribution on underreaction, to which
the ndings on splits are consistent.
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e¤ (2003) analyze stock splits from 1927 to 1996 using alternative
methodologies, with the aim to homogenize the di¤erent studies and
results. They nd an average excess return of 3.74% from the ex-date of
the split, using a buy-and-hold methodology with matching portfolios.
Moreover, they conrm that the e¤ect changes over time and the most
signicant average excess return is in the 1975 to 1990 window. Then,
they use a calendar-time abnormal return (as Mitchell and Sta¤ord,
2000) using both the three- factor model (Fama and French, 1993) and
the four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) to estimate normal returns. In
the rst model they nd signicant abnormal returns, even though they
are relatively small. However, when introducing the fourth factor, they
do not nd signicant abnormal returns.
Another impact on the wealth of the shareholders consists of future
abnormal increases in the company earnings. This was one of the main
e¤ects attributed to stock splits, as Fama et al. (1969), McNichols and
Dravid (1990).
Yet, similarly in this case there is no agreement within academia.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) consider this rise in earnings more as a cause
than an e¤ect of a split, showing that the fast growth in the months
preceding the announcement is quickly corrected in the few months
after, so it does not persist in the long run. Moreover, Huang, Liano
and Pan (2006) also recently report no signicant abnormal earnings
performance in the following ve years.
Splits also appear to inuence the risk of the shares. However,
the e¤ects on risk are still uncertain, because many empirical studies
suggest di¤erent and sometimes opposite conclusions, according to the
proxies used and the methodologies applied.
Dravid (1987), Ohlson and Penman (1985), Koski (1998) nd a per-
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manent increase in return volatility, estimating the daily return volatil-
ity as the expected squared daily returns. Likewise, Ohlson and Pen-
man (1985) observe an increase in risk, measured as daily variance up
until one year after the ex-date of the split, which is 30% on average.
Brennan and Copeland (1988a) nd that the systematic risk (as beta)
of these stocks also increases.
Besides, doubts arose that the results could be induced by measure-
ment error. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Blume and Stambaugh
(1983) show that bid-ask spreads and discreteness could induce up-
ward biases in the measurement of volatility. Yet, Koski (1998) report
an increase in realized volatility, clean of measurement errors. Another
example of disagreement comes from Bar-Yosef and Brown (1977), who
nd a decrease in the systematic risk of the company.
Furthermore, the impact of stock splits on liquidity and marketabil-
ity of the stocks has been carefully investigated. In fact, when managers
are asked about the motivations behind the splitting decision, the main
justications they report consider improving liquidity and marketabil-
ity of the shares and attracting a wider and more diversied pool of
investors. Articially decreasing the price of the stocks could make the
shares more accessible to small investors, allowing them to trade more
easily in round lots, or to take advantage from the improved liquidity.
All of these e¤ects consequently lead to increases in the value of the
companies (Baker and Gallagher, 1980).20
However, this is a controversial matter and the conclusions of the
academic empirical literature are not unied, as many di¤erent proxies
for liquidity and marketability are used. Two main variables are tested
for liquidity: relative bid-ask spread and trading volume.
20 See for example the reccomendation of splitting stock from a nancial analyst,
cited in McNichols and Dravid (1990), p. 858.
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Copeland (1979) nds an increase of 6.54% in the bid-ask spread
in the 20 days after the split, from 1968 to 1976. The e¤ect of this in-
crease on liquidity is mixed. This rise directly decreases the liquidity of
the stocks, and it is accompanied by simulated evidence of an increase
in brokerage fees of 7.1%. Conversely however, higher spreads in fact
encourage brokers to do research on these companies and increases the
analystscoverage (Brennan and Hughes, 1991 and Copeland, 1979).
McNichols and Dravid (1990) add that this new coverage is often pos-
itive and can be positively adapted to the small companiessituations.
Other supportive evidence of the increase in bid-ask spread are Con-
roy, Harris and Benet (1990) and Schultz (2000). The former authors,
for example, nd an increase in the relative bid-ask spread, along with
a decline in the absolute spread. Desai, Nimalendran and Venkatara-
man (1998) distinguish an adverse component from the bid-ask spread,
nding an increase in both the relative spread and the adverse infor-
mation component after the splits. Similarly, Gray, Smith and Whaley
(2003) nd that the order processing costs and inventory holding costs
increase, but that the degree of market competitiveness decreases.
Other studies use trading volume and turnover as proxies for liq-
uidity. Copeland (1979) nds that trading volume increases on a small
sample of 25 splits. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) nd an increase in
monthly turnover around the split, in comparison with matching non-
splitting companies, but it is more of a pre-event phenomenon that dies
out in the two months after the announcement. Instead, adjusting the
trading volume with general market trends, they observe a decline in
adjusted volume, following the announcement.
Finally, there is evidence of changes in the ownership basis. The
impact on the ownership structure is one of the explicit motivations
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for managers to split. In particular, splits can lead to an increase in
the number of shareholders (Lamoureux and Poon, 1987, and Maloney
and Mulherin, 1992) or to a change in the clientele of investors (Dhar,
Shepherd and Goetzmann, 2004), although the change in the pool of
investors is not clear. Some analyses show that splits are followed by
an increase in the institutional ownership of the company both in terms
of number of institutions owning the stocks and in the percentage of
shares owned by the institutions (Maloney and Mulherin, 1992, Baker
and Powell, 1993). However, there is not a signicant di¤erence between
splitting rms and control rms.
Other studies show evidence of an increase in the number of un-
informed and noise traders as well (Easley, OHara and Saar, 2001,
Admati and Peiderer, 1988, Lipson and Mortal, 2006).
The impact on informational asymmetry is also unclear: Desai,
Nimalendran and Venkataraman (1998) nd a rise in adverse selection
with a spread decomposition procedure, while Easley, OHara and Saar
(2001) conclude that there is a small decrease in adverse selection.
Chapter 3
Price impact of stock splits
and dispersion of beliefs
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to o¤er a new perspective on understanding
stock splits. We look at the market reaction to analyze whether the
announcement of such events impacts on the distribution of the ana-
lystsforecasts and whether the dispersion of forecasts impacts on the
abnormal future performance.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, a stock split is a "cosmetic"
corporate event, which does not directly result in changes in market
capitalization or to the ownership basis. Yet, managers invest resources
in splits, and the market subsequently reacts to their announcement,
as we evince from the empirical literature.
In the light of the Self-Selection hypothesis, our study aims to in-
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vestigate the underreaction to the announcement of a stock split, con-
necting it with the di¤erences of opinion among investors.
The literature on di¤erences of opinion investigates whether the
disagreement among investors a¤ects the future performance of stocks
returns. Empirical evidence shows that dispersion of beliefs is associ-
ated with measures of fundamental risk, such as market beta and stock
returns variability (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002). However,
dispersion of beliefs detects also an informational risk, not captured by
such measures. Chan, Hwang and Mian (2005) consider dispersion of
beliefs as a proxy for the reliability of the information to the market.
This is the approach relevant for our analysis, as higher disagreement
among analysts implies poor quality of the information available to the
market and therefore leading to higher returns. At the time of the
event, investors are facing uncertainty on the reliability of the new in-
formation. The increase in dispersion, together with the increase in
consensus and decrease in forecasts error, are consistent with the pres-
ence of a noisy signal in the event, that introduces a two-dimension
uncertainty on the value and on analystsaccuracy.
Our paper aims to investigate the relation between the dispersion in
analystsforecasts and market returns at the announcement of a stock
split. The idea underlying this project is that the distribution of the
forecast dispersion changes after a split and thereby can help to predict
future performance. In fact, assuming the presence of underreaction
in the markets at the announcement of stock splits (leading to long
run positive returns in the splitting company), our study evinces that
the dispersion in analystsestimates can contribute to explaining this
mispricing.
The analysis is carried out on a sample of splits which occurred in
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the US markets from 1993 to 2005, extracted from the CRSP and the
I/B/E/S databases, considering price data and analystsestimates. We
analyze three types of relations.
The rst step is to analyze the link between stock splits and market
expectations, looking at changes in analystsearnings forecasts. Pos-
itive changes in mean and negative changes in dispersion will conrm
a signalling model of splits. Therefore, we check for changes in the
distribution of the analystsforecasts around both the announcement
and the occurrence of a split. The results show an increase in the
mean of forecasts, but also a slight rise in dispersion after both the
announcement and the occurrence of a split.1 This result suggests
that an informational content is present in the event, as the estimates
error of analystsearnings forecasts decreases after the announcement.
In particular, before the event, these companies were underestimated,
with a negative forecasts error, close to signicance at 10%. After the
event, the mis-estimation is corrected as the error is on average posi-
tive but clearly not signicant. However, there is also an increase in
uncertainty, especially on the quality of information conveyed by the
event (Chan, Hwang and Mian, 2005). These results are consistent with
the Self-Selection hypothesis and the propensity for optimism by the
management of splitting companies. Optimistic managers cause uncer-
tainty in the market on the extent of the positive new information in
the event. Higher is the dispersion, poorer is the information available
to the market, so that the signals are noisy and not completely reliable.
1 The proxy for the di¤erences of opinion is the ratio between the standard
deviation of the earnings forecasts and the absolute value of the mean of these
estimates. Both the mean and the dispersion are measured in the 2 months before
the split and in the two months after (+/- 45 days from/to the event). We checked
if the e¤ect on dispersion could be contaminated by the contemporaneous increase
in coverage, using the ratio of the standard error of the estimates over the absolute
mean of the forecasts. We nd no di¤erent evidence.
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The second link we investigate is the relation between stock splits
and prices. Once we have evidenced whether a change in expectations
e¤ectively occurs, we carry out an event study on the future returns
of the splitting companies. We estimate the CARs with a four-factor
model (Carhart, 1997). We nd that a positive reaction of the market at
the announcement of the stock splits actually exists. In the 90 trading
days following the event, the abnormal component cannot be explained
by the four-factor model which we used for normal returns. These
results conrm the hypothesis of underreaction of the market to the
announcement of such events (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).
The nal link we investigate is the relation between market ex-
pectations and prices. We divide the sample into subgroups for prior
dispersion, then test for the impact of prior dispersion on abnormal
returns. We nd evidence that a relation, however weak, exists. The
CARs are compared among three groups and we nd that high levels
of dispersion, in both the announcement and ex date databases, have
a positive e¤ect on abnormal returns. We can conclude that the excess
returns are partly explained by the dispersion that exists before the
announcement of the splits. We also regress the future returns on the
change in dispersion, using an Instrumental Variable approach. The
instrument for the change in dispersion is the prior dispersion. We nd
a non-linear relation between the change in dispersion and future re-
turns, while a positive relation is signicant between prior dispersion
and 5-month compounding returns. .
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the empir-
ical framework on underreaction to splits and on di¤erences of opin-
ion. Next, Section 3 introduces the sample and the methodology, and
summarizes the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes our
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ndings.
3.2 Dispersion of beliefs and stock splits
In this study we aim to address the phenomenon of stock splits from
the point of view of di¤erences of opinion. We examine whether the
literature on dispersion of beliefs could help us to gain a better un-
derstanding of the motivations behind the abnormal returns after the
announcement of stock splits.
Recalling Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996), they nd evidence
of positive excess returns in the announcement period and in the long
run on a sample of 2-to-1 splits from 1975 to 1990. These ndings
are consistent with both the Signalling hypothesis of stock splits and
the underreaction literature. In fact, in the long run, favourable in-
formation is incorporated into prices within one year, and the positive
excess one-year returns are not reversed. This is consistent with the
Self-Selection hypothesis and the presence of optimistic managers. The
authors also conrm the Trading Range hypothesis, nding that post-
split prices tend to be close to the median of comparably sized rms.2
Once found that the market underreacts to stock splits, Ikenberry
and Ramnath (2002) deepen the analysis, investigating the theoretical
motivations. They consider the analystscontribution to this reaction
either because investors fail to anticipate new analystscoverage, which
2 However, some criticism has been levelled at the empirical evidence on under-
reaction. The main objections are concerns about spurious results of such analysis,
about the joint test hypothesis problem, famously reported by Fama (1998) and
due to the absence of a robust asset pricing model to e¤ectively compare abnormal
returns.
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is likely to be optimistic, or because investors are slow to revise their
expectations about future performance (which analysts forecasts are
supposed to be proxies for). The rst hypothesis comes from the gen-
eral suggestion that managers split their stocks in order to draw the
attention of analysts and convey news to the markets. Ikenberry et al.
deny this explanation of underreaction. In fact, the increase in analysts
coverage after a stock split is not so relevant when compared to the rise
in coverage they observe for benchmark rms. Actually, the role of an-
alystsforecasts is more relevant in the creation of expectations, which
is consistent with the Self-Selection hypothesis. Optimistic managers
are more likely to split their stocks, and they intend to draw the at-
tention of analysts to their positive expectations about future returns.
Conversely, both investors and analysts are slow in incorporating these
expectations into their own earning forecasts, causing underreaction.
The evidence of the authors validates the hypothesis. Considering the
forecast accuracy, such as the error between the estimation of the next
annual earnings and the actual value, they nd that analysts tend to
underestimate future earnings of splitting rms even until three days
before the earnings release, in comparison with control rms.
We connect this evidence of underreaction with the literature on dif-
ferences of opinions. The empirical evidence on the relation between
returns and di¤erences of opinion are still mixed. A rst approach was
originally developed by Miller (1977) with a static model, then devel-
oped in the following years by other authors, such as Diether, Malloy
and Scherbina (2002), Liu, Xu and Yao (2004), Diether (2004). The
dispersion of beliefs is a proxy for disagreement among investors and it
can lead to a negative long-term mispricing, given the assumptions that
there are two classes of agents, optimistic and pessimistic investors, and
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there are short-sale costs that prevent the pessimistic opinions to be re-
vealed. A second branch of literature introduces heterogeneous beliefs
maintaining the equilibrium of the E¢ cient Market Hypothesis. Dia-
mond and Verrecchia (1987) and Hong and Stein (2003) suggest that
also in markets where disagreement exists, there are mechanisms or
perfectly rational agents that can maintain the prices at their e¢ cient
levels. In fact, rational investors take already into account the con-
straints to negative opinions to be revealed. Finally, a positive relation
between dispersion and future long term returns exists in the model
of Varian (1985) and Merton (1987), where the di¤erences of opinion
are interpreted by the investors in the market as a component of risk.
In this case of higher disagreement, it needs to be compensated with
higher future returns, so the asset prices are likely to be downward
mispriced today for a higher returns in the long run. This model works
assuming no constraints to short selling.
From the literature, it appears that the e¤ect extrapolated from the
dispersion of beliefs is still ambiguous, as partly due to risk premium,
as Varian (1985) and Merton (1987) models, and partly due to dis-
agreement, as Miller (1977) model. Our results can be motivated with
a dominant inuence of informational risk e¤ect over the disagreement
e¤ect. In particular, we focus on informational risk on the quality of
the new signal driving the positive e¤ect between dispersion of beliefs
and future returns (Chan, Hwang and Mian (2005)).
To conclude, few studies apply the literature on di¤erences of opin-
ion to corporate events. Diether (2004) analyses the underperformance
in the long run of a sample of SEOs, motivating it with short sale con-
straints and di¤erences of opinion. Then, Loughran and Ritter (2000)
analyze the dispersion of beliefs around extreme events in the three
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years after new equity issuances. They nd that these extreme events
are accompanied by a great divergence of opinion among investors,
proxied by the share turnover. Assuming Millers hypothesis, this leads
to poor future performance given evidence of short sale constraints in
IPOs or SEOs.
3.3 The empirical analysis
3.3.1 The sample
In order to analyze the impact of the dispersion of analystsbeliefs in
the future performance of splitting rms, we use a sample of stock splits
which occurred in companies quoted on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ
markets in the period from 1993 to 2005. The CRSP monthly and daily
datasheets provide the market variables of the companies and the infor-
mation regarding the declared stock splits, such as announcement and
payment dates and adjustment factors. The I/B/E/S Detail dataset
provides the estimates for the next scal year earnings, for each ana-
lyst, with an indication of the estimate dates, revision dates and actual
EPS.3 By merging these two datasheets we obtain a sample composed
3 There are some concerns about the accuracy of some rounding and assumptions
made in the construction of the I/B/E/S data, as Diether, Malloy and Scherbina
(2002) and Baber and Kang (2002) explain. These authors consider a reporting in-
accuracy in this database which is normally used for research on analystsforecasts.
Because data is adjusted retroactively for splits, there are two sorts of problems
which can arise. Earnings are reported on the basis of the shares outstanding at
their present level, rather than at their historical values, and this assumption ignores
the fact that splits are usually done by companies with positive performances. This
means that the stock prices of splitting companies contain ex-post positive infor-
mation, and the subsequent comparison with non-splitting rms is distorted. The
second problem is a rounding approximation that with long series of data can cause
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of 2090 splits, corresponding to 1299 companies. The companies are
selected if they had announced at least one split in the above period,
according to the CRSP database, and have been covered by at least
two analysts as reported in the I/B/E/S database.
The splits have been selected by rstly considering all the available
data in both the CRSP and the I/B/E/S databases. Not all the splitting
companies in the CRSP have coverage in the I/B/E/S, as these latter
database tilted towards rms with the highest size and performance.4 In
particular, we are interested in cases with at least two analysts covering
each company before the announcement or the occurrence of the splits
and at least two analysts covering after the declaration date (or ex-
date).
Other important assumptions in the construction of the database
are in regards to the dates of the splits. In order to properly analyze
a misunderstanding of the behaviour of the variables and of the real manifestation
of the phenomena. Regarding this data, these problems seem to be particularly
relevant when attempting to make comparisons with non-splitting rms, and not
as relevant if for example you are calculating the impact of some sort of variable
on all the stocks in the market. In our particular case, focusing only on splitting
companies, the sample is a homogenous set of rms and we assume that each of
them incorporates the positive future expectations of the management about their
future performance.
4 It follows that the sample could underperform the negative cases in the mar-
kets and overperform the bigger and more protable companies. Two considerations
can alleviate this asymmetry. We have previously seen that optimistic managers
are more likely to split, because managers who imagine a negative performance
would probably not undertake a split operation due to the costs of lying below the
preferred trading range in the future. This means that the positive information
contained in a split is the optimistic expectations of the management (Grinblatt et
al. 1984, McNichols and Dravid, 1990). For this reason, the problem of overper-
forming the more protable companies, becomes less important, as the sample is
still homogeneous. It is, in fact, concentrated only on splitting companies, which
are more protable and have more optimistic expectations about the future. In
addition, La Porta (1996) shows that regardless of the concentration of big stocks
in the I/B/E/S database, the performance of this portfolio is the same as the one
composed of all the CRSP companies.
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the market reaction, we need to have an indication of both the days
of the announcement and the distribution of the new shares. Thus, we
assume that the announcement corresponds to the declaration date and
the occurrence to the payment date indicated by CRSP. In addition, the
splitting companies should have at least twelve months of observations
after the payment date in order to consider future performance and at
least 250 days before the announcement date as estimation windows.
The sample of splits has been cleansed further by disregarding the
cases in which other distribution events have been announced in the
previous ve days (as Grinblatt et al. (1984)). With this further selec-
tion, we eliminate the frequent cases in which splits are announced at
the same time as dividend distributions (Fama et al. (1969)).
Once the sample of splits is identied, two distinct databases are
constructed: one is composed using the market variables and the an-
alystsestimates around the declaration dates and the second one is
composed using the variables around the payment dates of the splits.
This distinction allows us to measure the e¤ect on the markets both
around the announcement and the occurrence of the split.
3.3.2 The methodology
The empirical analysis consists of three stages. First at all, we check
for changes in market expectations around the announcement and the
occurrence of a split. Once we have analyzed that a change in the
distribution of analysts forecasts e¤ectively occurs, we carry out an
event study to investigate the market reaction to the announcement of
the event. Finally, we analyze the impact of the dispersion of forecasts
estimates on future returns of the splitting companies.
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Distribution of the analystsforecasts
Looking at the market expectations, we focus on any changes in mean
and dispersion after the announcement of the event. We focus in par-
ticular on the di¤erences of opinion, proxied by dispersion in analysts
earnings forecasts, in order to test the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Positive changes in mean of the forecasts estimates and
negative changes in dispersion and estimates error after the event will
conrm a signalling model of splits.
We measure the dispersion of forecasts as the ration of the stan-
dard deviation of earnings forecasts to the absolute value of the mean
of these estimates (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002). As a ro-
bustness check, we also use the standard error, instead of the standard
deviation over the absolute value of the mean estimate. This correc-
tion prevents the simultaneous increase in coverage from a¤ecting the
change in dispersion. We estimate the dispersion in four groups: before
the announcement date, after the announcement date, before the ex-
date and after the ex-date. We also analyze the change in dispersion,
dened as the di¤erence between the dispersion levels preceding and
following the event.
This stage of the analysis is carried out with monthly data from
CRSP and I/B/E/S, given the non-uniformity in time of the distri-
bution of the I/B/E/S estimates. We consider the estimates by any
analyst in a window of two months before the announcement (or pay-
ment) dates of the splits and analogously the estimates by each analyst
in a window of two months after the event. The window is chosen
primarily to facilitate a suitable size of the sample. As a robustness
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check, we use a window of 30 days before (after) the announcement. If
an analyst has published more than one forecast in each period, only
the closest to the event date is considered in each window.
We also analyze the relation between the dispersion of analysts
forecasts and present and future compounded returns.
Conjecture 2 The hypothesis of an existing relation between returns
and dispersion will be broadly veried if moving from the smallest to
the highest group of dispersion, we can observe a systematic variation
in the average returns. According to our assumption of dispersion of
beliefs as a proxy for the reliability of the information, or information
risk, we expect upwards changes in the returns moving from stocks with
low to high dispersion.
We rst reduce the variability of an analysis on the whole sample,
distinguishing groups of dispersion (see Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).
Next, we construct three portfolios of companies with low, medium or
high intensity of dispersion, considering prior dispersion, post disper-
sion or the change in dispersion. We assign the stocks to the corre-
sponding portfolio and calculate the average returns for each.
This relation is also checked by introducing a second variable to
catch whether there is any endogenous inuence of size e¤ect on the
relation. In this two-way cut, the mean returns are calculated for port-
folios derived from the intersection of dispersion groups and size groups.
An increase in the di¤erential between the returns of low and high dis-
persion groups as the size diminishes would conrm that the relation
is even stronger for small rms (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002).
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We also investigate whether the change in dispersion after the an-
nouncement of stock splits a¤ects the future returns of the companies
by regressing the compounded returns on the change in dispersion. We
use a polynomial model, using the square and the square root of the
change in dispersion as regressors:
R
(0;t)
i;n = +1;tDispin+2;t(Dispin)
2+3;t
p
Dispin+in (3.3.1)
where t goes from 0 to 12 months after the event and in identies
the company-split going from 1 to 2090. R(0;t)in is the compounded
return for the company n from the month 0 of the announcement until
month t after the split i. Dispin is the change in dispersion of beliefs,
measured as:
Dispin = PostDispin   PriorDispin (3.3.2)
where PriorDispin is the dispersion of beliefs, measured in the two
months before the event, while PostDispin is the dispersion of beliefs,
measured in the two months after the event.5
We use an Instrumental Variable approach. In fact, the change in
dispersion is measured in a window from 2 months before to 2 months
after the event. Therefore, the post period overlaps with the returns
period. The instrument which we use for the change is the prior dis-
persion; given that it is a good and relevant instrument.
5 From now on we omit the index n, identifying i with both the splitting company
and the stock split.
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We also separately regress the average compounded returns, from
the month of the split to 12 months later on the prior dispersion:
R
(0;t)
i;n = + tPriorDispin + i (3.3.3)
and similarly on post dispersion:
R
(0;t)
i;n = + tPostDispin + i (3.3.4)
The event study
The second part of the analysis focuses more formally on the e¤ect of
dispersion in analystsforecasts on the cross- section of stock returns
after the announcements of the events.
Conjecture 3 If the stock split event is signalling positive informa-
tion, we expect the market to react to the announcement with positive
abnormal returns.
In this stage, our analysis follows the standard event study method-
ology. We use daily data from the CRSP database.6 We analyze the
impact of the events (assuming they are exogenous) on the performance
of the market, comparing the returns e¤ectively veried after the event
6 The main references are Cambpell, Lo and McKinlay (1997), Brown and
Warner (1985), Kothari and Warner (2006). Thus, the methodology in use to-
day was broadly introduced by Fama et al. (1969) in their analysis on stock splits,
and with regard to short term analysis it is still similar.
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with the "normal performance" as if the split did not occur. The choice
of the method and model to best measure the unconditional returns is
crucial to adjust returns for the risk.7
We estimate the parameters of a normal return model using the
four-factor model as Carhart (1997). Then, in the post event window,
we use the previously estimated coe¢ cients in order to predict the
abnormal returns after the arrival of the news conveyed by the splits.
The choice of estimation window and event window has to be taken
carefully. In the estimation of the parameters of normal returns we have
to exclude any eventual implication in trading activities or expectations
from the split itself and other splits of the same company.
Regarding the estimation window from t1 to t2 before the announce-
ment, we consider the period of 230 days that starts at t1= -250 and
ends at t2 = -20 days before the declaration date of the split. The left
extreme has been chosen in order to su¢ ciently avoid any overlap be-
tween previous stock splits undertaken by the same company and any
contamination of altered performances. The right extreme derives in-
stead from previous empirical ndings that revealed an abnormal trad-
ing activity in the 10 days prior to the event announcement (Maloney
and Mulherin, 1992, Easley, OHara and Saar, 2001).
Regarding the event window from  1 to  2 after the announcement
(or occurrence) dates, we take into consideration di¤erent lengths in
order to permit di¤erent analyses of the e¤ect of the event. Given that
day 0 is the announcement of the event, we consider the cases of 2
trading days (from day 0 to day 1) and 6 trading days (from 0 to 5).
The event window should be short enough to avoid any overlap among
7 See Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2000) for considerations on how methodological or
sampling di¤erences can have a huge impact on the results of the study. This is
especially important regarding long term abnormal returns.
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companies. We clean the sample of splits for events that have no other
distributions in the event window until 5 days after the split. In the
following analysis we will also look at longer post-event windows in the
months after the split. Once the windows of analysis have been de-
ned, abnormal returns are assumed to capture the event impact. The
abnormal returns are estimated as the di¤erence between the observed
returns over the event window and the normal returns that would exist
in the absence of any event.
The asset pricing model used is the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997), in which the explanatory variables are excess returns on portfo-
lios constructed to mimic for size, book-to-market, market return and
momentum. This check for momentum is particularly important to de-
tect a split e¤ect, given the abnormal high returns in the period before
the event.
The regression equation is then:
Rit = i + 1;iFmkret;t + 2;iFbtm;t + 3;iFsize + 4;iFmom;t + "it (3.3.5)
whereRit is the continuously compounded excess return of the split-
ting company i from day t  1 to day t of the estimation window. 1;i,
2;i, 3;i and 4;i are the risk sensitivities of the four explanatory fac-
tors, for company i, "it is the disturbance terms or the abnormal returns.
Fmkret;t, Fsize;t, Fbtm;t, and Fmom;t are the four explanatory variables
corresponding to the excess returns on portfolios constructed to mimic
the implicit risks respectively in market return, size, book-to-market
and momentum for the period t.8
8 Factor returns are downloaded from the FF website.
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Then, for company i and event day  , we dene the estimated
abnormal returns in the event window ( 1,  2) as:
ARi = Ri   E[Ri jF ] = ei (3.3.6)
where  corresponds to the days around the announcement of the
event; Ri are the returns for company/event i at day  ; and F is the
matrix of the four factors observed in this event window.
We use the CAR method in order to aggregate the abnormal re-
turns. Then, we determine the cumulative abnormal returns in the
event window for three groups, classied on the basis of the level of
prior dispersion measured before the announcement of the splits.
Cumulative abnormal returns and standardized cumulative abnor-
mal returns are estimated for each security/event i through time (for
the interval  1 to  2 within the event window):9
CARi( 1 2) =
2X
=1
ARi (3.3.7)
and
SCARi( 1 2) =
CARi( 1 2)
[b2i ( 1 2)]1=2 (3.3.8)
where b2i ( 1 2) = 2(ARi;1) is the variance of one periods abnormal
returns.
Next, the cumulative abnormal returns are also aggregated across
the events i, from 1 to N , and time  1 to  2, as the cumulative average
abnormal return in the event window from  1 to  2, or equivalently as
the average of the cumulative abnormal returns for i:
9 With a su¢ ciently large estimation window, the SCAR is asymptotically dis-
tributed as a standard normal.
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CAR( 1 2) =
2X
=1
AR =
1
N
NX
i=i
CARi( 1 2) (3.3.9)
The last important step is to test for zero cumulative average ab-
normal return. This test raises the issue of the independence of the
abnormal returns. In fact, the test constructed as the cumulative aver-
age abnormal returns divided by the variance of the abnormal returns
(which we performed in the standardized CAR) brings some problems
of specication. This is because the assumption of no correlation among
the one period abnormal returns is not veried and also because of the
existence of time clustering.10
Therefore, we use the test statistics as:
T ( 1 2) =
CAR( 1 2)
[b2(ARt)]1=2 v N(0; 1) (3.3.10)
where as estimator of the standard deviation is the average of the
variances of the single CARi, 2i ( 1 2):
b2i (ARt) = 1N2X 2i (ARt) (3.3.11)
Another possible test constructed from the Standardized CAR is:
(
N(T   4)
T   2 )
1=2SCAR( 1 2) (3.3.12)
where T is the length of the event window.
The statistics under the null have a standard normal asymptotic
distribution.
10 A solution for the problem of specication of these tests considers using the
estimated variance of the observed returns of the portfolio of the splitting companies
in a period far from the event.
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Dispersion of beliefs and future performance
The nal step consists in a cross-section regression analysis. We exam-
ine whether the abnormal returns after the events are related to the
dispersion of analystsforecasts as measured in the period before the
splits.
Conjecture 4 If the event conveys uncertain information, we expect
prices to underreact and the abnormal returns to be related to the quality
of the information, proxied by the dispersion of beliefs.
In order to perform this analysis, we use the three portfolios pre-
viously constructed based on the level of dispersion in the two months
before the announcement and we compare the portfolio abnormal re-
turns in the event windows.
To take into account the other variables that can a¤ect the ab-
normal returns, the following regression is also estimated as a linear
function of the abnormal returns on dispersion, and on the four factors
of size, book-to-market, market return and momentum:
ARi = i+0PriorDispi+1Fmkret;+2Fbtm;+3Fsize;+4Fmom;+"i
(3.3.13)
ARi = + X + i;t (3.3.14)
where Xt includes the dispersion ratio, and the excess returns on
the factors size, book-to-market, market return and momentum.
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3.4 Empirical evidence
3.4.1 The sample and the descriptive analysis
Regarding the descriptive statistics of the sample of splits, Tables 1.1
and 1.2 show the number of splits per year and per split-factor and the
average number of splits per company.
The splits occurred in the period from 1993 to 2003 with a peak
in 1999 and a following decreasing trend over the subsequent years.
This is consistent with Lakonishok and Lev (1987), as we see that the
splits tend to occur most frequently when the markets are in expansion
phases.
The split-factor is the number of additional shares issued per one
old share. The great majority of splits occur at the round numbers of
0.5, 1, 2, and the split 2-to-1 accounts for nearly half of the sample.
This is an "anomaly" inside the anomaly, because it does not seem
that there is a fundamental rationale for managers to prefer round fac-
tors, neither when considering the Signalling hypothesis nor the Trading
Range hypothesis. We do not nd evidence for a tick size motivation
in this preference, as the number of splits or the preference for round
split-factors does not change signicantly after the 1997 change in the
rules of decimalization in the US exchange.
The median number of splits per company in the period and in our
sample is 2. The number of splits per share is, however, even higher, if
we consider the complete sample of events. The decrease that we nd
is due to the cleaning we carried out for other distributions. Indeed,
some companies choose to split their stocks regularly and often these
events are declared concurrently with dividend distributions.
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Table 2 reports the market variables of the companies in the sample
by year of announcement. We consider in particular the averages of
prices, volume of trading, market capitalization and shares outstanding
at the end of the month of the announcement and the compounded
returns for the 12 months after the split, by year of announcement.
Next, we analyze the distribution of analystsforecasts for the four
groups: (i) before the announcement date, (ii) after the announcement
date, (iii) before the payment date and (iv) after the payment date.
We focus in particular on our proxy for the forecast dispersion; that is
the ration of the standard deviation to the absolute value of the mean
of the forecasts. We initially examine all the changes in the analysts
coverage before and after the announcement (occurrence) of the split,
based on the number of analysts that provided one scal year earnings
estimates for each split-rm (Table 3.1 and 3.2).
One of the hypotheses explaining why managers are willing to split
their stocks considers that they wish to attract the attention (usually
positive) of analysts (Brennan and Hughes, 1991). Looking at the ana-
lystscoverage, the evidence actually shows an average increase in the
number of analysts following the rms after the announcement of the
split, from 7.76 to 8.84 (Table 3.1). This change is stressed and accen-
tuated after the occurrence of the event, when the average number of
analysts increases from 8.35 to 9.48. Considering the median values,
in both databases there is an increase of one unit before and after the
event, from 6 to 7 analysts for each company-split.
The increase in coverage is stressed even more, by the evidence that
in the month of the split, the total number of forecasts of the annual
earnings of the splitting companies is strongly higher than in the month
before or in the month after the split (Table 3.2).
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Then, regarding the forecasts of analysts after the splits, we see in
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that the mean of the estimated EPS for the earnings
per share of the next scal year signicantly increases, by 0.04 to 0.99$,
while the estimation error considerably decreases to close to zero, from
a signicant error of -0.024 to a less signicant -0.007$.
The estimation error is measured as the di¤erence between the earn-
ings forecasts and the actual values. It shows that analysts tend to un-
derestimate companiesearnings in the window before the event while
this is nearly corrected in the following period. This is consistent with
the Signalling hypothesis and with the hypothesis that a split draws
positive attention to the company.
Considering the variability of the forecasts, we measure the range
of the analystsforecasts in the two months before (and after) the an-
nouncement date (and payment date) of the events. As we can see
in Table 5.1, there is a slight increase in the average range after the
announcement date from 0.17 to 0.19, which is also conrmed by an
augment in the median. The di¤erences of opinion increase even more
after the payment date, as we have seen happening to the coverage.
Then, the dispersion ratio is measured by the standard deviation
of the estimates, scaled by the absolute value of the mean of their
forecasts. It conrms the same results seen for the range, consisting of
a slight increase in the average value after the split and in an increase
in its volatility in both databases, announcement and ex date (Table
5.2). From unreported results, using the ration of the standard error
to the absolute mean of the estimate does not change the pattern.
The change in dispersion, given by the di¤erence between the prior
and post dispersion ratios has therefore a positive average value. This
means that we see a small raise in the disagreement among analysts
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after the splits. In the payment database, the average is still slightly
positive, even though it is lower than in the announcement database
(Table 7).
Moreover, we consider the average of the estimates and forecast er-
ror by group of dispersion. We distinguish three groups of low, medium
and high dispersion. We notice a decreasing relation between disper-
sion and average estimate, for which both before and after the splits,
higher dispersions are associated with lower average estimates. Consid-
ering the average error of underestimation, it tends to be higher in the
medium groups of dispersion, both before and after the event. The pat-
tern is evident in both announcement and payment databases (Tables
6.1 and 6.2).
3.4.2 Dispersion of analystsforecasts and returns
In order to analyze the relation between dispersion and returns, rstly
we divide the sample into subgroups to reduce the variability of the
previous phase (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, Diether, Malloy and
Scherbina, 2002).
We construct di¤erent portfolios on the basis of the degree of prior
and post dispersion and the change in dispersion. The stocks are as-
signed to the corresponding portfolio based on their level of forecasts
dispersion and we then calculate the average returns for each portfolio,
checking for any corresponding trend in the average returns.
We observe a pattern between the dispersion in analystsforecasts,
both before and after the announcement of the event, and future per-
formance. In particular, moving from the lowest to the highest disper-
sion group, the compounded returns increase, broadly conrming the
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hypothesis of dispersion as an element of uncertainty (Tables 8.1 and
8.2).
Considering the change in dispersion, as the change in disagreement
around the stock splits, it seems that returns are positively related to it
(Table 8.3). The highest and the lowest groups exhibiting a change in
dispersion (that corresponds to the extreme positive or negative varia-
tions of dispersion around the event) have the highest returns. There-
fore, it seems that the direction of the change in dispersion is not as
relevant as its entity. High variations in dispersion, either towards con-
vergence or divergence of opinion, lead to higher future returns, while
small changes lead to smaller but still positive returns.11 However,
this relation is not symmetric and is not stable across the compounded
returns examined. Furthermore, this relation weakens with longer re-
turns, and the pattern is less evident in the last months of the analysis.
We further analyze this relation introducing a second variable to
check if there is an endogenous e¤ect related to size. In a two-way cut,
the average returns are calculated for each portfolio deriving from the
intersection of dispersion quantiles and size quantiles (Table 9). The
expected e¤ect is a decline in the di¤erence between the returns of lower
and higher dispersion quantiles as the size increases, but that there is
still a positive relation. This would conrm that the relation between
returns and dispersion should be stronger for small rms. In fact our
results show that the higher the capitalization of the company, the lower
the future positive returns, but that they still exhibit a relation between
the dispersion inuences and future performance. This means that the
smaller the rm, the bigger the predicted e¤ect of the dispersion on the
returns.
11 We will consider in the future the relation between the change in dispersion
and the returns with the introduction of herding.
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All these conclusions regarding the announcement database are not
however evinced in the payment database, conrming that the infor-
mational risk increases around the stock only at the announcement of
the event.
Then, we regress the compounded returns from 1 to 12 months
after the split on the dispersion ratios, as equations (3.3.1), (3.3.3)
and (3.3.4). Table 10 reports the results of the regressions for the
announcement database.
Looking at the prior dispersion, we conrm the positive relation
between returns and di¤erences of opinion before the event, in concur-
rence with the preceding results. However, it is signicant only at 5
months after the announcement. Post dispersion has a positive esti-
mated coe¢ cient as well, although it is never signicant in any of the
12 regressions.
Finally, we see that the change in dispersion, computed in the win-
dows of -2 + 2 months around the event declaration dates, is signi-
cantly impacting on the compounded returns until 8 months after the
announcement. In particular, we observe a negative relation between
the change and the returns. The relation is not linear. In fact, the
square root is also a signicant component for all the compounded re-
turns until 8 months after the event, but also with a signicance at 12
months.
3.4.3 The results of the event study
The results from the previous analysis motivate the next step of the
event study of the market reaction around the splits, and the analysis
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of this reaction in the light of the di¤erences of opinion. In fact, we have
found evidence of a relation between returns and dispersion of analysts
forecasts and now we wish to examine both whether abnormality exists
in the post event performance and whether this abnormality is related
to the prior dispersion.
We estimate the abnormal returns and the CAR following the an-
nouncement of the event, as equations (3.3.6) and (3.3.7).
As we can see in Table 11, the CARs are signicant in the event
windows that include the day of the event and the following day. They
are positive and slightly increasing as we enlarge the event windows, but
not signicant enough according to the test we have constructed. We
estimate in particular ve CARs considering ve event windows, which
we denote as the number of days in each window: CAR2 (from day 0
to 1), CAR6 (from 0 to 5), CAR31 (from 0 to 30), CAR61 (from 0 to
60) and CAR91 (from 0 to 90 days after). The results of the CARs are
signicant and positive, and this is evident both in the announcement
and in the payment datasets.
Running the analysis by groups of prior dispersion, we use the dis-
persion in the 2 months before the announcement (and occurrence) of
the split in order to estimate the CARs for each of the three groups
and compare them. In Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we show the trends of the
cumulative abnormal returns distinguishing the three classes of disper-
sion. The results are di¤erent between the announcement and payment
dates.
For the announcement date, the group with medium dispersion
has the highest abnormal returns, followed by the group with higher
dispersion and then by the group with lowest dispersion.
However, for the payment date, the group with the highest disper-
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sion are the ones with the highest cumulative abnormal returns. The
di¤erence in returns is especially large 50-60 days after the event. The
group with the lowest dispersion (negative value on average) is the one
with the lowest abnormal returns on most days. Especially in the rst
days after the event, we verify very low or even negative abnormal re-
turns. These values increase, as in the other subsamples, 50- 60 days
after the event.
In order to better discern this relation, we carry out cross-sectional
regressions, in which the CARs are explained by the prior dispersion
and the set of factors, as we can see in Tables 12.1 and 12.2. We nd
that the dispersion is not a signicant explanatory variable of the CARs
in the event window, where other factors are shown to be more impor-
tant. Instead, when increasing the window of analysis, the dispersion
becomes a signicant explanatory variable, given a positive relation
with the abnormal returns.
Finally, we look at the cumulative abnormal returns dividing into
three groups by time period: before 1996, between 1996 and 2000, and
after 2000, in order to investigate whether, in the di¤erent time periods,
the reaction of the market changed in its intensity. In fact, as we can
see in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, we observed that in the period from 1996
to 2000 we have the lowest impact of abnormal returns, while the most
recent period is the one that evidenced the highest e¤ects, especially in
the longest windows.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter is an analysis of the relation between the dispersion of
beliefs among analysts at the time of a stock split and the market
reaction and future performance of the company. The central idea of
the chapter is to analyze whether, either around the announcement or
the payment date of a split, the disagreement in the consensus of the
analysts is a determinant of the future abnormal returns of the splitting
companies.
Firstly, we have analyzed the relation between dispersion and re-
turns in the subsample of rms that have split their stocks in the period
from 1993 to 2004, extracting the data from the CRSP and I/B/E/S
databases. We have found a positive relation between the average of
the compounded returns in the twelve months following the event and
the dispersion ratio, measured as the ration of the standard deviation
of the analystsforecasts to the mean of the forecasts in the two months
before the event. The results come from the analysis on subgroups of
companies, where the average returns for each group seems to increase,
when moving from a lower to a higher dispersion.
From carrying out an event study on the announcement of the split,
we have evinced that the returns in the days around the events and in
the next three months exhibit an abnormal component not explained
by the four-factor model. When the abnormal returns are aggregated
in the event windows, we observe positive and increasing cumulative
abnormal returns.
In addition, the cumulate abnormal returns through companies and
time series are compared among the groups of dispersion ratio measured
before the announcement of the splits. We can conclude that these
excess returns are partly explained by the introduction of the dispersion
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that exists before the announcement of the event.
A rationale for this relation is the idea that dispersion of beliefs is
an indicator of informational risk and therefore induces an increase in
the returns. The positive drift we observe in the returns of splitting
companies, and the increase in uncertainty around these stocks will
be seen more in details in future chapters, in the light of a herding
motivation.
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3.A Appendix A
Tables 1.1 & 1.2
Descriptive Statistics of the Splits
1.1  The number of stock splits per year of announcement and per split-factor.
Year Number of splits < 3-to-2 3-to-2
< 2-to-1 and >
3-to-2
2-to-1 > 2-to-1
1993 228 12.04% 37.75% 0.00% 46.99% 3.21%
1994 156 9.76% 37.36% 0.00% 47.13% 5.74%
1995 202 4.44% 37.33% 0.00% 55.56% 2.66%
1996 244 7.02% 38.38% 0.00% 50.55% 4.06%
1997 246 7.73% 32.05% 0.39% 56.37% 3.48%
1998 220 3.38% 31.78% 0.42% 58.90% 5.51%
1999 255 3.69% 24.72% 0.00% 68.27% 3.32%
2000 226 1.26% 19.75% 0.00% 71.43% 7.56%
2001 105 7.55% 48.11% 0.00% 43.40% 0.94%
2002 103 8.53% 36.75% 0.85% 52.14% 1.71%
2003 105 9.83% 39.29% 0.00% 45.54% 4.46%
Total 2090 131 677 3 1191 88
1.2   The number of stock splits per company
Number of splits
per company
Number of
splits
Number of
companies
1 787 787
2 685 343
3 313 104
4 162 41
5 73 15
6 26 4
7 34 5
10 10 1
Total 2090 1299
Median 2
Mode 1
Std. Deviation 1.42
Range 9
These tables show the main descriptive analysis carried out on the sample of splits.  We present the
frequencies of the splits by year of announcement and split- factor ( table 1.1 ) and by the number of splits
per company ( table 1.2 ). The split- factor is extracted from the CRSP data, and it represents the number of
new shares to old shares. It is estimated with the following formula:
where s(t) is the number of shares outstanding, t is a date after or on the distribution date for the split,
and t’ is a date before the split.
The number of splits per company is calculated from the firms in the final sample, considering their
distribution in the period 1993 - 2004.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Companies
Year of
announcement
12-months
compounded
returns
Price Volume Capitalization
Shares
outstanding
1993 Mean 0.12 44.62 42,753 2,502,883 44,175
St. dev 0.38 19.81 81,994 6,185,242 91,100
1994 Mean 0.33 54.00 54,492 3,360,036 50,927
St. dev 0.60 61.48 88,820 8,723,626 97,582
1995 Mean 0.40 49.75 75,277 2,972,688 46,829
St. dev 0.65 21.36 135,455 5,721,260 69,097
1996 Mean 0.27 51.51 68,256 4,188,622 62,539
St. dev 0.49 23.74 128,755 10,400,000 128,120
1997 Mean 0.27 54.94 105,941 7,434,517 88,776
St. dev 0.70 27.05 276,806 20,200,000 186,772
1998 Mean 0.33 59.46 129,907 9,648,895 113,671
St. dev 1.23 29.51 353,254 23,100,000 214,864
1999 Mean 0.67 73.86 331,977 17,200,000 184,958
St. dev 1.58 34.73 647,979 41,400,000 397,635
2000 Mean -0.21 93.26 291,102 16,400,000 156,098
St. dev 0.52 61.01 578,115 50,800,000 457,131
2001 Mean 0.18 51.33 149,944 7,684,072 109,596
St. dev 0.47 22.20 243,519 32,100,000 367,151
2002 Mean 0.06 52.33 133,930 3,938,523 69,894
St. dev 0.42 26.79 415,934 6,778,046 127,803
2003 Mean 0.37 48.95 202,809 6,339,919 108,080
St. dev 0.52 23.27 658,726 27,600,000 521,855
Total Mean 0.27 59.16 146,424 7,962,379 96,689
St. dev 0.86 38.07 396,226 27,100,000 279,217
This table describes the market variables of the sample of splitting companies, by year of announcement. We consider the
average compounded returns of the company in the 12 months after the splits, price (in dollars), market capitalization (in
dollars), volume of trading (in number of shares) and shares outstanding (in number of shares) at the end of month in
which the split is announced.
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Tables 3.1 & 3.2
Descriptive Statistics of Analysts' Coverage
Number of ANALYSTS
before
announcement
after
announcement
before ex-date after ex-date
Mean 7.76 8.84 8.35 9.48
Median 6 7 6 7
Std. Deviation 6.12 6.48 6.50 6.84
Minimum 2 2 2 2
Maximum 42 42 41 39
Number of
FORECASTS
Previous Month
Month of the event
Next Month
11,336
7,262
8,624
10,302
8,969
3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the analysts’ coverage of the splitting firms before and after the
event.
Table 3.1  shows the number of analysts that cover each splitting company in the period preceding or
following the split. The averages are weighted with the number of splits each firm has announced and are
included in the sample. They are divided in the two databases of analysis: the announcement-date
database and the payment-date database. We consider only the analysts that have made at least one
estimate in the two months before or in the 2 months after the announcement or payment date of the
event. Table 3.2  shows the total number of forecasts in the month before the announcement or payment
date of the event, in the month of the event, or in the month after the split.
3.2 Total number of forecasts
announcement date ex-date
7,192
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Tables 4.1 & 4.2
Mean of Analysts' Estimates and Estimates Error before and after the Splits.
Estimates Mean t- test Est. Error Mean t- test
Before 0.9512 *** 37.82 Before -0.0244 *** -3.59
After 0.9958 *** 38.50 After -0.0069 -0.96
Difference 0.0446 *** 12.84 Difference 0.0175 *** 3.76
Estimates Mean t- test Est. Error Mean t- test
Before 0.9844 *** 39.43 Before -0.0119 -1.60
After 1.0136 *** 37.66 After 0.0039 0.48
Difference 0.0292 *** 6.61 Difference 0.0158 *** 2.13
Table 4.1. Mean of analysts' estimates and estimates error before and after the
announcements.
Table 4.2. Mean of analysts' estimates and estimates error before and after the payment dates.
These tables present the average forecasts estimates and estimates error before and after the announcement
( table 4.1 ) and the payment date of the splits ( table 4.2 ). The average forecasts estimates are the mean EPS
forecasts for the next fiscal year, published in the two months before and two months after the
announcement/payment dates. The estimates error is the mean of the difference between the forecasts
estimates and the actual earnings per share.
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Tables 5.1 & 5.2
Range and Dispersion Ratio
RANGE
before
announcement
after
announcement
before exdate after exdate
Mean 0.1669 0.1892 0.1675 0.1796
Std. Error of Mean 0.0132 0.0140 0.0132 0.0100
*** *** *** ***
Median 0.0475 0.0650 0.0492 0.0800
Std. Deviation 0.6047 0.6394 0.6031 0.4591
Variance 0.3656 0.4089 0.3637 0.2108
Skewness 14.66 18.27 15.61 17.64
Kurtosis 295.05 454.68 332.19 489.37
Range 15.70 18.48 14.85 14.60
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 15.70 18.48 14.85 14.60
DISPERSION
before
announcemet
after
announcement
before exdate after exdate
Mean 0.0828 0.0955 0.0782 0.0940
Std. Error of Mean 0.0110 0.0155 0.0093 0.0127
*** *** *** ***
Median 0.0242 0.0277 0.0230 0.0313
Std. Deviation 0.5013 0.7070 0.4234 0.5784
Variance 0.2513 0.4999 0.1793 0.3345
Skewness 24.14 25.87 21.93 24.19
Kurtosis 659.64 718.40 555.37 647.11
Range 15.46 22.11 12.17 16.69
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 15.46 22.11 12.17 16.69
The tables report the range and the dispersion of the forecasts estimates. The range is calculated for each
stock split as the difference between maximum and minimum of all the estimates published by analysts in
the two months before or after the event, both at the announcement or at the payment date ( table 5.1 ).
The dispersion ratio is computed for each split as the standard deviation of the estimates in the 2-month
window, scaled by the absolute value of the mean of the same estimates ( table 5.2 ).
5.1  Range of forecasts estimates before and after the announcement/payment date
5.2  Dispersion of forecasts estimates before and after the announcement date and the
payment date
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Tables 6.1 & 6.2
Mean of Analysts' Estimates and Estimates Error by Dispersion Groups
Mean t- test Mean t- test
Before Total 0.9512 *** 37.82 Before Total -0.0244 *** -3.59
Low dispersion 1.0882 *** 33.17 Low dispersion -0.0222 *** -3.77
Medium 1.0083 *** 30.58 Medium -0.0414 *** -4.29
High dispersion 0.7554 *** 12.81 High dispersion -0.0095 -0.56
After Total 0.9958 *** 38.50 After Total -0.0069 -0.96
Low dispersion 1.1328 *** 33.55 Low dispersion -0.0119 * -1.67
Medium 1.0533 *** 31.41 Medium -0.0119 -0.93
High dispersion 0.7997 *** 13.13 High dispersion 0.0030 0.19
Mean t- test Mean t- test
Before Total 0.9844 *** 39.43 Before Total -0.0119 -1.60
Low dispersion 1.1723 *** 37.67 Low dispersion -0.0099 -1.18
Medium 1.0616 *** 31.03 Medium -0.0370 *** -4.57
High dispersion 0.7153 *** 12.34 High dispersion 0.0118 0.62
After Total 1.0136 *** 37.66 After Total 0.0039 0.48
Low dispersion 1.2146 *** 37.93 Low dispersion 0.0219 1.17
Medium 1.0861 *** 31.27 Medium -0.0237 *** -3.17
High dispersion 0.7360 *** 11.39 High dispersion 0.0139 0.97
These tables present the average estimates and the average estimates errors by the dispersion ratio before and after the announcement ( table
6.1 ) and the payment date of the splits ( table 6.2 ). The estimates are the EPS forecasts for the next fiscal year averaged in the two months
before or after the announcement/payment date. The estimates error is the mean of the difference between the forecasts and the actual
earnings per share in the same windows.
Table 6.1. Mean of analysts' estimates and estimates error before and after the announcements of the splits by dispersion
groups
Table 6.2. Mean of analysts' estimates and estimates error before and after the splits by dispersion groups
Forecasts estimates
Forecasts estimates
Estimates Error
Estimstes Error
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Table 7
Change in Dispersion
Mean (St. error) 0.0128 (0.017) 0.0158 (0.010)
T test 0.7361 1.5800
Lower Bound -0.0212 -0.0047
Upper Bound 0.0468 0.0362
5% Trimmed Mean 0.0052 0.0081
Median 0.0008 0.0036
Variance 0.6280 0.2280
Std. Deviation 0.7926 0.4771
Minimum -15.20 -7.03
Maximum 20.16 15.76
Range 35.36 22.79
Interquartile Range 0.04 0.04
Skewness (St. error) 10.985 (0.054) 19.099 (0.054)
Kurtosis (St. error) 434.684 (0.107) 674.839 (0.107)
Change in dispersion -
announcement date
Change in dispersion -
ex date
The change in dispersion is computed as the difference between the dispersion computed in the 2
months before the event and the dispersion in the 2 months after the event, as announcement or
payment date.
Change in dispersion among analysts' forecasts in the announcement and payment
databases
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
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Tables 8.1, 8.2
Compounded Returns by Dispersion Groups (Announcement Database)
Month 0 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Low dispersion mean 0.0515 0.0837 0.1246 0.1671 0.2086
se(mean) 0.0050 0.0079 0.0135 0.0162 0.0250
st. dev. 0.1319 0.2072 0.3574 0.4264 0.6603
Medium mean 0.0763 0.1104 0.1586 0.2127 0.2991
se(mean) 0.0057 0.0087 0.0138 0.0207 0.0341
st. dev. 0.1500 0.2306 0.3633 0.5464 0.8992
High dispersion mean 0.1050 0.1458 0.2063 0.2155 0.2878
se(mean) 0.0081 0.0125 0.0221 0.0220 0.0377
st. dev. 0.2132 0.3300 0.5833 0.5819 0.9953
Total mean 0.0776 0.1133 0.1632 0.1984 0.2652
se(mean) 0.0037 0.0057 0.0098 0.0114 0.0189
st. dev. 0.1700 0.2626 0.4483 0.5228 0.8637
Month 0 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Low dispersion mean 0.0575 0.0751 0.0989 0.1430 0.2042
se(mean) 0.0048 0.0071 0.0100 0.0142 0.0235
st. dev. 0.1259 0.1880 0.2641 0.3759 0.6205
Medium mean 0.0727 0.1151 0.1586 0.2005 0.2756
se(mean) 0.0059 0.0090 0.0159 0.0188 0.0311
st. dev. 0.1552 0.2388 0.4195 0.4969 0.8223
High dispersion mean 0.1007 0.1452 0.2241 0.2379 0.2881
se(mean) 0.0081 0.0127 0.0224 0.0248 0.0411
st. dev. 0.2146 0.3356 0.5922 0.6554 1.0842
Total mean 0.0770 0.1118 0.1606 0.1938 0.2560
se(mean) 0.0037 0.0057 0.0098 0.0114 0.0189
st. dev. 0.1702 0.2629 0.4487 0.5233 0.8639
Table 8.1 Prior dispersion
Table 8.2 Post dispersion
Dispersion before the
announcement
Compounded returns
Dispersion after the
announcement
Compounded returns
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Month 0 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Low mean 0.1029 0.1455 0.2058 0.2184 0.3121
se(mean) 0.0107 0.0166 0.0305 0.0291 0.0524
st. dev. 0.2182 0.3395 0.6229 0.5950 1.0722
2 mean 0.0690 0.0883 0.1075 0.1674 0.2434
se(mean) 0.0067 0.0103 0.0149 0.0207 0.0364
st. dev. 0.1363 0.2105 0.3037 0.4232 0.7444
3 mean 0.0592 0.0909 0.1213 0.1395 0.1960
se(mean) 0.0073 0.0103 0.0146 0.0174 0.0301
st. dev. 0.1487 0.2112 0.2983 0.3555 0.6160
4 mean 0.0628 0.0939 0.1451 0.2067 0.2598
se(mean) 0.0068 0.0105 0.0192 0.0252 0.0397
st. dev. 0.1389 0.2157 0.3918 0.5145 0.8107
High mean 0.0909 0.1404 0.2232 0.2372 0.2687
se(mean) 0.0093 0.0149 0.0257 0.0325 0.0487
st. dev. 0.1899 0.3036 0.5245 0.6645 0.9957
Total mean 0.0770 0.1118 0.1606 0.1938 0.2560
se(mean) 0.0037 0.0057 0.0098 0.0114 0.0189
st. dev. 0.1702 0.2629 0.4487 0.5233 0.8639
In these tables, the average compounded returns for the month of the announcement of the split until 12 months
after the event are reported in groups of  prior dispersion, as computed in the two months before the event ( table
8.1 ), post dispersion, as computed in the two months after the event ( table 8.2 ) and change in dispersion, as the
difference between prior and post dispersion ( table 8.3 ).
Table 8.3 Change in dispersion
Change in dispersion
Compounded returns
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Table 9
Compounded Returns after the Announcement by Dispersion Groups and Size Groups
Month 0 1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months
Low Small companies mean 0.0876 0.1234 0.2103 0.2754 0.3030
se(mean) 0.0119 0.0177 0.0328 0.0446 0.0554
2 mean 0.0629 0.0996 0.1435 0.2136 0.2066
se(mean) 0.0119 0.0160 0.0255 0.0351 0.0468
3 mean 0.0327 0.0605 0.0547 0.0411 0.0607
se(mean) 0.0114 0.0202 0.0325 0.0306 0.0440
4 mean 0.0454 0.0784 0.1513 0.1628 0.2830
se(mean) 0.0117 0.0169 0.0368 0.0365 0.0837
Big companies mean 0.0275 0.0546 0.0592 0.1329 0.1825
se(mean) 0.0080 0.0166 0.0203 0.0286 0.0382
Total mean 0.0515 0.0837 0.1246 0.1671 0.2086
se(mean) 0.0050 0.0079 0.0135 0.0162 0.0250
Medium Small companies mean 0.1152 0.1470 0.2129 0.2774 0.3298
se(mean) 0.0145 0.0209 0.0283 0.0446 0.0683
2 mean 0.0668 0.0988 0.1253 0.1276 0.1679
se(mean) 0.0108 0.0192 0.0296 0.0350 0.0510
3 mean 0.0793 0.1127 0.1484 0.2123 0.3839
se(mean) 0.0141 0.0193 0.0330 0.0411 0.0906
4 mean 0.0573 0.0892 0.1574 0.2497 0.3432
se(mean) 0.0099 0.0158 0.0279 0.0598 0.0808
Big companies mean 0.0587 0.1001 0.1446 0.1904 0.2607
se(mean) 0.0123 0.0214 0.0343 0.0480 0.0821
Total mean 0.0763 0.1104 0.1586 0.2127 0.2991
se(mean) 0.0057 0.0087 0.0138 0.0207 0.0341
High Small companies mean 0.1529 0.2237 0.2694 0.2894 0.3655
se(mean) 0.0188 0.0282 0.0400 0.0492 0.0730
2 mean 0.1341 0.1791 0.2666 0.2537 0.2486
se(mean) 0.0187 0.0285 0.0620 0.0453 0.0499
3 mean 0.0700 0.1263 0.1896 0.2500 0.4535
se(mean) 0.0154 0.0295 0.0424 0.0589 0.1302
4 mean 0.0818 0.1140 0.1821 0.1828 0.2012
se(mean) 0.0191 0.0281 0.0549 0.0425 0.0649
Big companies mean 0.0921 0.0951 0.1320 0.1116 0.1828
se(mean) 0.0173 0.0242 0.0417 0.0487 0.0794
Total mean 0.1050 0.1458 0.2063 0.2155 0.2878
se(mean) 0.0081 0.0125 0.0221 0.0220 0.0377
Dispersion before the
announcement
Compounded returns
Market
capitalization
This table reports the average compounded returns for the month of the announcement of the split until 12 months after the event,
in a two-way cut, by groups of  prior dispersion and by company market capitalization.
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Table 10
Regressions Results: Compounded Returns on Dispersion Ratios (announcement db)
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 9 months 10 months 11 months 12 months
Prior coeff. -0.0461 0.1193 0.0942 -0.0354 0.1033 0.1100 0.0760 0.1932 0.2374 0.3546 0.2594 -0.0778
st. error 0.0382 0.1354 0.0727 0.0419 0.0575 0.0858 0.1269 0.2106 0.3315 0.4442 0.4269 0.2049
*
Post coeff. 0.0061 0.0170 0.0055 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0082 0.0080 0.0170 0.0191 0.0281 0.0201 -0.0164
st. error 0.0042 0.0208 0.0217 0.0132 0.0189 0.0188 0.0235 0.0344 0.0400 0.0510 0.0455 0.0192
Change coeff. 0.0421 -0.5389 -0.4907 -0.2406 -0.4899 -0.7481 -0.7932 -1.2024 -1.2693 -1.5375 -1.2470 -0.4966
st. error 0.0969 0.3229 0.2036 0.2171 0.2293 0.2308 0.4624 0.6718 1.0295 1.3659 1.3029 0.6761
* ** ** *** * *
Square root coeff. -0.0883 -0.6346 -0.5469 -0.3593 -0.4697 -0.8366 -0.7942 -1.2342 -1.2002 -1.2097 -1.1424 -0.9884
of change st. error 0.2041 0.3032 0.2479 0.2244 0.2939 0.3102 0.4160 0.5752 0.8026 1.0467 1.0001 0.5648
** ** *** * ** *
Square coeff. 0.0214 0.1136 0.0734 -0.0028 0.0452 0.0788 -0.0037 0.0891 0.0779 0.0428 0.0852 0.1109
of change st. error 0.0548 0.0788 0.0634 0.0678 0.0707 0.0802 0.1151 0.1382 0.1850 0.2420 0.2223 0.1431
Model 3. Change in dispersion
This table reports the results of the regression of compounded returns on the dispersion ratios. Model 1 regresses separately each of the compounded returns
from one month to 12 months after the announcement of the event on the prior dispersion. Prior dispersion is computed as the standard deviation of
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean, in the 2 months before the event announcement date. Compounded returns are computed aggregating
daily returns from the CRSP dababase from 22 to 264 trading days after the event declaration date. Model 2 regresses compounded returns on post
dispersion. Model 3 regresses a quadratic model of the compounded returns on the change dispersion (post-dispersion ratio - prior dispersion ratio).
Regressors
Dependent variables: Compounded returns after the announcement of the split
Model 1. Prior dispersion
Model 2. Post dispersion
Table 11
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Window length T
(in days)
Mean t test TEST(T) Mean Std. Err. t test TEST(T)
CAR(0,1) 2 .01557 15.25 15.18 .0048 .001000 4.84 5.49
CAR(0,5) 6 .01561 10.85 17.91 .0045 .001648 2.73 4.74
CAR(0,30) 31 .01593 4.96 18.94 .0076 .003465 2.18 7.80
CAR(0,60) 61 .02495 5.38 27.82 .0126 .004591 2.75 13.18
CAR(0,90) 91 .01678 3.00 18.41 .0020 .005459 .37 2.12
Payment date database
The table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns computed on five different event windows from the event day 0.
CAR(0,b) are computed on a window from day 0 to day b after the event. TEST(T) is computed as the ratio between the
CAR(0,b) and the standard error of the abnormal returns in the event window.
Announcement date database
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Tables 12.1 & 12.2
Summary of the Regressions of the CARs on the Prior Dispersion
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Prior Dispersion .0002 .977 -.020 .000 .056 .000 .096 .000 .117 .000
Market Return .005 .008 .005 .000 .012 .000 .012 .000 .013 .000
Size .008 .000 .006 .000 .012 .000 .017 .000 .017 .000
Book-to-market .005 .049 .008 .000 .016 .000 .016 .000 .020 .000
Momentum -.007 .000 -.008 .000 -.011 .000 -.011 .000 -.010 .000
Constant .015 .000 .017 .000 .013 .000 .020 .000 .010 .000
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Prior Dispersion -.007 .315 .013 .035 .182 .000 .153 .000 .197 .000
Market Return .006 .000 .008 .000 .013 .000 .015 .000 .015 .000
Size .009 .000 .012 .000 .012 .000 .016 .000 .016 .000
Book-to-market .004 .079 .008 .001 .019 .000 .024 .000 .026 .000
Momentum -.004 .002 -.010 .000 -.011 .000 -.012 .000 -.010 .000
Constant .005 .000 .004 .000 -.002 .095 .005 .000 -.008 .000
CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60) CAR(0,90)
Table 12.2 Payment date database
CAR(0,90)
Tables 12.1 & 12.2 sum up the main results of the linear regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns on the
prior dispersion and the four factors (market return, size, book-to-market and momentum) at the month of the
event for both the announcement date database ( Table 12.1 ) and the payment date database ( Table 12.2 ). For
each coefficient, the p-value is reported.
Table 12.1 Announcement date database
CAR(0,1) CAR(0,5) CAR(0,30) CAR(0,60)
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Chapter 4
An empirical literature re-
view on herding
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the literature on institutional herding. The
primary focus is on the empirical works, looking at the principal mea-
sures developed and the main ndings on herding among institutional
investors. Nevertheless, it is necessary to briey introduce the most
important theoretical families of models.
The denition of herding does not nd universal agreement, as it
depends on the aim of the research. In the theoretical literature of
rational social learning, herding is broadly dened as "a situation in
which all agents take the same action after some date" (Chamley, 2003,
pag. 5). In turn, the empirical literature mainly identies herding with
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correlated trading (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).1
The main question in the literature is whether herding can have an
ine¢ cient impact on the market variables and lead to excess volatility
and market fragility. Actually, most of the empirical and theoretical
literature focuses on analyzing whether herding moves prices away from
their fundamental values for long periods of time, or whether it helps the
information aggregation to become more rapid and e¢ cient. Many au-
thors focus primarily on the behaviour of institutional investors. Given
their growing importance, their acting as a herd could have a more
visible and stronger impact on the market variables. Recent studies, in
fact, document a relation between swings in institutional demand and
same period stock returns and these swings can be aggravated by cor-
related trading among institutions (Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers,
1995; Wermers, 1999; Sias, Starks and Titman, 2001).
Most of the empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between
the direction of herding and the future short term returns (Nofsinger
and Sias, 1999). This is consistent with a positive stabilizing e¤ect,
whereby herding pushes prices closer to their e¢ cient level. However,
recent papers conversely show a destabilizing e¤ect on prices, as herding
helps to predict reversals in long term returns (Dasgupta, Prat and
Verardo, 2010).
Theoretical and empirical literature is, however, notably hard to
connect. In particular, empirical studies struggle to identify a clean
measure of herding in real functioning markets.
The fundamental problem arises from its denition. In most em-
pirical works, herding is dened in terms of correlated behaviour across
1 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature, see Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2000), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Chamley (2003).
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individuals, independent of the underlying motivations to it. The
strength of this approach lays on the clear and easy- to- test deni-
tion. The main weakness comes from the fact that this concept does
not imply a coordination mechanism among agents. A correlated be-
haviour could, in fact, also appear when investors receive correlated
information and act according to it, but are still acting independently
of each other.
From the theoretical view, investors are not independent when they
exhibit herding behaviour, but rather, they act in response to the de-
cisions of other agents. The will of the individual to include other
agentsactions in his evaluation process is the main attribute to true
herding, which is also dened as "intentional herding" (Bikhchandani
and Sharma, 2000).
This limitation of the empirical literature is di¢ cult to solve be-
cause of the lack of data on private signals and on the communication
that occurs among real agents. A proposed solution is to factor out the
impact of fundamentals and examine whether specic assumptions be-
hind the theoretical models are satised. This method provides a way
of approximately distinguishing between intentional and unintentional
herding.
Alternative approaches attempting to overcome this lack of data
have been developed. We will briey review some experimental stud-
ies in nancial laboratories (as Anderson and Holt, 1997; Cipriani and
Guarino, 2005, 2009; Park and Sgroi, 2008) and the estimation of struc-
tural models based on the assumptions of a specic theoretical herding
type (as Cipriani and Guarino, 2010).
The rst approach investigates the overall market, assuming that
herding is a phenomenon more likely to occur in periods of stress. When
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big changes in prices happen, returns cluster more tightly around the
market return if herding is present. This clustering is due to investors
who do not discriminate enough between individual stocks.
Christie and Huang (1995) show that, in the presence of herding, re-
turns will not di¤erentiate enough from the overall market return. This
leads to a rise in dispersion at a declining rate or even to a decrease if
herding is relatively severe. Assuming that in periods of extreme market
movements, herding tends to be higher, they nd that the dispersion
of equity returns is lower than average during stress periods.
Chang et al. (2000) also consider that equity returns could reveal
the presence of herding, and, in particular, that the dispersion of re-
turns is a traditional measure of it. In the presence of herding, the
relation between dispersion of returns and market return tends to be
non-linearly increasing or even decreasing. On the contrary, rational
asset pricing models would predict a linear relation. The dispersion of
returns would increase with the absolute value of the market return,
since individual assets di¤er in their betas. Therefore, in periods of ex-
treme price movements, if the dispersion of returns increases linearly,
it provides evidence that herding is not occurring. A non-linear rela-
tion between dispersion and market price movement instead reveals the
presence of some sort of imitative behaviour.
A second approach looks specically at the behaviour of institu-
tional investors. As the market clears itself between buyers and sellers,
looking at a specic category of agents could show whether this group
particularly buys or sells through the process of herding. The two ear-
liest papers which investigate herding among institutional investors as
a correlation of trading patterns are Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Friend,
Blume and Crockett (1970). The rst authors investigate herding as
"parallel trading". They nd little evidence of correlated behaviour in
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the monthly changes in holdings and weak evidence of a relationship
between price changes and excess institutional demand in the same pe-
riod of time. Friend et al. (1970) evince that mutual funds tend to buy
stocks which were bought by successful funds in the previous quarter,
conrming positive feedback strategies and correlated trading.
More recently, institutional herding has been proxied by large vari-
ations of stocksholdings (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Dasgupta, Prat
and Verardo, 2010). Most of the recent literature denes herding as
the correlation between institutional decisions in the same period of
time or in subsequent periods. We will focus on the developments in
this eld and review two of the most important measures of herding,
with their subsequent improvements and applications: the Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) measure and the beta developed by Sias
(2004).
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 will briey in-
troduce the main theoretical models of herding in nancial markets.
Section 2 will review the Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) mea-
sure of clustering and its improvements and applications. Section 3
will focus on Siass methodology (2004) and its applications. Section 4
briey points out other methodologies developed by the literature for
this purpose.
4.2 The theoretical aspects of herding
In the theoretical literature, herding is characterized by a coordination
mechanism. Di¤erent coordination mechanisms bring di¤erent forms of
herding. A traditional distinction sets rational herding (see Devenow
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and Welch, 1996 and Chamley, 2003) against irrational herding (see
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1991). In the rst group
of models, individuals observe othersbehaviour and rationally follow
their actions while they maximize their personal utility. Non-rational
herding, in its extreme form, is instead based on psychological devia-
tions from rationality and it considers agents who follow each other
because they are driven by emotions, non-Bayesian expectations or
widely-spread coordination rules of thumb. Lying somewhere between
these two distinctions, are near-rational agents who use non-fully ra-
tional heuristics, which implies that they are utilizing the observation
of other agents in their decision process.
Another proposed classication distinguishes between intentional
herding and spurious herding (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000), hav-
ing in mind the distinction between theoretical and empirical litera-
ture. Intentional herding assumes the will of individuals to renounce
their private signals and follow othersdecisions. This can bring inef-
cient outcomes as this type of behaviour is fragile and idiosyncratic,
and subsequently, it may lead to excess volatility and systemic risk.
Spurious herding, instead, does not require an intentional will. Simi-
lar behaviour among agents may be due to independent responses to
their own private yet correlated signals. It may be driven by changes in
fundamentals, thereby bringing an e¢ cient outcome as it pushes prices
towards their new correct values.
In the purpose of this review, we distinguish between informational-
based models and positive-feedback models of herding in the nancial
markets.
The rst category includes informational cascades, reputational
herding and investigative herding. They are based on a strong theoret-
ical background and in all models, herding is triggered by the arrival of
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new information. In informational cascades models, all agents optimize
their personal utility, ignoring their own private signals and following
the behaviour of prior agents. In reputational models, agents ratio-
nally follow the herd in order to positively a¤ect their reputation. In
investigative herding, agents act alike because the payo¤ resulting from
following the same action increases with the number of agents adopting
it.
The second category includes characteristic-based herding, momen-
tum herding and investment style strategies. They are theories inducted
by the evidence from the behaviour of institutional investors in real-
functioning markets. The will of investors to trade alike, mimicking
their peers, is based on sharing the same trading strategies based on the
observation of past prices or companiescharacteristics. Characteristic-
based herding applies when investors show the tendency to hold the
same stocks, because they share the same stock preferences. Momen-
tum herding is a specic case of the former, for which investors co-
move by buying stocks with high past returns and comove away from
past losers stocks. Investment style is based more explicitly on be-
havioural components, as it occurs when investors categorize stocks in
broad groups and allocate their investments among these "styles".
4.2.1 Informational cascades models
Informational cascades represent the widest family of models in the
literature on herding which was originally proposed in the seminal works
of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). In
these earlier works, agents face the decision between investing and not
investing in an uncertain project. They have access to imperfect public
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information, an imperfect binary private signal and the observation
of previous agentsdecisions. It is through the observation of others
behaviour that they can infer othersprivate signals. An informational
cascade occurs when, given rationality, Bayesian expectations and the
maximization of their expected utility, agents are better o¤ ignoring
their own private signals and conforming to the previous actions of
their peers.
Herding occurs when the action of the agents is independent of
their private signals. The presence of informational cascades is shown
when all the agents herd and, period after period, private beliefs are
not incorporated into their decisions.2
Thus, an informational cascade is a failure in the social learning
process because it causes a block in the acquisition of public informa-
tion. When a cascade starts, herding is present and private information
is no longer incorporated in the behaviour that other agents can ob-
serve. Thus, an initial mistake will lead to all the other agents acting
alike in taking the wrong decision, with the resultant public payo¤ be-
ing far from optimal. The probability of a wrong cascade is not negligi-
ble, as Bikhchandani et al. (1992) show. However, a cascade is fragile,
idiosyncratic and path dependent. This is because all the agents are
rational and any small informational shock can break the cascade and
bring about a quick reversal in behaviour.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) adapt the basic model of informational
cascades to the nancial markets. In the earlier models the price is
given and xed, while in nancial markets the price updates to reect
the publicly available information. According to Avery and Zemsky,
2 An "invest cascade" will start when, given rationality and Bayes rules, the
agents decide to invest in the project following prior decisions whatever their own
private signals are. A "reject cascade" is a series of non-investments, given the same
conditions.
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the presence of rational risk-neutral actors and of an informationally
e¢ cient price mechanic, provide enough conditions to prevent herding
from arising. This is true if the only source of uncertainty in the market
comes from the value of the asset (value uncertainty) and there are no
market frictions.
Nevertheless, herding can still arise if agents face an additional
source of uncertainty. In addiction to uncertainty as to the value of the
asset, investors could also have imperfect information as to whether
the value has changed from its initial expected value due to any in-
formational shock (value uncertainty). With the introduction of this
two-dimensional uncertainty, the model is consistent with the presence
of herding, but there is little e¤ect on prices, which remain e¢ cient.
Finally, if we add uncertainty about the average accuracy of traders
information (composition uncertainty), not only does herding arise, but
in turn it leads to ine¢ ciency in prices, such as bubbles and crashes. In
this situation, traders cannot be distinguished between well-informed
and poorly informed traders. Consequently, herding destabilizes prices
and causes severe mispricing or contrarian behaviour.
The empirical literature tests these models by mainly looking at
conditions for imperfect information. More recently, a new microstruc-
ture approach has been developed.
In the rst approach, the literature looks at market variables that
could proxy for information availability. Traditionally, empirical in-
vestigations of this kind have used market capitalization. Grinblatt,
Titman and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999) consider that infor-
mational cascades are more likely to occur when the information avail-
able to the market is noisier, such as in the case of small companies.
Also, Sias (2004) consistently nds a signicant level of clustering of
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trades for small companies, in comparison with larger rms.
Other than size, Chan, Hwang and Mian (2005) consider the dis-
persion of analystsforecasts as an indicator of the quality of the in-
formation available to the market. They conclude that investors herd
more in cases of highly divergent recommendations about a rm.
Similarly, Kremer (2010) uses trading volume of the stock as an
indicator of the information quality or the stock return volatility.
Alternative recent approach aims to construct a theoretical mi-
crostructure model whose parameters could be easily estimated to test
for informational cascades. Cipriani and Guarino (2010) nd intraday
herding among informed and uninformed traders. They nd that this
typology occurs on only a minority of days. However, on some partic-
ular days, it can heavily inuence tradersbehaviour and destabilize
prices.
4.2.2 Reputational herding
An earlier family of informational based models considers career and
reputational concerns. Economic incentives are particularly delicate in
learning and decision processes when the external evaluation of per-
formances is linked to a market benchmark.3 Financial analysts and
fund managers are ideal categories to test for reputational impact on
their decisions. Applied to the nancial markets, Scharfstein and Stein
(1990) consider a one-period model in which managers rationally mimic
the investment decisions of other managers in order to maximize their
3 There is a vast literature on the e¤ect of economic incentives on the investment
choices of nancial actors. Roll (1992) derives the portfolio choices of managers that
are compensated relative to the S&P 1500, while Brennan (1993) builds an asset
pricing model in which the benchmark-relative performance represents an extra
factor.
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reputation. If the abilities of managers are not immediately visible
to their companies or their clients, conformity avoids being negatively
evaluated. Although this behaviour is socially ine¢ cient, it is rational
from the perspectives of managers who are concerned about their ca-
reers in the labour market. The basic one-period model is constructed
with one project to invest in and two managers. Managers can be of
two types. "Smart managers" receive imperfect informative private sig-
nals and their signals are correlated. "Dumb managers" receive purely
noisy and independent signals. However, neither the managers nor the
market know the quality of the signals, so managers can use their in-
vestment decisions in order to manipulate the learning process of the
market. The market can infer their ability ex post considering both
the performance of the investment and the performance of the other
manager. The rst piece of information alone cannot bring a denite
valuation, because of unpredictable components that could lead to the
smart managers also showing a bad performance. Because smart man-
agers receive correlated signals, if the managers mimic the prior agents
on the "sharing the blame" principle, the market would infer that they
have correlated signals. The authors prove that the manager that makes
their decision last will conform to the rst agents behaviour, no mat-
ter what his private information or his ability may be. The tendency
to herd will again lead to ine¢ ciency in the market, because private
signals are not incorporated in the public information.
Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010) construct a multi- period model
à la Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in which some of the traders are
reputationally- concerned. With the introduction of reputational con-
cerns, herding arises. Therefore, the price aggregation of information
is limited and the prices will never converge to their true value. This
conclusion is reached because managers do not have su¢ cient monetary
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incentives to trade according to their signals while the price becomes
more and more precise. The endogenous reputational costs of acting as
a contrarian strategy will be higher than the expected prot of exploit-
ing the mispricing. Moreover, this theoretical model explains the em-
pirical evidence that institutional herding is positively correlated with
short-term returns, but negatively correlated with long- term returns.
Additionally, the authors also propose a correlation between repu-
tational concerns and liquidity in the market. The increased presence
of career-concerned managers will decrease the price informativeness,
but it will improve the liquidity and the volatility of the market.
The literature nds supportive empirical evidence in di¤erent envi-
ronments. De Bondt and Forbes (1999) conduct a survey study among
analysts, evidencing the di¤erent factors that can help the develop-
ment of imitative behaviour. From their results, they stress the role of
the creation of a good reputation, the economic incentives system, the
sharing of similar mental schemes, the payo¤ externalities in acquiring
information and the likeliness of informational cascades.
By examining the behaviour of di¤erent classes of investors and
stocks it is possible to draw more conclusions on reputational herd-
ing (Del Guercio, 1996; Bennett, Sias and Starks, 2003; Sias, 2004).
According to Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010), it is more likely to
observe reputational herding by independent advisors and investment
companies. Their clients are more attentive to reputation, so these in-
stitutions are more dependent on sudden changes in net ows because
of reputation changes. Moreover, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show
that reputational concerns are more binding for stable stocks, because
errors of evaluation are considered more severely if more information is
publicly available. On the contrary, Sias (2004) evinces that herding is
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more accentuated for bank trust departments and insurance companies,
as they are more likely to be connected to reputational concerns.
Finally, Lobão and Serra (2002) assume that di¤erent motivations
for herding could also depend on the size of the fund. Managers of
funds of similar size would have a higher incentive to adopt reputa-
tional herding, as they are risk adverse in preserving their reputation.
Conversely, small funds would tend to adopt contrarian behaviour in or-
der to distinguish themselves. However, Lobao and Serra do not verify
these assumptions in their Portuguese sample of investors.
4.2.3 Investigative Herding
Investigative herding belongs to the wider class of payo¤-esternalities
models. Agents herd on the same action because their payo¤s increase
with the number of following agents who take the same decision.4 In
nancial markets, payo¤ esternalities have been studied with regards
to institutional investors who face information acquisition decisions.
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1994) develop the concept of rational investigative herd-
ing. The two papers start from two di¤erent sets of assumptions, but
they both conclude that agents herd on the information they choose to
collect because their payo¤s increase with the number of agents who
are researching the same source. Froot et al. assume risk-neutral in-
vestors with exogenous short horizons. Hirshleifer et al. instead assume
a sequential arrival of information and risk-adverse investors.
Froot et al. (1992) consider fully rational investors who trade on
short-term horizons. Short-term risk-neutral speculators prot on us-
4 There is a extensive literature of the applications of payo¤ esternalities in
banking markets, but this is out of their scope of this chapter.
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ing their private signals if the same information is gradually aggregated
into the prices by the actions of following investors. Positive informa-
tion externalities are realized when earlier investors reverse their trades,
proting from the slow and gradual updates of the prices. Earlier agents
are constrained to reverse because of exogenous short horizons. How-
ever, in the aggregate market, these information externalities are not
e¢ cient. The traditional view of long-term investors considers neg-
ative informational spillovers that lead to contrarian behaviour and
lead investors to equally study all the available sources of information.
Short-horizon speculators instead have incentives to acquire informa-
tion earlier if other agents are then acting alike. As a result, traders
tend to focus on the same source of information, to the extent that they
herd on a few types of sources, sometimes of poor quality, neglecting
other pieces of information, which are often the fundamentals.
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) build a di¤erent model of investigative herd-
ing in which rational investors receive information at di¤erent times.
This assumption implies positive externalities in acquiring and using
the same piece of information. The earlier the investor receives his
private signal, the higher his prot will be in exploiting it, given that
other agents invest using the same source.
The sequential arrival of signals a¤ects both the trading decisions
and the information acquisition process. Early investors trade aggres-
sively according to their private signals in an initial period. Then they
partially reverse their trades as late-informed agents enter the market.
Their actions induce prices to move gradually closer to the fundamen-
tal value, and the prot of reverse trading increases. The basic as-
sumption is that earlier traders reverse their positions because they are
risk-averse. They appear as short-term prot-seekers "leaders", while
late-informed traders appear as "followers", because their trades are
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positively correlated with the former agents.
The sequential arrival of information also a¤ects the information
that investors are willing to acquire. They nd it more attractive to
invest in information that is followed by many investors. In this way,
the rst agents to acquire and use the information will prot by the
price movement induced by late-informed investors and the reversal of
the position. The e¤ect is the same as in the Froot et al. (1992) model.
Investors will herd in acquiring some information and in following some
stocks, while they will neglect other stocks and other sources.
There is however, no agreement on the empirical evidence of these
models. Researchers usually agree on the presence of herding caused
by informational arrival, but it is a complex task to distinguish among
the three types of informational-based herding.
Wylie (2005) concludes that investigative herding exists among UK
funds. He conrms that herding is stronger for the smallest stocks and
the largest stocks. Moreover, herding increases with the number of
managers who trade a stock in a particular period. He assumes that
the positive relation between herding and the number of managers is
consistent with investigative herding, as it is with all other models of
informational based herding.
Sias (2004) also tests for the presence of investigative herding. He
nds evidence of informational based herding, but that it is predomi-
nantly caused by informational cascades rather than investigative herd-
ing. In order to distinguish between the two types, Sias assumes that
the cross-sectional correlation between trades is more likely to occur
in small stocks due to informational cascades, while in larger stocks it
is more likely to be due to investigative herding. His results conrm
the prevalence of cascades, as there exists a monotonic inverse relation
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between herding and market capitalization.
Finally, Choi and Sias (2009) nd evidence of investigative herding
when analyzing the behaviour of institutions at industry level rather
than at stock-picking level.
4.2.4 Characteristic- based herding
The previous models are based on strong theoretical backgrounds, which
are centred around rational social learning and informational arrival.
Other motivations for herding have alternatively been induced from
the evidence of the behaviour of institutional investors. In particular,
starting from the "anomalies" of strategies not consistent with the ba-
sic dictates of the traditional nance paradigm, these models belong to
the behavioural empirical literature.
As well as the considerations regarding the arrival of new informa-
tion, herding can also be due to agents undertaking positive feedback
strategies. Investors collectively trade according to feedback coming
from the markets, which is by its nature past and stale information.
There is evidence that these changes in market variables can attract
the attention of investors and cause convergent behaviour (Barber and
Odean, 2007).
A particular case in point is when institutional investors hold the
same securities because they are attracted by the same asset charac-
teristics (Falkenstein, 1996, Gompers and Metrick, 2001, Bennett, Sias
and Starks, 2003). Gompers and Metrick (2001) focus on the motiva-
tion for the disappearance of the small-stocks premium in recent years.
Therefore, they analyze the impact of changes in the institutional share
of the market on the demand for stocks and prices. Institutional in-
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vestors have had an increasing participation in US companies over the
years and have consequently taken over the role of the "representative
investor" in the markets. They have a di¤erent, stable demand for stock
characteristics when compared with individual investors, thus a change
in the representative actor brings changes in which stocks are more
likely to be bought/sold and in their relative and absolute returns.5
Gompers and Metrick (2001) evince the impact of three main vari-
ables in institutional demand: prudence or regulations, liquidity of the
stocks and the historical returns pattern. Institutional demand is pos-
itively correlated to liquidity of the stock (proxied by rm size, price
per share, share turnover), company size, book-to-market, S&P mem-
bership and volatility. Instead, institutional investors tend to avoid
investing in stocks with high past returns and high dividends.
Hence, the representative investor, in a market dominated by insti-
tutional investors, will cause a convergence of behaviour around large
and stable companies, with low past returns.
Del Guercio (1996) focuses in particular on the e¤ect of prudence.
She looks at mutual funds and banks and nds evidence of a preference
for "prudent" stocks. In fact, she concludes there is a stable demand
for prudent characteristics, because institutional demand is positively
related to age, yield, S&P membership and negatively related to volatil-
ity.
Moreover, Falkenstein (1996) evinces that mutual funds exhibit
preference for highly liquid, transparent and volatile stocks. In fact,
institutions turn over their portfolios and trade more often than indi-
viduals; therefore they are more sensitive to transaction costs. Their
large orders lead to them preferably investing in stocks with large mar-
ket capitalization and thick markets. Therefore, rm size, per share
5 Given assumptions of imperfectly elastic demand and supply curves for stocks.
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price and share turnover are proxies for this preference for liquidity.
Historical returns patterns can also lead to cross-sectional variation in
institutional ownership. Higher historical returns and preferences re-
garding risk and return could motivate investment in large companies,
with high book-to-market and high past returns.
Finally, Persaud (2000) specically underlines the behaviour of
banks, considering that these institutions appear to share the same
characteristics preference because they are regulated by the same au-
thorities and they are induced to use the same risk management system.
Systems such as VAR techniques could bring all banks to buy/sell the
same typology of stocks in the same period of time.
4.2.5 Momentum strategies
A vast part of the literature on positive feedback strategies examines
in particular the preference for stocks with high historical returns. Mo-
mentum trading consists of the strategy by institutional investors of
buying stocks with high past returns and selling stocks that performed
poorly in the past (Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995, Wermers,
1999). Evidence shows correlated decisions among institutions as em-
pirical herding, due to the fact that most investors in the market apply
the same strategy.
There are di¤erent reasons for institutional investors to engage in
momentum trading. One set of reasons considers institutions as ratio-
nal investors who act in consequence to irrational individual investors.
Underreaction (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998) as well
as overreaction to information (De Long et al., 1991) can induce insti-
tutions to use positive feedback strategies. behavioural studies argue
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that institutions momentum trade in order to answer to uninformed
investors who are subject to psychological biases. Individual investors
engage in contrarian trading, because of the so-called "disposition ef-
fect", or the reluctance to realize losses (Barber, Odean and Zhu, 2009),
and, therefore, institutions provide them with the necessary liquidity.
Similarly, a conservative bias in individual investors causes them to un-
derreact to information. As a consequence, prices do not immediately
incorporate all the available information but rather this happens slowly
over time (Hong and Stein, 1999), giving institutions the opportunity
to exploit the mispricing, and so appearing as momentum traders (Bar-
beris, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
There are other rational motivations for institutional investors to
momentum trade. Due to agency problems in the money management
industry, contrarian strategies would take too long to pay o¤ (Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Also, because institutional investors
avoid small capitalization stocks, this leads to momentum trading when
they sell stocks whose large negative returns have reduced the market
capitalization (Sias, 2007).
Another set of reasons considers institutions as directly subject to
heuristic and not fully rational behaviour. They can be subject to the
belief that trends are likely to continue or use window dressing in order
to remove bad investments from the portfolio (Lakonishok, Shleifer,
Thaler and Vishny, 1991).
Empirically, the evidence of the relation between demand of stocks
and past returns, and the convergence of trading decisions, is mixed.
We have previously seen Gompers and Metrick (2001) nd evidence
against momentum trading, while Falkenstein (1996) nd a positive
relation between high past returns and institutional demand.
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Sias (2007) reviews the results of 11 papers on the topic. He reports
nine papers that empirically support the presence of momentum trad-
ing. However, only two of them provide clear evidence (Bennett, Sias
and Starks, 2003 and Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002). The author explains
that the discrepancy is mainly due to the use of di¤erent methodolo-
gies. Some measures are inuenced by the size of the company, therefore
they mainly measure feedback trading in very large stocks. Other tests
focus on the average institutional demand, whereas others on aggre-
gate institutional demand. Works using the changes in the fraction of
outstanding shares held by investors are using an aggregate concept.
Average institutional demand is measured by the number of buyers re-
lated to the number of sellers. In addition, di¤erences in the measure of
institutional demand can a¤ect the evidence of feedback trading. Some
papers focus on changes in portfolio weights (Wermers, 1995) rather
than changes in the number of shares traded (Lakonishok, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992). Using one or other of the denitions could even bring
contradictory indications of the change in institutional demand. Fi-
nally, the lack of independence between current capitalization, lag re-
turns and absolute value of measures of institutional demand further
complicates the tests.
Sias (2007) homogenizes the methodology and tests a sample of US
listed stocks from 1983 to 2003, nding strong presence of momentum
trading in all but the largest stocks.
4.2.6 Style investing and behavioural models
Another case of convergence of behaviour which is not completely justi-
able by rational motivations is the "style investing" proposed by Bar-
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beris and Shleifer (2003). They consider the psychological attitude of
individuals who think in terms of categories and di¤erences (Rosch and
Lloyd, 1978). Therefore, even when they decide on investments, they
tend to categorize securities in broad groups, such as by size, typology
and fundamental values. Then they take decisions on how to allocate
their funds among these groups (Bernstein, 1995). This attitude sim-
plies the choice problem of managers and, on the other hand, it helps
investors to evaluate the activity of managers. The non-rationality of
this behaviour, however, lies in the fact that when investors allocate
their resources, they fail to consider the absolute performance of the
stocks. They rather view the relative performance of a style of stock
compared to another one, which in turn has likely e¤ects on the prices
and phenomenon such as fads and bubbles.
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) state three propositions from their
model. Firstly, if investors are style-investing, there is comovement of
returns among stocks that belong to the same style, which is not con-
rmed by comovement of fundamentals. In fact, prices of assets that are
in the same style comove more than their cash ows do. The opposite is
true among stocks of di¤erent styles that comove less than they should
when considering the correlation between cash ows. Secondly, when
assets change from one style to another, they exhibit a relative change
in the intensity of the comovement of returns. They will comove more
with the assets in the new style once added to the new group. On the
contrary, their returns will comove less with the returns of the stocks
in the previous group. Finally, the returns of stocks in the same style
are positively correlated in the short-run and negatively correlated in
the long run, even in terms of market adjusted returns.
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Choi and Sias (2009) study the presence of style investing. They
focus their attention to herding on industries, rather than single stocks,
assuming industries proxy the di¤erent styles which investors are look-
ing at. They nd that the correlation between institutional demand
for an industry and the previous quarter demand is an average of 40%.
This result conrms that investors take their decisions looking at in-
dustries and herding on industry, rather than on single assets.6
4.3 Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) develop a measure of the con-
vergence of behaviour among fund managers in trading securities. The
assumption behind it is that, if investors follow each other over a pe-
riod of time, they will end up being either primary buyers or sellers of a
security in that period. Therefore, they measure the excess dispersion
of trades of a subset of the market, either on the buy- or sell- side, over
the same period of time.
They study the quarterly stocks holdings of 769 all-equity tax-
exempt funds, from 1985 to 1989. They select a small subgroup of
investors that is homogeneous enough to face similar decision problems.
Money managers directly compete with each other, in terms of clients
and evaluation. In addition, the subgroup has to be small enough to
avoid the group of buyers in aggregate balancing the group of sellers in
aggregate.
The main aim of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) is to inves-
tigate whether institutional investorstrading patterns inuence stock
6 Other developments and empirical investigations on style investing are Teo and
Woo (2004), Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) and Froot and Teo (2008).
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prices. They rst assess the degree of correlation across money man-
agers in buying and selling a given stock. Then, they examine the
presence of positive feedback strategies when looking at the relation-
ship between money managersdemand for a stock and its past per-
formance. Finally, the core of the analysis is to investigate if herding
and/or positive feedback strategies could destabilize the stock prices,
testing the relationship between the excess demand by institutions and
contemporaneous stock price changes.
4.3.1 Description of methodology
Technically, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) consider the av-
erage tendency of investors to buy the same securities in the same
quarter of the year, compared to an expected value in case of indepen-
dence. Given a homogenous sample of fund managers, a stock i and a
sub period t, the LSV herding measure is dened as:
LSVi;t = jPi;t   Ptj   AFi;t (4.3.1)
where: Pi;t is the fraction of buyers, dened as the number of fund
managers that have increased their holdings in security i in period
t (Bi;t), over the total number of active managers that have traded
stock i during period t (Nit), either buyers or sellers; Pt is the expected
proportion of buyers, aggregated across all stocks traded in the quarter
t. In some literature, it is computed as the average Pi;t across the
securities i, for the period t; or it is most commonly computed as
P
BitP
Nit
.
AFi;t is an adjustment factor, estimated in case of independence where
we assume that Bi;t follows a binomial distribution with probability of
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success Pt and number of trials is equal to Nit.7
The adjustment factor is necessary in order to correct the upward
bias introduced for securities traded by a small number of managers.
It declines with the number of active investors, and, when Ni;t is big
enough, it equals zero.
In the null hypothesis of independence of behaviour, the measure
of herding is zero, Hi;t = 0. The probability that an investor would buy
stock i at time t is equal to Pt, and jpi;t Ptj = AFi;t. Vice versa, values
of Hi;t signicantly di¤erent from zero are interpreted as a convergence
(or divergence) of behaviour. Hence, it measures the imbalance of buy-
ers versus sellers, compared to the expected proportion of buyers.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) nd weak evidence of herd-
ing, as 2.7% of imbalance trading on average, in their selected sample
of US pension funds. In detail, they nd that the correlation between
trades is higher for smaller stocks against the larger companies (6.1%
against 1.6%). This is consistent with the presence of informational
based herding.
They do not nd signicant evidence of positive-feedback strategies,
apart from with the smallest stocks.
Finally, they nd a weak destabilizing e¤ect on prices, given the tiny
correlation between the excess demand for a stock in a given quarter
and the contemporaneous change in price.8
7 It is computed as: E (jP i;t P tj) =
NitX
i=0
 
Nit
i

P iit (1   P t)Nit ij iNit P tj.
8 An accurate measure of the elasticities of demand for stocks would better
examine the possibility of larger price impacts from small amounts of herding or
positive-feedback strategies.
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4.3.2 Limitations and further developments
The biggest limitation of the LSV measure is that it is not a measure of
intentional herding, but rather of the clustering in trading patterns. If
herding implies correlation of the trading decisions, the opposite cannot
be said to be true. Correlation can have di¤erent motivations other
than the intentional will to use otherstrades in the decision process.
According to this, the LSV measure is equal to zero in case of no-
herding, but it could overestimate the phenomenon in cases where true
herding exists.
Moreover, this correlation of trades is based on the strong assump-
tion that investors can observe the decisions of others and can then use
them in their trading decision process.
Other issues a¤ect its interpretation, especially if the sample is not
homogeneous and the securities have a thin market.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) do not consider the volumes
of negotiations, but only the number of investors who trade them. This
leads to an inaccurate reection of the intensity of the phenomenon.
The LSV measure does not pick up herding if the number of buyers
and sellers is similar, but the amount of stocks bought are substantially
di¤erent to the amount sold. This distinction seems particularly crucial
if the aim of the work is to investigate the stabilization e¤ect of herding
on prices.
Addressing this issue, Wermers (1995) develops a measure of portfolio-
change correlated trading. The intensity of the herding phenomenon is
given by the change in the fraction of a stock in the investors portfo-
lio. Herding is measured as the comovement on the portfolio-weights
assigned to each stock by di¤erent managers:
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(4.3.2)
where: !Ii;t is the change in portfolio Is weight of stock i, during
the period t   1 to t; !Ji;t  is the change in portfolio Js weight of
stock i, during the period t     1 to t   ; It is the number of stocks
traded between period t    1 and t; I;J() is the time series average
of the product of the cross- sectional standard deviations:
I;J() =
1
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(!Ji;t 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2]1=2g (4.3.3)
Wermers nds a signicant level of herding with this newmeasure of
cross correlation. However, it introduces another distortion: managers
with larger funds will tend to have a higher weight in the measure.
Moreover, weights of stocks that increase in values tend to go up even
without trades occurring.
Besides, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) do not consider the
direction of the herding phenomenon. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers
(1995) propose an improvement that distinguishes herding on the buy-
side (herding into the stock) from herding on the sell- side (herding out
of the stock), respectively:
BGTW(i;t) = LSVi;tj(pi;t > pt) (4.3.4)
and
SGTW(i;t) = LSVi;tj(pi;t < pt) (4.3.5)
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They apply the distinction on a sample of US mutual funds nd-
ing on average little evidence of herding. Distinguishing between the
buy- and sell- side allows them to conclude for the presence of positive
feedback trading, even if it is a relatively small entity.9
Another improved measure is proposed by Oehler (1998), in order
to distinguish between market-wide herding and stock-picking herd-
ing. Market or benchmark herding is identied as a mere consequence
of market-wide e¤ects; hence it is an irrelevant component to inten-
tional herding. In fact, Oehler argues that market-wide net cash in-
ows/outows should not lead to similar decisions in case of active fund
management, while the LSV measure does not make this distinction.
Stock-picking herding is the excess to this benchmark level.
Oehler proposed a measure of the excess demand of supply which
has to be settled in the market, which represents only the market-wide
herding:
Oit = jBit   Sit
Bit + Sit
j (4.3.6)
More correctly, these measures are additionally cleaned, distin-
guishing only the e¤ect of active funds:
O(A) = jBit   Sit
Nactiveit
j (4.3.7)
9 Moreover, they present a measure of herding by an individual fund to access
the extent a fund runs with or against the crowd and how this is correlated with the
performance. In fact, LSV does not consider the intertemporal trading behavior of
a specic fund (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000).
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where N (A)it is the number of funds that allows for investments in
stock i:
The stock-picking level of herding is the excess of the LSV measure
once we adjust for the market-wide herding:
O
(A)
it (adj) = j(
Bit
Nit
  (P buyt   P sellt )j   AF (A)it (4.3.8)
where: P buyt (P
sell
t ) is the average probability for a buying (sell-
ing) decision, and AF (A)it is the adjustment factor that follows the same
properties as LSV. It represents the expected value of O(A)it in case of
no herding, when Bit(Sit) follows a binomial distribution with parame-
ters P buyt (P
sell
t ) and Nit. Additionally, he controls for the di¤erence
between buying and selling decisions of the funds being a random de-
cision process. It can be written as:
AF
(A)
it = jE[
Bit
Nit
  P buyt ]  E[
Sit
Nit
  P sellt ]j (4.3.9)
Studying a sample of German mutual funds, Oehler nds strong
evidence of herding due to the entire mutual fund industry facing cash
inows/outows. However, not much stock-picking herding is left in
excess to this market-wide benchmark.
Moreover, Wylie (2005) criticizes the assumptions under the null
hypothesis of no herding. He argues that short-selling constraints and
money manager heterogeneity can induce the measure to over-estimate
herding where there is none.
Firstly, if institutional investors are subject to short sell constraints,
the number of sellers for a stock- period cannot be higher than the
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number of managers who hold the stock at the beginning of the period.
The distribution of sells is therefore truncated on the left.
Secondly, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) simplify the dis-
tribution of trades in a stock-period. In the absence of herding, trades
follow a Bernoulli distribution, where each trial is independent of all
other trials and the probability of success Pt is invariant across all
managers and stocks in a period t. They do not consider the specic
propensity of the manager j to buy stock i in period t, represented by
the parameter pjit = Pr ob(X
j
it =buyjXjit 2 fbuy, sellg). In the LSV
measure, the ex-ante probability of buyers is assumed to be constant
across managers and companies, as pjit = Pt;8i; j; regardless for exam-
ple of the initial holding in the stock or liquidity needs. If signicant
cross section variation is found, then the null of no herding is mistakenly
rejected.
Wylie (2005) estimates the sampling distribution of LSV using a
sample of UK funds. His evidence shows a level of unadjusted LSV
similar to US studies, as 2.6% on average in the overall sample. How-
ever, in funds where managers cannot short sell stocks, the LSV is not
calibrated to zero and 1.5% of the 2.6% of herding can be attributable
to short-selling constraints. Then, checking the e¤ect of cross-sectional
variation among managers on the propensity to buy, its e¤ect on the
LSV measure in the UK market is small and negative.
Another issue is raised by Frey, Herbst and Walter (2007). They
argue that the LSV measure is downwards biased because of the ad-
justment factor. Without the AF, the measure will overestimate the
true level of herding in case of a small number of funds. However,
it overcorrects leading to an underestimation of herding. Using a mi-
crostructure framework, they show that the LSV measure is unbiased
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only if the number of transactions per stock and period is very large.
In cases of a smaller number of transactions the bias is function of the
number of trades in a stock per period and the true level of herding.
This introduced bias has three main characteristics. Firstly it in-
creases with the true level of herding. Secondly, it decreases with the
number of trades in a stock and lastly, this decrease is more pronounced
when true herding is higher. This bias implies in particular that di¤er-
ences between unequal subsets of the data might be a¤ected solely by
sample di¤erences in the trading activity (such as the number of active
funds itself or company size).
This criticism stimulates the development of an improved measure
of clustering. Frey et al. (2007) build a structural model of investor
transactions and herding consistent with the LSV measure. Then, they
suggest an alternative measure of herding that works unbiasely in the
same structural framework.
Dening the LSV measure as the excess dispersion in either buy or
sell probabilities in a stock-quarter, there are three assumptions for a
consistent model:
 under the null hypothesis of no herding, the probability of being
a buyer of stock i at time t corresponds to the overall probability
of buys during the period of analysis;
 herding is dened as deviation from the overall buy probability
during the period;
 herding can be either on the buy or on the sell side.10
10 In a consistent model the probability that the stock i is bought by a fund
manager active in period t is:
it = t + itit,
where: t is the overall probability of buys in period t for all stocks; it is an
unobservable variable indicating whether herding is on the buy (it = 1) or sell side
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Given the three assumptions and the microstructure model, the
LSV measure can be written as:
LSV q;s = j bit
nit
  btj   E[j ebit
nit
  btj;ebit  B(bt; nit] (4.3.10)
where: bit is the number of buys transactions of stock i in period
t; nit is the total number of transactions for stock i in period t; and bt
is the average proportion of buys to the total number of transactions
in any stock in period t. This is the expected probability of a buy
under the hypothesis of no herding. E[jfbit
nit
  btj;ebit  B(bt; nit] is the
adjustment factor, that represents the expected value of the dispersion
of buys, assuming that the buys are binomially distributed. With nit
fund managers active in stock i - quarter t, the number of buys is the
result of nit draws from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability
of t:
They propose an alternative measure, which uses the second mo-
ment of the excess dispersion of buyers:
FHW 2it = ((
bit
nit
  bt)2   E[(ebit
nit
  bt)2;ebit  B(bt; nit)]) 1
nit(nit   1)
(4.3.11)
or alternatively:
FHW 2q;s =
(bit   btnit)2   nitbt(1  bt)
nit(nit   1) (4.3.12)
In order to make it comparable with the original LSV, they use the
square root of the aggregated herding measure.
(it =  1), with equal probabilities; and it is the true degree of herding in stock i
- quarter t:
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The authors prove that this new measure is an unbiased and con-
sistent estimator of the parameter  in their structural model.
However, while it excels over the LSV in measuring the level of
herding in cases where it exists, it is not as reliable as the LSV under
the null hypothesis of no herding. The authors suggest therefore the
use of both measures. The LSV is a good rst step to test for the
presence of herding, because it is consistent and unbiased under the
null hypothesis. The FHW can then be used as a good estimator of
herding once the presence of correlated trading is tested.
Frey et al. (2007) apply the two measures on a set of German mu-
tual funds, excluding passively managed funds, sorting the stocks per
returns and market capitalization. They nd evidence that the FHW
measure is considerably higher than the LSV (2.8 times higher on aver-
age) and it monotonically increases when more funds trade in a stock.
Then, the relative bias between LSV and FHW decreases with an in-
crease in trading activity, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
the LSV is downward biased for stocks with low trading activity.
Consistently, the relative di¤erences between classes of stocks, is
less pronounced under the FHW than under the LSV. Moreover, the
FHW measure of herding is u- shaped when stocks are grouped by size.
4.3.3 Other applications
Despite the limitations, the empirical literature widely used the LSV
measure to assess herding. Mainly because of its simplicity and intu-
itiveness, it has been applied to di¤erent markets, assets and countries.
However, many studies show little evidence of herding among investors,
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especially in the US and the UK (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992,
Grinblatt et al., 1995, Wylie, 2005).
We classify the applications of the LSV measure considering:
 US or non-US markets;
 Stock or other securities markets;
 Quarterly or higher frequency data.
Earlier papers focus on investigating the US market, where data on
quarterly stock holdings is widely available, given transparency regula-
tions. However, little evidence of herding is found in the US market,
which is consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Grinblatt et al. (1995) study a sample of 274 US mutual funds from
1974 to 1984, conrming the small intensity of the imitative phenom-
enon.
They focus on investigating momentum herding; therefore they
classify the stocks based on their past performance. The results show a
higher level of buy- herding for past winners stocks, and hence evidence
for the use of positive feedback strategies in buying decisions. They do
not nd similar results for sell- herding for past losers.
Moreover, when they classify funds in homogenous groups based on
investment style, they nd even less evidence of herding in the di¤erent
classes when compared with the average level. Finally, they assess a
weak tendency at a fund level to run with or against the herd.
Wermers (1999) studies a larger and long term sample, looking at
all US mutual funds from 1975 to 1994. The main aim of his work
is to test the stabilizing e¤ect on prices. First, he nds evidence of a
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slightly higher level of herding when compared to Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992). Specically, he shows that the LSV measure de-
creases with the trading activity (as dened by the number of traders)
and it is negatively related to the market capitalization of the compa-
nies.
Then, he shows that this herding is benecial to the market, as it
pushes quickly prices close to their fundamental values. This conclusion
is reached from the fact that stocks bought by herding have on average
higher contemporaneous and future returns than stocks sold by herding,
especially when considering small stocks, and this di¤erential persists
over time.
Looking at momentum strategies, Wermers conrms that buy herd-
ing is stronger in stocks with high past returns. However, sell herding
is stronger and increases for companies with poor past performances,
in contrast with Grinblatt et al. (1995). Window dressing considera-
tions are excluded because there is no variation in sell herding across
quarters in a year.
Brown et al. (2007) study the impact of analystsrecommendations
on institutional herding. They apply the LSV measures and the Grin-
blatt et al. (1995) buy- sell distinction on a sample of funds from 1994
to 2003. They nd evidence of interactions between analystsrevisions
and mutual funds herding. An increase in consensus among analysts
induces rises on buy- herding, while decline in consensus pushes sell-
herding up. However, this documented level of herding has an ine¢ -
cient e¤ect on prices, inducing overreactions.
More recently, the focus of such analysis moved to the behaviour of
other geographical markets, especially less developed markets. There
are many contributions exploring the phenomenon of herding in several
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other countries and the phenomenon is usually documented to be at a
higher level than in the US. Kim andWei (2002a), Kim andWei (2002b)
were among the rst authors to look at a market outside the US. They
investigate the trading decisions of investors in Korea, nding higher
level of herding among foreign institutional investors. In contrast, Kim
and Nofsinger (2005) study institutional herding in Japan and although
they nd smaller herding than in the US, there is a higher price impact
of herding on Japanese stocks. More recent papers use both the LSV
and the FHWmeasures, as for example Blasco et al. (2009)) who study
the Spanish market or Arouri et al. (2010) who investigate the French
market.
There are several reasons for this di¤erence. Informational opaque-
ness is higher in less developed markets. A di¤erence in herding because
of informational opaqueness can be linked closely to informational-
based herding. Lobão and Serra (2002) test quarterly data in the
Portuguese market, among 32 mutual funds between 1998 and 2000.
They nd a 4-5 times stronger level of herding (11.38% on average)
than the one documented by previous studies in the US market, which
is especially strong in terms of buying herding. Averaging the LSV
in subgroups by the size of fund portfolio, they nd that herding is
higher for medium-sized funds and funds trading in a higher number
of stocks. The motivation for this can be understood when consider-
ing that an excessive specialization will encourage a simplication of
decision processes and lead to naive techniques. They also show that
herding is correlated with the volatility and the sentiment of the mar-
ket, being at its lowest in growing and volatile markets.
Walter and Weber (2006) link herding with the stage of develop-
ment of the market, motivating the di¤erences in markets with more
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incomplete regulatory frameworks and less transparent markets. They
investigate herding behaviour in German mutual funds and they evince
that German managers tend to herd more than their US peers and ex-
hibit positive feedback trading patterns. They also nd that a large
proportion of apparent herding behaviour can be attributed to changes
in the benchmark index composition. Oehler and Wendt (2008) also
focus on the German market and they nd a considerable amount of
correlated behaviour in moments of wide cash inows and outows,
which could be dened as unintentional herding.
The original works using the LSV measure are applied to the stock
markets. Another extension is towards the behaviour of institutional
investors in other securities markets.
Haigh, Boyd and Buyuksahin (2006) analyze daily data on future
contracts from 1992 to 1994. They conclude that there is herding among
investors in this sector, but that its e¤ect is not destabilizing to the
e¢ ciency of the prices.
Oehler and Chao (2000) look at the behaviour of German investors
in bond markets. They nd a signicant amount of herding, though of a
much lower intensity than in the equity markets. Herding is highly de-
pendent on the interest rates, and it inuences the market by a¤ecting
the shape of the yield curve.
Recently, Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009) have applied this measure
to investigate the behaviour of individual investors and the psycholog-
ical and systematic biases that induce herding. They also evince that
institutional investors are more likely to herd than individual investors,
even if for di¤erent and more rational reasons.
In the earliest empirical tests applying the LSV measure, the most
common data were quarterly stocks holdings from US institutional in-
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vestors, as this was the most easily accessible data. Recently, studies
have been proposed with higher frequency, such as weekly (Puckett
and Yan, 2007), daily (Christo¤ersen and Tang, 2010) or intradaily
data (Sharma, 2004).
Herding measures at a high frequency is much greater than quar-
terly evidence suggests. On an intradaily basis, Christo¤ersen and Tang
(2010) nd that the level of herding is twice the quarterly level (6.72%
of buyers imbalance on average, in contrast with 3.04% measured on
a quarterly basis). They nd that herding increases with poorer infor-
mation quality, conrming informational cascades at a high frequency.
Puckett and Yan (2007) also nd that weekly herding is 4.78% on av-
erage.
Herding might be understated using low frequency data, because
many trades are completed within the period of analysis, therefore
many trades which occurred due to herding, are not visible.
This will also make a di¤erence when comparing di¤erent types
of investors that act at di¤erent investment horizons. Informational
cascades, for example, are usually short term phenomena because they
can easily be broken by public information arrival. In these cases, they
are not detected by quarterly data.
It is also di¢ cult to correlate herding measures with stock-specic
measures that change over the period. Sias et al. (2006) proposes an
approach to use quarterly trading data and daily market data.
The proposed correct frequency to use in empirical analysis of herd-
ing is the average time between trades of a stock. The fact that larger
stocks are subject to lower levels of herding could also be due to the
frequency of data being much lower than the average time between
trades.
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Finally, there is a recent development of the literature that aims
to deliver more comprehensive analyses of herding and its motivations.
These studies use the LSV measure on regression analysis to analyze
herding in the light of other stocks and market characteristics. Earlier
examples are studies on the contribution to herding of size (Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Wermers, 1999), book- to- market (Grin-
blatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995) and performance measures (Kim
and Wei, 2002a and Kim and Wei, 2002b). These studies help to com-
plete the understanding of institutions that have a tendency to herd
more around small and growth companies. More recently, Gelos and
Wei (2002) nd a negative correlation between herding and market
transparency. Finally, Sharma, Easterwood and Kumar (2005) look at
internet companies and conclude that these specic category of stocks
exhibits a level of herding nearly double that of the rest of the market.
4.4 Siasmethodology (2004)
Sias (2004) proposes an alternative herding measure. He denes herd-
ing as the action of following each other into the same securities over a
consecutive period of time. Therefore, the intertemporal cross-sectional
correlation between the institutional demand measured this quarter and
the previous quarters demand, is proxy for herding. The underlying
assumption is that, in the case of imitative behaviour, the buying deci-
sion of an investor is explained by the trading decisions undertaken in
the previous period by the whole set of investors.
Once evidence of the presence of herding has been shown, Sias
argues over its motivations and its impact on the e¢ ciency of the mar-
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ket, taking into account momentum trading, company size, time and
investor type. Moreover, he examines whether herding depends on in-
stitutional ownership and market liquidity.
4.4.1 Description of methodology
The methodology is based on the number of buyers over traders, as
the LSV measure, rather than the dollar value of trades. The starting
point is the fraction Pi;t of institutional investors dened as buyers of
stock i at the end of each quarter t over the number of traders. Then,
the institutional demand for stock i at quarter t is standardized as:
i;t = (Pi;t   Pt)=t (4.4.1)
where: Pt is the mean in the quarter t of the proportions Pi;t across
all companies; and t is the standard deviation in the quarter t of the
proportions Pi;t across all stocks.
The potential level of herding is identied as the correlation t
between the standardized institutional demand i;t of quarter t and its
lag:
i;t = ti;t 1 + "i;t (4.4.2)
A positive correlation between the institutional demand and its
lag is consistent with investors following the past behaviour of all the
institutions in the market. Instead, a negative coe¢ cient implies a
contrarian attitude, such as if the institutional demand is still correlated
with its past, but investors reverse from previous decisions.
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Because of the standardization, this coe¢ cient represents both the
correlation between the standardized fraction this quarter and the pre-
vious consecutive one and the correlation between the institutional de-
mand and its lag:
t = (i;t;i;t 1) = (Pi;t; Pi;t 1) (4.4.3)
The estimated beta coe¢ cient is the key measure for the level of in-
tertemporal correlation between the investorsobserved decisions. How-
ever, Sias (2004) further cleans it in order to distinguish between the
correlation with the past decisions of the same investor and the past
decisions of other investors.
In fact, the inertia of investing in the stocks already in a portfolio
has to be cleared out. Reasons for this inertia could be related to trans-
actions costs, including liquidity considerations (Grossman and Miller,
1988) or informed trading (Kyle, 1985). Investors build a position over
time for fear of liquidity premiums on large orders; or else, investors
exhibit a higher correlation with their own previous trades for fear of
impacting too strongly on the price with the informational content of
a large order.
We can consider the fraction of buyers as the sum of a series of
dummy variables Dn;i;t that assume value 1 if trader n is a buyer of i
at quarter t, divided by the number of traders. Thus, we can rewrite
the coe¢ cient t as:
t =

1
(I   1)tt 1
 IX
i=1
24Ni;tX
n=1
(Dn;i;t   Pt)
Ni;t
Ni;t 1X
n=1
(Dn;i;t 1   Pt 1)
Ni;t 1
35
(4.4.4)
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Then, rearranging the expression we solve for the beta as the sum
of the two components:
t = t(1) + t(2) (4.4.5)
- the "following themselves" component:
t(1) =

1
(I   1)tt 1
 IX
i=1
24Ni;tX
n=1
(Dn;i;t   Pt)(Dn;i;t 1   Pt 1)
Ni;tNi;t 1
35
(4.4.6)
- the "following others" component:
t(2) =

1
(I   1)tt 1
 IX
i=1
24Ni;tX
n=1
Ni;t 1X
m=1;m 6=n
(Dn;i;t   Pt)(Dm;i;t 1   Pt 1)
Ni;tNi;t 1
35
(4.4.7)
where: I is the total number of stocks in the analysis; N is the total
number of institutional investors with open positions in any stock; t is
the standard deviation of the proportions of buyers of stocks i at time
t; Dn;i;t are dummy variables for each trader n that has increased his
position on the stock i at the end of period t, and 0 otherwise; and
Dm;i;t 1 are dummy variables that take value 1 if the investor m, with
m 6= n, has increased his position in the stock i at the end of quarter
t  1.
The rst component represents the portion of correlation that re-
sults from inertia in the investorsdecisions, who follow their own past
in and out of the same securities. If t(1) is positive (negative), the
trading decisions in t are positively (negatively) inuenced by the choice
that the same investor took in t 1. Instead, if t(1) is not signicantly
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di¤erent from zero for each period, then investors act independently
from their own past trading activities.
The second component estimates the portion of correlation that
results from investor n following other agents m, with m 6= n, in their
trading decisions. Thus, t(2) represents more precisely the potential
herding phenomenon. If it is signicantly positive (negative), there is
evidence of a convergence (divergence) of behaviour among the nancial
institutions.
Moreover, Sias distinguishes the correlation within the same in-
vestor type and with other investor types. We have previously seen
that di¤erences in the environments where nancial institutions are
working can inuence their tendency to herd and determine who they
are more likely to follow. Hence, this allows initial considerations on
the di¤erent theoretical types of herding that are more likely to occur
among certain categories of institution in comparison with others.
For this reason, the coe¢ cients of correlation ct for each investor
type is dened as:
ci;t = 
c
ti;t 1 + "i;t (4.4.8)
where ci;t is the standardized fraction of buyers among the type c
of investors, that is regressed on the lag demand of the sample of all
investors.
Sias (2004) shows that the decomposition of the coe¢ cient is still
possible and it further permits to distinguish the correlation between
similar institutions to the correlation between investors of di¤erent cat-
egories. The three additive components are in this case:
1. "following their own past trades":
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t(1) =

1
(I   1)citi;t 1
 IX
i=1
24Ci;tX
c=1
(Dcit   P ct )(Dc;i;t 1   Pt 1)
CitNi;t 1
35
(4.4.9)
2a. "following other investors m 6= n, belonging to the same insti-
tutional category C":
t(2a) =

1
(I   1)citi;t 1
 IX
i=1
24Ci;tX
c=1
Ci;t 1X
m=1;m 6=c;m2C
(Dcit   P ct )(Dm;i;t 1   Pt 1)
Ci;tNi;t 1
35
(4.4.10)
2b. and "following other investors m 6= n, belonging to other cate-
gories else than C":
t(2b) =

1
(I   1)citi;t 1
 IX
i=1
24Ci;tX
c=1
Ni;t 1Ci;t 1X
m=1;m=2C
(Dcit   P ct )(Dm;i;t 1   Pt 1)
Ci;tNi;t 1
35
(4.4.11)
where: Dc;i;t is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor
c, that belongs to the type C, is buyer of the security i over the period
t; and Ci;t is the number of nancial institutions of type C that trade
in stock i in quarter t. P ct is the average fraction of buyers over time
t belonging to the type c; while Pt 1 is the average fraction of buyers
over time t for any type. cit is the standard deviation of the fraction of
buyers of stock i in time t, belonging to the institutional type c, while
i;t 1 is the analogous standard deviation of the fraction of all buyers
of any type, estimated for time t  1:
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4.4.2 Further developments and applications
The limitations of this methodology are that again it does not com-
pletely isolate herding from a spurious non-intentional correlation. Sias
partly addresses this problem, distinguishing between correlation with
others previous demand and the same investors previous demand.
However, this adjustment does not eliminate the e¤ect of correlated
signals to which the investors answer similarly but independently.
We will propose a solution to this issue in the next chapter, using
the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors to correct for
passive market strategies.
Moreover, this methodology only gives measures of herding per pe-
riod, so it does not provide information at stock level.
Siass measure has been applied by other researchers to the nancial
markets, mainly to stocks in the US markets.
Puckett and Yan (2007) use both the LSV measure and Siass betas
on the trades of 776 institutional investors, from 1999 to 2004 on weekly
data. They nd evidence of herding and destabilizing e¤ects on the
e¢ ciency of prices, especially considering the sell-side. This result does
not conrm the ndings of older studies based on the LSV measure,
which conclude that sell-herding has a stabilizing e¤ect on prices. More
recent studies, based on Siasmethodology consider behavioural reasons
which bring ine¢ ciency to the prices through herding. They do not
nd destabilizing on the buy- side. Buy-herding is instead stabilizing,
considering the absence of price reversals after short-term buy herds.
Choi and Sias (2009) nds highly signicant evidence of herding
as cross- sectional correlation, when investigating the phenomenon at
industry level, rather than at stock level. Moreover, they motivate it
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with correlated signals and style investing. They nd that industry
herding is due mainly to investigative herding, thus investors receive
correlated signals at di¤erent times, and therefore it appears that late
informed investors follow early informed ones.
This result is after correcting for underlying investorsows. Fol-
lowing Dasgupta et al. (2010), they exclude the investors who are most
subject to retail ows (mutual funds and independent advisors) and
then look at the changes in portfolio weights rather than signs of trade.
They do not nd evidence of momentum herding: institutional de-
mand is independent of lag industry returns once controlling for lag
demand.
4.5 Other methodologies
We have seen that the main limitations of the previous measures are the
strong assumptions that a mere correlation of trades could be proxied
for herding. For this reason, authors have tried to develop di¤erent
methodologies to investigate the phenomenon more precisely, such as
laboratory experiments, the estimation of microstructure models and
econometric tests.
The limits of these methodologies lie in the econometrics robustness
of the approaches, which restrict their agreement in the literature.
Experimental tests on articial laboratories are one of the possible
alternatives to the traditional clustering measures. They directly ad-
dress the problem of lacking information on private signals, controlling
exactly what information each trader receives, according to a theory.
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They could directly test theories of herding, stating and assessing the
assumptions and deviations.
Anderson and Holt (1997) is one of the rst contributions to exper-
imental tests of imitative behaviour. They found the presence of herd-
ing, but their model is not applicable to the nancial markets because
of the assumption of xed price. The rst contributions to experimen-
tal testing of herding in the nancial markets are Drehmann, Oechssler
and Roider (2005), Cipriani and Guarino (2005, 2009) and Park and
Sgroi (2008).
Drehmann et al. (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005) perform
two similar experiments on a group of university students. They both
test a model of informational cascades à la Avery and Zemsky (1998).
Individuals have a choice between two actions, after receiving a binary
signal and observing a moving price that e¢ ciently incorporates the
available public information. Both papers report that prices tend to
exhibit lower volatility than expected and to revert to the mean. They
found that informational cascades happen, but less often than predicted
by the theory. Contrarian behaviour also happens, especially among
subjects with high signals in moments of increasing prices.
Park and Sgroi (2008) test for both rational herding and rational
contrarian behaviour in a multi-state multi-signal model, à la Park and
Sabourian (2005). Their individuals are represented by a large sample
of university students. They again found evidence of rational herding,
however less than the theoretical expectations, as well as irrational
herding.
A limitation of this approach is the validity of the sample of in-
dividuals they interview, as they are undergraduate students who will
not pay directly the full consequences of the decisions they take during
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the experiment. The rst issue is addressed by Alevy and Haigh (2006)
and Cipriani and Guarino (2009). Alevy and Haigh (2006) experimen-
tally compare the herding behaviour of students with that of CBOT
traders. They nd that students follow Bayesian rules more strictly,
but that they do not perform better than professionals. In fact, pro-
fessionals show a better use of the public information and they tend to
use private information more than students do, limiting the probability
of the rise of informational cascades. Professionals show their ability to
learn throughout the game and to update the usage of the Bayesrule
according to the stage they are at in the game. However, despite the
interesting results, Alevy and Haigh (2006) use a xed payo¤ frame-
work.
Cipriani and Guarino (2009) distinguishes themselves from the above
paper because they test rational herding on a group of professionals and
they use a model à la Avery and Zemsky (1998) with two states, two
signals and a moving price that follows an e¢ cient mechanism. They
particularly focus on testing the hypothesis of herding the assumption
of "event uncertainty". They nd little evidence of rational herding
among this group of real-world agents, and signicantly they conrm
the previous results from the sample of economics students.
Another recent alternative to the measures of clustering is devel-
oped by Cipriani and Guarino (2010). They build and estimate a se-
quential trading model of informational cascades, based on Avery and
Zemsky (1998) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Traders take deci-
sions on an asset of unknown value, trading against an uninformed
market maker. On informational days, some agents receive a private
signal of the changed value of the asset. On the other days, agents can
still trade but only for non-informational reasons. The market maker
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is uninformed both on the change in the value of the asset and the type
of investors, therefore he will tend to update the prices slowly, given
space for informed traders to gain prot and informational cascades to
arise.
The model parameters are then estimated using transaction data,
as Easley, Kiefer and OHara (1997). They construct the likelihood
function for the trading of the asset over several days, taking account
of the signals, the updated probability of a buy or sell and the history
of trades.
The results show the presence of buy (sell) herding in just 9% (11%)
of the trading periods, particularly concentrated in some days, days in
which herding also has a destabilizing e¤ect on prices.11
Another approach developed by the literature is based on econo-
metrics tools to detect dependence between trades. For this purpose,
Patterson and Sharma (2007) utilize two di¤erent approaches on in-
tradaily data based on econometrics tools. They use a bootstrapped
runs test and a test of dependence between interarrival trade times.
Using this method, they fail to nd a relevant presence of herding and
the market works e¢ ciently. The level of herding they nd is limited
to very small stocks and it is not correlated with dispersion of opinion
and analystsrecommendations.
11 Other examples of the direct estimation of theoretical models are Welch (2000),
who builds a structural model for analyst recommendations in which herding is a
parameter inuencing the transition probabilities between recommendations, and
Hwang and Salmon (2004) who model how herding a¤ects pricing in the CAPM.
Chapter 5
Stock splits and Herding
5.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses institutional herding in the specic occurrence
of a stock split. One of the main concerns addressed by the literature
on herding is the potential destabilizing e¤ect of imitative behavior on
prices. It is therefore interesting to examine whether herding has an
impact on the market reaction to the announcement of a stock split.
This event is still a puzzling phenomenon because of the abnormal mar-
ket reaction following its announcement and occurrence (Lakonishok
and Vermaelen, 1986, Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002). The presence of
imitative behavior could exacerbate suboptimal decisions in the func-
tioning of the markets and the announcement reaction. On the other
hand, a stabilizing herd behavior would help prices to aggregate more
quickly any informational content that is driven by the event. The ef-
fect is particularly delicate if institutional investors are herding, given
their growing presence and impact on the markets.
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In the light of previous literature, that evince an informational con-
tent on the announcement of stock splits, we investigate whether com-
panies that announce stock splits exhibit a systematic abnormal level
of herding with respect to the rest of the market. The intensity of the
phenomenon could help to explain the abnormal performance observed
in the event window around the announcement.
The main data for the analysis are quarterly stocks holdings of
US institutional investors, from Thompson Financial database, from
1994 to 2005. CRSP and I/B/E/S databases complete the information
with market and analystsdata. We investigate institutional herding
as proxy for market herding, dened as the correlation between trades
among nancial institutions over two consecutive periods of time (as
Sias, 2004).
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we measure the level of
correlation among investorsdecisions both in the overall market and in
a subsample of companies that have announced at least one stock split
in the quarter. Then, we propose an analysis of the motivations of this
behavior according to the theoretical literature and in particular to the
motivations behind the di¤erence in herding between spitting and non-
splitting companies. Finally, we carry out some robustness checks. In
particular, we control the estimated measure for a set of factors that,
we assume, imply a nonvoluntary correlation and we investigate the
stabilizing e¤ect of herding on splitting stocks.
Before proceeding, we need to acknowledge the delicate challenges
that the empirical literature faces in verifying both the presence and
the causes of herding among investors in real-functioning markets. The
empirical tests are usually based on the denition of institutional herd-
ing as the excess level of correlation with respect to a benchmark of
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independence. All the main measures of herding among institutional
investors that we have reviewed in the previous chapter are based on
this clear and easy-to-test denition. However, as it is true that herding
implies correlated behaviour, this denition does not allow to investi-
gate the coordination mechanism between agents, and therefore, it does
not allow in itself to distinguish among di¤erent reasons to herd.
This issue is an hard task to solve in the empirical analysis of real-
functioning markets, mainly because of the lack of data on the private
signals and private communications between agents. As data on the
inputs of the real decision processes of institution are di¢ cult to access,
the theoretical denition of herding, as the will of the individual to
introduce other agents decision in his evaluation process, is di¢ cult to
extrapolate.
One solution is to factor out the variables that could a¤ect system-
atically the decisions of all the agents. This is partly done in the ad-
justment factor of the LSV measure (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny,
1992). It is performed in our analysis controlling for variables that could
determine correlated trades because of market conditions (four-factors
Carhart, 1997).
We propose to use also di¤erent sets of variables to identify the
presence of specic types of herding. It is an attempt to reach conclu-
sions as accurate as possible on informational herding versus feedback
strategies herding. However, it is not an entirely clean test, as both the
four di¤erent types of herding and the sets of variables used are not
completely disjoint one another.1
1 Further research will focus on minimizing this limitation with a di¤erent
methodology, using a microstructure models that could identify a cleaner impact of
informational-based herding on the days around the announcement of a split.
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The fact, however, that we are comparing two distinct groups, split-
ting and nonsplitting companies, and that the interest of the analysis
is mostly on the di¤erence between groups, could mitigate these lim-
itations. Both samples share the same di¢ culties and lack of data,
therefore we concentrate in extrapolating any interesting di¤erence be-
tween the two categories of stocks.
Said so, the starting point in the measurement of the convergence
of behavior among institutions is the methodology developed by Sias
(2004), estimating the intertemporal correlation of the institutional de-
mand. In the presence of herding, the trading actions observed in the
previous quarter will help to explain this quarters decisions.
We nd that the rst order serial correlations of the fraction of
investors buying this quarter are always positive and highly signicant
in any period.2 The phenomenon is particularly intense between 1998
and 2001. Restricting the analysis to splitting stocks, we observe a
negligible di¤erence on the average beta coe¢ cients with respect to
the non-splitting sample. Investors tend to herd slightly more when
they trade on splitting companies in the subperiod from 1994 to 2001,
while we observe a higher herding on non-splitting companies, even if
still not signicant, from 2002 onwards. In period of crisis, herding
increases for nonsplitting companies, consistently with the literature.
Splitting stocks are instead a¤ected by market crises in their number,
but not in the intensity of the herding phenomenon. This variation
over time, and the negligible average di¤erence between the two groups,
motivates additional analysis. Firstly we take into account the e¤ect of
2 As a robustness check, we also use the methodology proposed by Lakonishov,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that measures the convergent behavior in trading over
the same period of time. The results conrm the presence of a correlation among
investors decisions.
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di¤erent trading activity among companies. We see that the correlation
increases with the trading activity of the company and herding is more
likely to occur among non-splitting stocks once we take out the e¤ect
of companies with thin markets. The di¤erence between splitting and
non-splitting companies is on average negative for all the restricted
groups, reaching its minimum for highly traded rms.
We perform further analyses on the betas in order to account for the
inuence of factors other than intentional herding. In fact, if investors
are exposed to similar market conditions, passive trading strategies and
correlated information, they could exhibit clustered, but nonvoluntary,
behavior. We factor out the e¤ect of fundamentals and common public
information, cleaning the estimated coe¢ cients for the four factors of
Carhart (1997): size, book-to-market, market return and momentum.
The empirical evidence shows that these factors are signicant de-
terminants of the institutional demand especially for non-splitting com-
panies. Consistently with what stated above non-splitting stocks are
more sensible to market conditions. Passive strategies based on the
four factors account signicantly in the trading activities on nonsplit-
ting companies, while splitting stocks might tend to be more actively
traded.Splitting companies appear to be less a¤ected by unintentional
factors, as the adjusted beta still accounts for 93% of the total correla-
tion (against 85%).
The next part of the analysis aims to investigate the motivations be-
hind the observed level of potential herding and the di¤erence between
splitting and non-splitting stocks. We impose and test specic assump-
tions for four theoretical reasons for herding in our samples. Hence,
we construct a unifying model in order to estimate the contributions of
each type to the overall herding.
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We assume the most likely explanation for herding on stock splits
is that it is informational-based, and our results are consistent with
the presence of informational content in the split announcement and
consequent underreaction of the market. We can also add that this
underreaction is itself a¤ected by trading on herd.3
Informational cascades can arise among Bayesian agents who face
decisions in uncertain environments when they rationally ignore their
noisy and imperfect private information. We therefore test empirically
for the presence of informational-based herding, in the form of informa-
tional cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Avery and
Zemsky, 1998) and reputational herding (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990,
Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo, 2008), looking at market or company
conditions for imperfect information (Wermers, 1999, Chan, Hwang
and Mian, 2005). In order to proxy for critical information we use
small market capitalization, high dispersion of analystsforecasts and
low analystscoverage. In this case, the coe¢ cients of the lag institu-
tional demand are smaller than the overall Siasbeta, even if they are
mostly positive and signicant. This result conrms both the presence
of informational-based herding and factors other than informational
content.
For the splitting companies, we nd that most of the general level
of herding is explained by an informational component. This result
is consistent with the theoretical literature on nancial herding and
3 A recent work by Green and Hwang (2009) connects the reason to split with
a particular form of herding, such as style investing (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003.
The authors consider how the market is attentive to the nominal price, therefore
investors categorize stocks according to their price. This price-categorization could
be one of the possible reason for managers to split their stocks. In our work, we
have checked for reasons to herd as informational-based and characteristics-based,
and price categorization would enter in this latter class, as institutional investors
tend to commove towards stocks with high price.
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the empirical literature on the market reaction to splits. In particu-
lar, according to the information cascades model developed by Avery
and Zemsky (1998), when the market is uncertain about whether the
value of the stock has changed from expectations, herding can arise.
Moreover, if we combine this with uncertainty on the average accu-
racy of tradersinformation, it could link herding to mispricing e¤ects.
Once we account for informational factors, non-splitting stocks exhibit
a much higher and more signicant level of unexplained herding than
splitting rms.
In particular we see that the di¤erence in herding between split-
ting and non-splitting companies is explained predominantly by the
dispersion of beliefs among analysts.
We then look more carefully to distinguish career and reputation
concerns from informational cascades. Noisy environments can also
induce rational managers to mimic the investment decisions of other
managers in order to maximize their reputations (Scharfstein and Stein,
1990). According to Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2010), it more likely
to observe reputational herding by independent advisors and invest-
ment companies. Therefore, we test for herding looking at the di¤erent
institutional types and size-groups and the correlation of their trades
within the same group or extra group.4 We observe a high level of cor-
relation inter-group, according to the size of the investor. In particular,
the correlation of behavior is higher for big investors, where we assume
reputational concerns are more binding. They also tend to herd more
on splitting stocks, while small investors tend to cluster more easily
4 Moreover, Scharfstein and Stein (1990), show that reputational concerns are
more binding for stable stocks. Therefore, we alternatively look at stable stocks to
give an indication of the presence of reputational concerns, proxied by big companies
with high coverage from analysts.
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around non-splitting companies.
Informational-based herding however does not explain all of the cor-
relation for the overall market. In particular company size is positively
related to herding, contradicting with informational-based herding. We
test therefore for other motivations, such as positive-feedback strategies
in the forms of characteristic herding (Falkenstein, 1996, Gompers and
Metrick, 2001) and momentum strategies (Bennett, Sias and Starks,
2003, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995, Wermers, 1999).
According to the former, investors collectively trade the same rms
because they are attracted by the same company characteristics. Shar-
ing this same strategy would cause convergent behavior towards the
same companies. Gompers and Metrick (2001) nd evidence that the
institutional demand is positively correlated to the liquidity of the stock
(proxied by rm size, price per share, share turnover), size, book-to-
market, S&Pmembership and volatility. Instead, institutional investors
tend to avoid investing in stocks with high past returns and high divi-
dends. Regressing the institutional demand on its lag, interacted with
the above regressors, we nd that those variables have a signicant im-
pact on herding. Higher convergence of trades around large, more liquid
stocks with low past returns stocks. However, on average there is still
a positive component not explainable by characteristics motivations.
A specic case of positive feedback strategies is momentum trad-
ing, when investors buy stocks with high past returns and vice-versa.
Evidence comes from the relation between demand of stocks and past
returns. However, the evidence of such convergence is mixed, with
many papers nding a weak presence of momentum trading and only
a few which discover strong clear evidence (Sias, 2007, Bennett, Sias
and Starks, 2003 and Hong and Stein, 1999). We nd that momentum
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herding has little e¤ect on imitative behavior and it does not impact on
the di¤erence in herding between splitting and non-splitting companies.
The nal step is to test for the e¤ect of herding on the future re-
turns of companies. We observe that for the overall market and for
non-splitting companies, herding does not have a signicant impact on
future returns. Conversely, the imitative behavior we observe for split-
ting stocks has a strong stabilizing e¤ect on future returns. This result
conrms the informational content that is included in the announce-
ment of the event, and which the market reacts to. This is evidenced
by the positive relation between institutional demand and consecutive
two quarterly returns.
Yet, a signicant part of the correlation among investors and of
the di¤erence between the subsamples is still not explained by these
four types, suggesting that further studies can be carried out to better
understand other motivations, probably irrational, to the phenomenon.
The remainder of this paper ensures as follows. Section 2 describes
the methodology we use to detect, measure and motivate herding in our
samples. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the main empirical
results, whereas Section 4 reports the results of the robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes o¤ering some nal remarks.
5.2 Measuring herding
For the empirical verication of herding among institutional investors,
we start with the methodology proposed by Sias (2004). It consists of
estimating the potential level of herding in quarter t as the correlation
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across companies between the standardized fraction of buyers of stock
i in the quarter t on the analogous proportion in the previous period
t  1:
i;t = ti;t 1 + "i;t (5.2.1)
where: i;t is the standardized institutional demand for stock at
quarter t, computed as i;t = (Pi;t   P t)=t; Pi;t is the fraction of
institutional buyers of stock i at the end of quarter t; P t is the mean
in the quarter t of the proportions Pi;t across the companies i; while t
is the standard deviation in the quarter t of the proportions Pi;t across
the stocks i.
A positive coe¢ cient t is consistent with investors following the
past aggregate behavior of all the institutional investors in the market,
whereas a negative coe¢ cient implies contrarian behavior.
First, we estimate the betas on the overall sample. Then, we repli-
cate the quarterly estimations in each of the two subsamples of splitting
and non-splitting stocks, rst separately and then in a single model with
a dummy variable.
In order to compute the beta in the subsamples we need to com-
pute the institutional demand in the sample of splitting/non-splitting
companies only, as respectively (S)i;t and 
(NS)
i;t . We therefore estimate
a general level of herding as the (S)t from the equation:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
t i;t 1 + "
(S)
i;t (5.2.2)
i;t 1 is computed on a di¤erent portfolio than
(S)
i;t , that consists of
all the stocks traded in the previous period, splitting and non-splitting.
We have analogous general herding among non-splitting companies,
for which i 2 NS, as:
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
(NS)
i;t = 
(NS)
t i;t 1 + "
(NS)
i;t (5.2.3)
Then, we test the equality of the betas in the two groups.
As a robustness check, we investigate the di¤erence in herding be-
tween splitting and nonsplitting companies using another model speci-
cation that includes a binary variable Si;t. The variable assumes value
1 if the company has announced at least one stock split in the quarter
of interest and zero otherwise. We interact the dummy with the lag
institutional demand. We regress, thence, the standardized fractions of
buyers in period t on the fraction at end-of-quarter t   1 and on this
interacted dummy, as:
i;t = 0;ti;t 1 + 1;t
S
i;ti;t 1 + i;t (5.2.4)
A signicant coe¢ cient 1;t of the splitting dummy 
S
i;ti;t 1 repre-
sents a signicant di¤erence in herding for splitting stocks when com-
pared to the rest of the market.5
For a better understanding, we perform all the analysis in subsam-
ples according to the number of traders, Trdit. We restrict the sample
to the securities with at least 10, 20, 50 or 100 traders per quarter re-
spectively. This is an additional test to consider if the securities with
5 We could have a bias here that derives from the inuence of the number of
institutional investors, which is di¤erent in the two groups. If this is the case, we
should use another model that avoids any misinterpretation given by the di¤erent
number of investors in the samples, as in Sias (2004). We will address this issue
later, by looking at the number of traders.
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too few traders could drive up the results from the true values.6 More-
over, it homogenizes the samples for the number of investors trading in
the company at time t.
5.2.1 Intentional herding
An initial issue arises when we consider that the beta does not provide
any indication of the intentionality of the imitative behavior. Instead,
one of the delicate points for the empirical investigation of herding
is to distinguish unintentional comovements in the buying and selling
decisions due to correlated or fundamental-driven signals.
Therefore, we assume that the determinants of non-intentionally
correlated decisions are the market factors of Carhart (1997) (size,
book-to-market, market return and one-year momentum factor). We
assume they can proxy passive strategies and portfolio changes driven
by variations on the fundamental characteristics of the market.
Thus, we estimate a measure of herding "conditional on the mar-
ket conditions", across companies, regressing the previously estimated
betas on the four market factors:
t = + HMLHMLt + SMBSMBt + MRMt + MOMMOMt + t
(5.2.5)
where HMLt; SMBt; RMt and MOMt are the returns on value-
weighted zero-investment factors that mimic portfolios for, respectively,
6 In Sias (2004), the results of this additional test show that in the group of
securities with at least 5 investors, the coe¢ cients are even stronger, while in the
other subgroups the number of investors per security does not alter the previous
results. In our sample, we have already selected only stock-quarters with at least
three traders.
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book-to-market, company size, market returns and momentum, in quar-
ter t.7
The coe¢ cients of the factors indicate the proportion of the total
beta ("Siasbeta") that is attributable to fundamental- driven cluster-
ing. While et = (+t) corresponds to the clean measure of intentional
beta for the quarter t, that we call "beta adjusted".
Analogously, we distinguish between splitting stocks and non-splitting
stocks and regress the previous model separately in the two samples,
respectively:

(S)
t = 
(S)+
(S)
HMLHMLt+
(S)
SMBSMBt+
(S)
M RMt+
(S)
MOMMOMt+
(S)
t
(5.2.6)
and

(NS)
t = 
(NS)+
(NS)
HMLHMLt+
(NS)
SMBSMBt+
(NS)
M RMt+
(NS)
MOMMOMt+
(NS)
t
(5.2.7)
5.2.2 Testing for herding motivations
The next step of the analysis is to motivate herding and the di¤er-
ence in splitting and non-splitting stocks in the light of the theoretical
literature.
We distinguish informational-based theories, such as informational
cascades and reputational herding, and positive feedback theories, such
7 The quarterly factors returns are downloaded from the Fama and French web-
site.
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as characteristic herding and momentum trading. At rst, we con-
sider separately each type, both for the overall sample and for the
splitting/non-splitting groups. Later, a unifying model is constructed
in order to distinguish simultaneously the impact of all the above types.
Informational - based herding
Both informational cascades and reputational herding models are based
on the underlying hypothesis of partially noisy private signals. There-
fore, we consider triggering conditions for noisy information such as
small market capitalization, high dispersion of beliefs and low analysts
coverage. The rst two following conjectures will detect informational-
based herding of any kind, the third conjecture will instead distinguish
a reputational component.
Conjecture 1 In the presence of informational based herding, we ex-
pect herding to be higher for small stocks than for big stocks. This dif-
ference between small and big companies will detect both informational
cascades and reputational concerns.
This conjecture is consistent with much of the empirical literature,
such as Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999).8
Conjecture 2 In the presence of informational based herding, we ex-
pect herding to be higher when the dispersion of beliefs among analysts
is higher.
8 On the contrary, a positive relation between size and herding will conrm the
presence of correlated behavior which is caused only as a result of correlated signals
received by the investors (Sias, 2004, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1994).
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This conjecture is consistent with the evidence from Chan, Hwang
and Mian (2005) among individual and institutional investors.
We consider analystscoverage as a proxy for the public informa-
tion available to the market. We assume that the higher the public
information, the lower weight investors then put on their own private
signals and, in particular, the higher reputational concerns will be. To
take out the e¤ect of reputational herding, we consider the e¤ect of
coverage in inter-size groups.
Conjecture 3 Coverage and the di¤erence in inter-size groups between
low and high analyst coverage can detect reputational concerns, distinct
from informational cascades. Reputational concerns are higher when
more public information is available to the market.
This conjecture is consistent with Scharfstein and Stein (1990), for
whom, stable stocks are more likely to raise reputational concerns.
In order to model conjectures 1, 2, and 3, we model the Siasbeta
as a function of Xi;t 1, the matrix of C companies characteristics that
proxy for informational-based herding:
i;t = t(Xi;t 1)i;t 1 + i;t (5.2.8)
Xt 1 includes: sizei;t 1; measured as the market capitalization of
stock i in the quarter t   1; dispersioni;t 1, as the ratio between
the standard deviation of the earningsforecasts and the standard er-
ror of the mean of these estimates, measured in the previous quarter
t   1; coveragei;t 1, as the number of analysts that have published at
least a forecast on the company i in the previous quarter t   1; and
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(coverage  size)i;t 1, as the number of analysts following the company
in the previous quarter among the same size group of companies.
Therefore, we regress the institutional demand on its lag, decom-
posing the total beta between the e¤ect from the information quality
proxies, Xi;t 1 and other factors:
i;t = NIH;ti;t 1 +
CX
c=1
'c;tXc;i;t 1i;t 1 + i;t (5.2.9)
The coe¢ cients 'c;t are catching the e¤ect of informational-based
herding, in the form of informational cascades ('size;t, 'dispersion;t and
'coverage;t) and reputational herding ('coveragesize;t).
Therefore, NIH;t represents the remaining part of the total beta
that cannot be attributed to informational contents, while IH;t = (t 
NIH;t) represents the "Informational Beta".
An alternative test for reputational herding is the analysis per type
and size of the investor portfolio. We expect reputational concerns
to be more relevant when investors share the same trading strategies,
the same clients and especially are subject to the same benchmark
evaluation. Therefore, we distinguish between beta of the decisions
of peer members of the same groups and beta of the overall group of
investors.
Conjecture 4 In case of reputational concerns, herding between in-
vestors belonging to the same class type will be considerably high com-
pared to the total clustering of decisions among all investors.
In order to test conjecture 4, we run the analysis in subsamples
according to the investor type, and for each group we estimate the be-
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tas inter-type and extra-type, respectively "peer herding" and "general
herding".
"Peer herding" is detected by (T )p;t , that represents the coe¢ cient
between the institutional demand of type T with the past demand of
peer investors belonging to the same type T :

(T )
i;t = 
(T )
p;t 
(T )
i;t 1 + "
(T )
i;t (5.2.10)
"General herding" is instead represented by (T )t , as the correlation be-
tween the demand of investor T with the past demand of all institutions
of any type.

(T )
i;t = 
(T )
t i;t 1 + "
(T )
i;t (5.2.11)
Similarly, the size of the investors could give information on the
importance of reputational concerns (Lobão and Serra, 2002).
Conjecture 5 If reputational herding is present, the correlation be-
tween trades of investors belonging to the same size class will be consid-
erably high compared to the clustering of decisions among all investors.
In particular, bigger investors will be more reputationally concerned
than smaller investors.
In order to test for Conjecture 5, we identify peer groups according
to the size of the fund. Hence, we classify three groups, small, medium
and large institutions according to the value of their portfolio and we
reallocate the groups at the end of every quarter. The value of the
portfolio of manager n is computed as the market value of all the stocks
held in his portfolio in quarter t. As for the type analysis, we distinguish
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the correlation with the peer members of the same size class, (Sz)p;t , and
the correlation with any other institution, (Sz)t :

(Sz)
i;t = 
(Sz)
p;t 
(Sz)
i;t 1 + "
(Sz)
i;t (5.2.12)
and

(Sz)
i;t = 
(Sz)
t i;t 1 + "
(Sz)
i;t (5.2.13)
Looking at the di¤erence for splitting and non-splitting companies,
we carry out all the previous analysis in the two samples, in order to
test for the following conjecture.
Conjecture 6 We expect the level of herding due to informational con-
tent to be higher for splitting stocks than for non-splitting stocks.
Conjecture 6 is consistent with both the theory of Avery and Zem-
sky (1998) and the empirical evidence of underreaction of the market
to the announcement of this event (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).
We therefore regress all the previous models separately in the two
subgroups. For each, we compute again the institutional demand, as
demand for splitting/non-splitting stocks only, and we regress it on
the lag demand for all stocks. In particular, for splitting stocks (and
analogously for non-splitting stocks) we have:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
NIH;ti;t 1 +
CX
c=1
'
(S)
c;t Xc;i;t 1i;t 1 + 
(S)
t ; where i 2 S
(5.2.14)
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Also the analysis per type and investor size is performed separately
in the two subsamples.
Finally, all the estimated coe¢ cients are then adjusted with the
Carhart factors.
Characteristic-based herding
Gompers and Metrick (2001) consider the impact of three main vari-
ables on the institutions demand for stocks: prudence or regulations,
liquidity of the stocks and the historical returns pattern. In order to
isolate the total level of herding by characteristic herding, we control
for these variables which mirror the stock characteristics relevant for
institutional investors. In particular, we use annual cash dividends per
quarter and volatility of the stock as proxies for prudence; market cap-
italization, price per share and share turnover, for liquidity; and the
returns over the previous year, for the historical pattern of returns.
Conjecture 7 If the beta is due to characteristics preference, the rela-
tion between institutional demand and its lag is signicantly explained
by the variables in Gompers and Metrick (2001) In particular, we expect
herding to be positively correlated with size, price, turnover and volatil-
ity, and negatively correlated with past returns and cash dividends.
In order to test for this Conjecture 7, the total beta is therefore
modelled as a function of Zi;t 1:
i;t = t(Zi;t 1)i;t 1 + t (5.2.15)
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where Zi;t is the vector of the Q characteristics that a¤ect the insti-
tutional demand: dividendsi;t; volatilityi;t; sizei;t; pricei;t; turnoveri;t;
and momentumi;t (as past year returns)
Hence, we regress the institutional demand on its lag, decomposing
the relation between the e¤ect of the characteristics of the company i
at the quarter t  1 and other factors:
i;t = NCH;ti;t 1 +
QX
q=1
 q;tZq;i;t 1i;t 1 + t (5.2.16)
where:  t is the vector of coe¢ cients of the Q company charac-
teristics, and NCH;t is the remaining part of the Sias beta that is
not attributable to characteristics preference among investors, while
we name CH;t = (t   NCH;t) the "Characteristics Beta".
We also analyze the impact of the equity ownership and the char-
acteristic herding on the splits subsample. Thus, we carry out the
analysis in the subgroup for splitting (and similarly for non-splitting
stocks) and estimate the general level of herding as the relation be-
tween the institutional demand for splitting stocks on the lag demand
for all stocks:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
NCH;ti;t 1+
QX
q=1
 
(S)
q;t Zq;i;t 1i;t 1+
S
t ; where i 2 S (5.2.17)
The estimated betas NCH;t so estimated are then adjusted for the
Carhart factors.
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Momentum herding
Institutional investors could also herd because there are momentum
traders. If investors use momentum strategies, they would tend to buy
the same stocks with past high returns and sell the same stocks with
past poor performance. The presence of momentum therefore can be
seen in the positive relation between the demand for stocks of quarter t
and the past returns of the stocks. Thus, we take into consideration the
possibility of a confounding e¤ect in the beta coe¢ cient, which comes
from the fact that the past demand proxies last quarter returns if there
is momentum among investors.
Conjecture 8 If herding is due to momentum trading, the relation
between institutional demand and its lag would be explained by the past
quarters returns. Higher past returns would explain higher correlation
among investors.
Following Sias (2007) freely, we model Conjecture 8 decomposing
the total correlation between the past returns e¤ect and other factors,
adding the lag returns interacted with the lag demand, as:
i;t = NMT;ti;t 1 + tRi;t 1i;t 1 + "i;t (5.2.18)
Therefore, NMT;t is the remaining part of the correlation not ex-
plainable by momentum trading, while MT;t = (t   NMT;t) is the
"Momentum beta".
We replicate the analysis for splitting and non-splitting companies.
General herding for splitting companies is estimated from the following:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
NMT;ti;t 1 + 
(S)
t Ri;t 1i;t 1 + "
(S)
i;t ; where i 2 S (5.2.19)
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The betas NMT;t so estimated are then again adjusted for the
Carhart factors.
The unifying model
Finally, we construct a model that simultaneously distinguishes the
impact of the four di¤erent herding motivations and their e¤ects on
splitting and non-splitting companies.
We model the total beta from Sias as a function of all the previously
stated explanatory variables:
t = f(Xi;t 1;Zi;t 1; Ri;t 1) (5.2.20)
and we regress the following model:
i;t= 0;ti;t 1+
CX
c=1
'c;tXp;i;t 1i;t 1+
QX
q=1
 q;tZq;i;t 1i;t 1+tRi;t 1i;t 1+i;t
(5.2.21)
The autocorrelation of the institutional demand is, thence, parti-
tioned in three herding components. We recall that Xi;t 1 is the matrix
of the variables that proxy informational cascades (size, dispersion of
beliefs and analysts coverage) and reputational herding (coverage*size).
The coe¢ cients 'c;t would detect any Informational-based herding, ei-
ther cascades or reputational herding. Zi;t 1 is the matrix of variables
that a¤ect the stock preference of institutional investors (size, price,
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turnover, standard deviation of returns and past year return). The co-
e¢ cient  q;t accounts therefore for the e¤ect of any characteristic-based
herding. Ri;t 1 is the momentum factor, proxied by the returns in the
previous quarter, and the estimated t represents that part of the total
correlation due to momentum strategies.
Then, 0;t is the remaining part of the original correlation that
cannot be explained by any of the theories we considered so far. In
order to attribute it to an intentional component, we clean it for the
common factors that contribute to unintentional correlation, as:
0;t = 0 +
KX
k=1
kFFk;t + 0;t (5.2.22)
whereg0;t = (e0+f0;t) is the " beta adjusted" not explained by the
theoretical types under examination.
We estimate the same model separately for splitting and non-splitting
companies. We need to take into consideration, however, that the
splitting sample is, in some quarters, too limited in size to be reliable
enough.
5.3 Empirical results
5.3.1 Data description
In order to investigate institutional herding, we use the Thompson Fi-
nancial database to access data from the quarterly reports of US stock
holdings by nancial institutions over a twelve year period. The sample
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period goes from 1994 to 2005. We consider all types of professional
investment companies and advisors who are asked to ll the 13F form
according to the SEC regulations. Information about the companies,
such as stock splits data, prices and capitalization, are extracted by the
CRSP daily database and aggregated per quarter. Data about the dis-
persion on analystsforecasts and analystscoverage is extracted from
the I/B/E/S monthly database and again aggregated per quarter.
The overall sample is composed of 1,760 companies, traded by 3,690
investors. Other than due to the availability of data, we clean the
sample considering: (i) any manager that holds at least one security
for two consecutive quarters and (ii) any stock that has at least three
investors trading it during the quarter. This sample represents the
overall market, and the level of correlated decisions is our proxy for
market herding.
We select the two subsamples of splitting and non-splitting stocks.
We dene a splitting stock if the company has announced at least one
split in the quarter of analysis, according to the CRSP daily database.
We have 1,602 announced events by 890 companies, with on average,
2.44 events per company. There are 3,252 investors with at least one
of these companies in their portfolios. Non-splitting stocks are the
remaining companies that have not had any split announcements in
the quarter.9
The drawback of this denition is that we have a limited number of
observations per quarter for the splitting companiesgroup. As shown
in Table 1, we have on average 39 splits per quarter, ranging from a
minimum level in the second half of 2002 and maximum in the sec-
ond quarter of 1998. This distribution of events conrms the empirical
9 We consider only one split per quarter per company. Only two companies
announced two splits in the same quarter in our database.
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literature that considers stock splits as a typical phenomenon of ex-
pansive phases. There are 9 "problematic" quarters with less than 20
observations.
We discuss some descriptive statistics on investors and companies
in the two subsamples of interest.
Table 2 reports the average number of companies per investor (Cnt)
and the average number of traders per company per quarter (Trdit).
The latter is the denominator of the fraction of buyers we will base
our analysis on. Splitting stocks tend to have a higher average trading
activity, compared to the more limited number of investors trading
in non-splitting stocks. In fact, splitting stocks have an average of
nearly 184 investors trading them per quarter, representing 95% of
the investors holding these stocks in their portfolios. The alternative
sample has an average of 147 traders, representing 85% of holders. This
di¤erence is consistent with the stock splits literature conrming the
higher trading activities of stocks that decide to split their stocks.
We evince from this data that traders who invest in splitting stocks
are on average bigger institutions, in terms of number of stocks traded in
a quarter, Cnt. When a splitting company is included in their portfolio,
investors tend to hold and trade in a higher number of stocks. We
have on average 160 stocks in a portfolio that includes companies that
announced stock splits in the quarter, compared to 127 in case of only
non-splitting companies. Moreover, the splitting sample is slightly more
homogeneous than the alternative one, in terms of smaller standard
deviation and a narrower range of Cnt.10
Table 3 provides more details of the average number of institutions
10 In unreported results, we have observed the same conclusions using the value
of the portfolio held, instead of the number of stocks held.
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trading in each stock in the samples. We classied the number of in-
vestors in ve institutional types, dened as:
1. banks,
2. insurance companies,
3. investment companies,
4. independent investment advisors, and
5. other institutions, which includes foundations, university endow-
ments, Employee Stock Option plans, internally managed pension
funds and individuals who invests othersmoney.
The Thompson Database classication of the institutional investors
is not always precise, especially between investment companies and in-
dependent advisors after 1998. In fact, in 1998 two di¤erent databases
were merged leading to a change in the classication scheme and a mas-
sive transition from types 1-4 to 5. Considering the residual character
of this class, we assume no real changes occur to type 5 after 1998 and
we revert to the previous association as groups 1 to 4. Instead, we
keep as valid, changes between types 1-4 or from 5 to any of the other
classes. For new investors who are entered into the database after 1998
directly as class 5, we keep the observations as valid.11
We notice, as expected, the rise through the years in the number of
institutions trading in the markets. This observation conrms the grow-
ing importance of these investors and the concerns around a change in
the "representative investor" in modern markets. The average increase
11 This correction is similar in spirit to Sharma (2004) and Sias, Starks and
Titman (2001).
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is primarily due to a strong rise in the number of independent advisors
and in the residual category of "not dened".
Table 4 sums up the variables we use in the analysis. We can
observe that the companies who are splitting stocks are on average
predominantly bigger companies, with higher price per share, analysts
coverage and quarterly returns, when compared with the alternative
sample. Therefore, the analysis on herding needs to be controlled by the
e¤ects of these variables as well, to isolate their e¤ects in the di¤erence
of correlation between splitting stocks and the rest of the market.
Table 5 reports the covariance matrix of the variables of interest in
the following analyses.
5.3.2 Siasbeta
The rst step in the analysis is the estimation of the correlation coef-
cient between the standardized fraction of buyers of stock i at end of
quarter t and the same fraction at the previous end of quarter t   1.
We call this estimate the "Siasbeta". We rst perform the regressions
as in equations (5.2.1) for the overall sample, (5.3.3) and (5.2.2) for the
splitting sample (analogously for non-splitting companies), in the 48
quarters from 1994 to 2005.
As we can see in Figure 1.1, the estimated correlations in the overall
market are positive and statistically di¤erent from zero for all quarters.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that a level of herding
exists in the trading decisions of institutional investors.12
12 The results show levels of quarterly correlation much higher than Sias (2004).
He studies the period from 1983 to 1997, considering all the investors who are
required to ll-in the 13F reports in the US markets, and nds an average level of
herding of 0.1755 (given the same assumption to consider only companies traded
by at least 5 investors per quarter).
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Table 6 documents that the beta is 0.457 on average across all the
quarters, and it is highly signicant, ranging from 0.346 in 2005 to 0.562
in 2000.
The results from the comparison between splitting and non-splitting
companies are more complex.
General herding is higher than expected, implying that investors
observe all the trades that occur in the past quarter. The average
di¤erence between splitting and non-splitting is negligible and not sig-
nicant. Non-splitting companies exhibit positive and signicant level
of herding throughout the period, which is very close to the result for
the overall market, which is 0.457 on average. Similarly, for splitting
stocks, we also estimate positive and signicant correlations for 36 out
of 48 quarters. On average, the estimated coe¢ cient for general herding
in the group of interest is very close (0.467) to the alternative sample,
but more volatile across the quarters. However, even if the di¤erence
in means is not statistically signicant, the median results are clearly
higher (0.471 against 0.442) for splitting companies.
As we can see graphically, investors tend to comove more on split-
ting companies in earlier years until 2001. Yet, in the years after 2001,
the trend is inverted. We investigate the phenomenon in more detail
breaking the analysis into three subperiods of four years each: 1994-
1997, 1998-2001 and 2002-2005.
Averaging the betas within the subperiods, we observe that the
highest level of herding occurs between 1998 and 2001. In this pe-
riod we actually have the e¤ect of a number of crises, conrming that
herding is a phenomenon more likely to occur in moments of market
stress. We see that the di¤erence between splitting and non-splitting
companies widens once we break the analysis into subperiods and it
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then decreases through the subsequent subperiods. Splitting stocks
exhibit higher herding in the rst and second subperiods, while non-
splitting stocks have a higher level of correlated behavior in the third
subperiod.13 The tests on the averages are however still not signicant.
This time pattern can be caused by market factors. The next step
therefore is to cleanse the coe¢ cients from common factors that could
a¤ect the decision process of institutional investors. We are then able
to approximately discriminate between intentional and unintentional
herding. We regress the estimated Siass betas on the four factors of
Carhart (1997) measured quarterly, as equations (5.2.5) and (5.2.6).
The last column of Table 6 reports the average standardized co-
e¢ cients for the three samples. The factors are determinants of the
herding phenomenon, but the average betas are still all considerably
signicant, and continue to represent almost all of the convergence of
behavior. On average, the estimated adjusted beta is 0.448, as 98% of
the total correlation measured by the average Siasbeta.
An interesting result is that the relative di¤erence between split-
ting and non-splitting stocks rises once we adjust for common factors,
especially for "general herding". In fact, the market factors seem to af-
fect more the trading decisions on herd on non-splitting companies, for
which the adjusted beta is on average smaller than the total correlation
(0.447). Splitting stocks instead exhibit a level of correlation that is
even higher once adjusted (0.506). Furthermore, the test on the means
shows that the di¤erence between the samples is signicantly di¤erent
from zero at 10%. It appears that non-splitting stocks are more a¤ected
by passive strategies, while common factors lead to contrarian behavior
in trading splitting companies. In other words, when investors trade
13 Unreported results.
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on stocks that have announced at least one event in the quarter, they
act actively against the information content in common factors. This
observation could be a¤ected either by the characteristics of splitting
stocks and the tendency to announce more splits in moments of booms,
or by private informational content in the split.
We conclude that, after adjusting for common factors, splitting
companies exhibit a slightly higher level of herding in general terms,
especially in the earlier years from 1994 to 2001. Later years show an
opposite trend and investors then tend to herd on non-splitting stocks
with higher intensity. These results need more investigation in order to
understand what the determinants of this variation are, over time.
We continue investigating the phenomenon in more homogenous
groups, in order to detect any bias that may derive from a di¤erent
level of trading activity. We identify four subgroups considering the
minimum number of traders, Trdit, per company and quarter: at least
10, 20, 50 or 100 traders.
We report the results from the model specication that includes
a dummy for splitting companies, interacted with the lag institutional
demand, Si;ti;t 1. Then, we distinguish the correlation with past trades
of stocks in the same group, from the correlation with past trades in
all companies. We call them respectively "peer herding" and "general
herding". In the splitting sample (analogously for the non-splitting
companies), they are estimated respectively from:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
0;p;t
(S)
i;t 1 + 1;p;t
S
i;t
(S)
i;t 1 + i;t (5.3.1)
and

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
0;t i;t 1 + 1;t
S
i;ti;t 1 + i;t (5.3.2)
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We report the results in Table 7, distinguishing the three subperiods
of analysis, and in Figures 2.
The general correlation is always highly signicant and positive,
and it increases with the minimum number of investors per company,
except in the highest class. The averages in the restricted samples
are always higher than in the unrestricted sample, ranging from 0.51
to 0.60. This result shows that low-traded companies (with 5 to 10
institutional investors per quarter) considerably lower the average level
of herding. This gives us a hint that reputational herding is indeed
present, when considering that according to the literature, it is more
likely to occur in stable stocks, such as high-traded companies.
We can draw the same conclusions when we break the sample into
three subperiods. We observe in the rst period, a decline in all the
groups and a clear positive relationship between trading activity and
herding. The increase in the estimated coe¢ cients in the second period
is, in part, a general tendency, but is mostly due to an increase in
herding on high-traded companies (0.6342).
"Peer herding" follows similar considerations. It is signicantly
smaller than the general correlation, in particular for medium traded
companies. Investors mainly observe their peers decisions, but they do
not forget to keep an eye on all trades in all companies. Interestingly,
high traded-companies exhibit a level of "peer herding" that is even
stronger than the general phenomenon (0.5379 over 0.4916). This result
shows herding behavior within the group, but contrarianism with the
outside. However, when analyzing the subperiods, the relation between
herding and trading activity is shown to be much weaker.
Looking at the average dummy coe¢ cients for general herding, we
observe that it is always negative and it is becomes increasingly negative
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as the minimum number of traders Trdit increases. Moreover, it is
signicant (at 1%), when we focus the attention on companies traded by
at least 20 or 50 traders per quarter. Therefore, the di¤erence between
splitting and non-splitting companies is at its highest (even slightly
positive) for companies that are followed by a restricted number of
investors, while it is at its lowest (signicantly negative) for companies
which are highly traded in the quarter (-0.1016).
Distinguishing by subperiod, we see that the dummy coe¢ cient
is still negative and highly signicant in the medium-high groups of
trading activity. In particular, the negative linear relation between
the di¤erence in splitting/non-splitting herding, and trading activity,
is clear and highly signicant for the last period, when high-traded
splitting companies exhibit a level of -0.1906 when compared with non-
splitting companies (0.536). We observed the highest level of herding
in the years from 1998 to 2001, but the di¤erence between splitting
and non-splitting, therefore still negative, is not signicant in any of
the restricted samples.
In terms of peer herding, we observe the same pattern, but it is even
stronger. The dummy coe¢ cients are highly signicant and negative
for all groups with at least 10 traders per company. Especially high
traded non-splitting companies exhibit a very high level of herding when
compared to the same portfolio.
Summarizing, the subsampling per trading activity shows the noisy
impact of companies with thin markets, where we observed a lower level
of herding and for which the dichotomy splitting/non-splitting does not
imply any strong di¤erence in the intensity of the imitative behavior.
Considering only medium- high traded companies, the level of herding
increases with the number of investors, and trades on non-splitting
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companies are generally more a¤ected by imitative behavior.
5.3.3 The Theoretical types of herding
The next step is to examine the impact of the four theoretical types of
herding on the estimated correlation: informational cascades, reputa-
tional herding, characteristic herding and momentum trading.
Table 8 reports the average estimated coe¢ cients for the variables
in all the di¤erent models. In summary, when looking at the overall
market, herding is mostly a¤ected by all the variables we consider. It is
positively a¤ected by size, coverage, turnover, price, dividend and past
returns. This conrms the presence of all the theoretical types we con-
sider. They show a predominance of characteristic herding, especially
as size and coverage have positive average coe¢ cients. Non-splitting
companies have results very similar to the overall market.
The splitting sample presents interesting results, which conrm the
predominance of informational-based herding. In fact, the dispersion
coe¢ cient is on average positive and signicant in the Informational-
based models, detecting all of the Siascorrelation for the informational
model. Higher is the dispersion of beliefs in the quarter preceding the
split, higher is the level of herding. Characteristic-based herding is im-
portant as well. In fact, both in the Informational-based and in the
Characteristic-based models, size is the predominant factor that a¤ects
herding for splitting companies the most, and we evince a positive re-
lation.
We will now examine these results in more detail.
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Informational- based herding
First at all, we check for the presence of informational-based herding.
We regress the standardized fraction of institutionsbuyers on its lag
and on the set of variables which proxies for the quality of information
available to the market.
We model the correlation of trades as a function of size, dispersion
of earnings forecasts among analysts, coverage and coverage*size for
the company i at the end of the quarter t   1: Thus, the estimated
coe¢ cient of the lag institutional demand now represents only that
part of the correlation that cannot be explained with informational
motivations. We call it the "Non-Informational beta" (Figure 1.2).
The lag institutional demand coe¢ cients are always positive and
signicant for the overall sample and for the non-splitting companies
(Table 9). The coe¢ cients are smaller than the overall Siasbeta, being
0.40 on average for the overall market.
However, when looking at the signs of the other regressors, we see
that they do not conrm conjectures 1 to 3, but rather, they imply the
presence of characteristic-based herding.
Analyzing the splitting rms, we observe that the general level of
herding has a very di¤erent pattern. It is signicantly positive only
in 10 quarters out of 18. In fact, the mean across quarters is actually
negative but not signicant. This average "Non-Informational beta"
shows that investors even herd out of splitting companies for motiva-
tions other than informational cascades.14
We can conclude that most of the imitative behavior for splitting
14 However, the range of the quarterly estimates is very wide and looking at
the median, the value is closer (0.437) to the overall market and higher than for
non-splitting companies (0.401).
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stocks is due to the observation of past trades and is determined by
informational content. In fact, the F tests on the four regressors provide
evidence of the signicance of these proxies for informational-based
herding in most of the quarters. Moreover, the signs of the coe¢ cients
of the proxies all conrm conjectures 1 to 3 stated above, even if only
dispersion is signicant on average. The level of general herding for
splitting companies is much lower than non-splitting rms, and the
di¤erence is signicant.
Looking at the adjusted beta, which is cleaned from common fac-
tors, we substantiate the previous conclusions reached on the unad-
justed estimates. General herding is even more negative on average
once we cleanse for the common factors. However, it does not change
the conclusions for unadjusted betas and non-splitting companies. No-
tably, the test for a positive di¤erence in mean is even more signicant
(1%).
Characteristic-based and momentum herding
Once we observed the presence of informational-based herding for split-
ting stocks, we subsequently test for the presence of other types of
herding, especially in the non-splitting sample.
We check rst for characteristic herding, using the proxies for char-
acteristics preference, such as size, price, turnover for company at the
end of quarter t-1, annual dividend per quarter and return in the previ-
ous year. Then, the estimated coe¢ cients of the institutional demand
will be that part of the Siascorrelation that remains after the attri-
bution of characteristic-based herding (Figure 1.3). We plot them per
quarter and we observe that they are still positive and signicant in 44
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quarters for both the overall market and the non-splitting samples. For
the splitting stocks, however, they tend to be more spread around the
overall betas, but still signicantly positive in 12 quarters.
On average the Non-Characteristics betas, not explainable by char-
acteristics motivations, are still positive and highly signicant (0.363
in the overall market), but smaller than the average Siasbeta and the
Non-Informational beta (Table 10). Thus, this is consistent with the
existence of characteristic-based herding. Moreover, looking at the re-
gressors, we see that company characteristics have an important e¤ect
on convergence. The F tests on the regressors mainly reject the null of
non- joint signicance for all samples. Moreover, the signs of the coef-
cients are consistent with Conjecture 7 and we observe a tendency to
herd towards large companies, with high price per share, high turnover
and high dividends.
The average betas are again much smaller for the splitting compa-
nies, even being negative on average as opposed to the other samples.
However, the results are weaker than informational-based herding, as
the di¤erence in means with non-splitting companies is not signicant
and there is a clear idea of the main sign of the estimated coe¢ cients.
The remaining correlation for splitting rms is actually positive in most
of the signicant quarters (9 out of 10). The F tests show a joint signi-
cance of the regressors in explaining the convergence of behavior. How-
ever, only size has a signicant and positive coe¢ cient, while all the
other variables have signs contrary to the expectations of characteristic-
based herding and are not signicant.
The last type of herding we investigate is momentum trading. We
extrapolate the e¤ect of momentum strategies based on past returns
(Figure 1.4 and Table 11).
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Momentum has a smaller e¤ect than the other types. The remain-
ing beta is very close to the Sias beta, for both the overall market
and the non-splitting sample. The test on the average coe¢ cient for
past returns is usually signicant, conrming that there is an impact
of momentum herding in the two samples, even if it is small. However,
it is not relevant for the splitting sample.
Looking in more detail, we nd that for splitting companies, the
remaining beta is slightly lower than the Sias coe¢ cient. However,
in the majority of the quarters, the test on past returns is not signif-
icant, while the Non-Momentum coe¢ cient is signicantly positive in
34 quarters. When comparing the di¤erence between samples, herding
for splitting companies is slightly higher than for non-splitting, partic-
ularly when analyzing the median values. However, the di¤erence in
means is not signicant.
The adjusted beta has interesting results after cleansing for pas-
sive strategies. In particular, general herding is much higher than the
respective unadjusted average coe¢ cient, to the extent that the di¤er-
ence in means between the samples is signicant (at 1%). Therefore,
once past returns are accounted for and the e¤ect of passive strategies
is cleared out, investors herd more on splitting companies for reasons
other than momentum.
Unifying model and unifying conclusions
The unifying model aims to identify the contributions of each herding
type. Yet, we can only rely on this model when considering the overall
market and the specication with the interacted dummies. In fact, we
cannot draw proper conclusions for the splitting sample, due to the
limited size, especially in the last four years.
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Table 12 reports the results of the model that includes all the prox-
ies for informational-based herding, characteristics preference and mo-
mentum strategies, estimated on the overall sample.
The remaining beta is on average positive (0.366), and positively
signicant in 41 samples out of 48. This is interpretable as the conver-
gence of behavior that remains after accounting for informational-based
herding, characteristics and momentum strategies. It is still quite a high
level when compared to the previous Siasbeta, therefore most of the
correlation still cannot be explained by using the four main traditional
theories.
We clean the estimated coe¢ cients from the e¤ect of common fac-
tors that could lead to an unintentional correlation, as equation (5.2.22).
Looking at the estimated adjusted beta, they are on average slightly
lower than the unadjusted value (0.333 on average), hence still positive
and highly signicant. This result shows that common factors have a
small impact on the level of correlation, accounting for fundamental-
driven clustering of the trades, yet still there is strong evidence of imi-
tative behavior that we assume at this point is intentional.
We use F tests on the signicance of the di¤erent sets of proxies.
We can see that jointly, all the models (except for reputational herd-
ing, which we do not report), have an impact on the overall correlation.
Characteristics and informational-based herding are especially signi-
cant determinants of the beta coe¢ cient in all quarters. Momentum
strategies are, conversely, much less important.
Then, we look at the results from the model specication that in-
cludes the set of dummies interacted with each of the regressors. The
dummy coe¢ cient on the lag institutional demand represents the di¤er-
ence in correlation that is not attributable to any of the four theoretical
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types. It is, on average, not signicant and very small (0.008). There-
fore there is no evidence of a di¤erence in herding between splitting
and non-splitting companies, after accounting for informational con-
tent, characteristics and momentum strategies.
When we break the analysis into subperiods of four years, we still
see the time pattern on the average beta coe¢ cient, which peaks in the
second period, then decreases in subsequent years. Also, the dummy
coe¢ cient on the lag institutional demand maintains the same time
pattern as the previous general analysis, as it decreases throughout the
three subperiods. Its average however, is still never signicant. There-
fore, the time pattern also cannot be explained by the four theoretical
types together.
We test each theory with an F test, both on the coe¢ cients of the
set of proxies and on the coe¢ cients of the interacted dummies. We
can see from the rst tests that yet again, all types of herding are
impacting on the correlation. Looking at the F test on the dummies,
characteristic herding in particular accounts for the di¤erence in imi-
tative behavior which we observe between splitting and non-splitting
rms. Informational cascades are also in part determinant of the dif-
ference, as the relative F tests are jointly signicant in most quarters,
even if the average p-value is 0.1331. Conversely, momentum herding,
clearly does not impact on the di¤erential in correlation.
The results on the di¤erence between the two groups show that
the model is well specied and detects all of the di¤erences between
splitting and non-splitting herding.
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5.3.4 Robustness checks
Peer- herding versus general- herding
In addition we also test whether investing in splitting stocks is an in-
vestment style shared by the investors (as Barberis and Shleifer (2003)).
If this is the case, institutions would imitate past trades in the same
style more than the trades in all the companies. We therefore dene
"peer herding" as the correlation between the institutional demand for
splitting stocks at time t on the demand for the same portfolio of split-
ting stocks at t  1. This denition distinguishes from the general level
of herding we measured so far, as the correlation of the splitting insti-
tutional demand on the demand for all stocks in the previous period.
We have "peer herding" among splitting companies estimated as
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The same distinction is carried out in all the previous models.
Peer herding is computed respectively for informational-based herding,
characteristic-based herding and momentum herding, as:

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
p;ICH;t
(S)
i;t 1+
CX
c=1
'
(S)
c;t Xc;i;t 1
(S)
i;t 1+
(S)
t ; where i 2 S (5.3.5)

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
p;NCH;t
(S)
i;t 1+
QX
q=1
 
(S)
q;t Zq;i;t 1
(S)
i;t 1+
S
t ; where i 2 S (5.3.6)
and

(S)
i;t = 
(S)
p;NMT;t
(S)
i;t 1 + 
(S)
t Ri;t 1
(S)
i;t 1 + "
(S)
i;t ; where i 2 S (5.3.7)
Analyzing the (unreported) results, we see that it does not add
much understanding to the previous conclusions. Therefore, when trad-
ing in splitting stocks, investors observe the trades that happen in all
the stocks in the market portfolio, without identifying splitting stocks
as a specic investment style.
The only point to stress is the result for informational-based herd-
ing. The average peer beta is lower than Siass beta on the same sample
but still positive, while we have seen that the general beta decreases
to zero (0.419 on average for peer herding). Besides, the quarterly be-
tas are positive in 12 out of 13 signicant quarters. This decrease in
value from the Siasbeta still has a positive signicance, but conrms
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that only a small amount of peer-herding can be explained by the in-
formational proxies when compared to the general level of imitative
behavior.
The splitting dummy model specication
In all the previous case, we investigate the di¤erence in herding between
splitting and non-splitting companies and also employ another model
specication that includes a binary variable Si;t. The variable assumes
value 1 if the company has announced at least one stock split in the
quarter of interest and zero otherwise. We interact the dummy with the
lag institutional demand and regress, thence, the standardized fractions
of buyers in period t on the fraction at end-of-quarter t  1 and on this
interacted dummy, as:
i;t = 0;ti;t 1 + 1;t
S
i;ti;t 1 + i;t (5.3.8)
The estimated coe¢ cients of the splitting dummy are signicantly
negative in 7 quarters of analysis and positive in 5.The average coe¢ -
cient of the binary variable across all the quarters is then very close to
zero and not signicant.
Averaging the dummy coe¢ cients in the 3 subperiods, it shows
a similar time pattern as the previous overall analysis. In the rst
two subperiods, the average of the estimates is positive (0.048 and
0.047 respectively) but not signicant. In the third period, it is instead
negative (-0.092), but still not signicant on average (Tables 13 and 14).
In the years, from 2002 to 2005, the dummy coe¢ cients are signicant in
7 quarters out of 48 and mainly negative. Besides, both the maximum
and minimum of the beta coe¢ cients are in this third subperiod.
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We use the same specication as in all the other cases, including as
many interacted dummies as the number of regressors.
For informational-based herding, we interact the dummy with the
proxies we use for the quality of information. We interpret these coef-
cients of the interacted dummies as the di¤erence in herding between
the two subsamples that is explainable by informational content, while
the dummy interacted only with the lag demand is the part of the
di¤erence in herding that is not explained by the proxies:
i;t = NIH;0;ti;t 1 + NIH;1;t
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We look at the coe¢ cient of the dummy interacted with only the
lag demand, NI;1;t. These coe¢ cients are equally positive and negative
in 6 out of the 12 signicant quarters, conrming that informational
content accounts for most of the di¤erence in herding in the two groups.
The average of the estimates across all quarters is smaller than the
general Siasanalysis, negative and not signicant. Also, as an average
in each of the three subperiods, the average dummy coe¢ cient is never
signicant, even though it shows the same pattern of decrease through
the periods. It is in fact slightly positive in the years 1994 to 1998
(0.037), while it is negative in the third period (-0.066). This conrms
that this time pattern is still not of informational content. However,
it is less pronounced, as we cannot reject the null that the interacted
dummies are not jointly signicant.
Looking at characteristic herding, we interact the dummies with
the companiesvariables we identied as important characteristics for
institutional demand. We estimate:
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Looking at the dummy interacted with only the lag demand, the
estimated average coe¢ cient NCH;1;t is negative and not signicant
on average, conrmed by the quarterly evidence that only 7 quarters
are signicantly positive, while 13 are negative. Averaging in each of
the three subperiods, we observe again that the average dummy coe¢ -
cient decreases throughout the years. In particular, it is negative and
signicant in the third period, as investors herd more on non-splitting
companies, once cleaned by the e¤ect of characteristics. This supports
the previous considerations that the di¤erence between splitting and
non-splitting companies is not explainable by characteristics preference.
Looking at momentum herding, we regress the following model:
i;t = NMH;0;ti;t 1+NMH;1;t
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i;t i;t 1+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The splitting dummy coe¢ cient follows NMH;1;t the same pattern
as in the rst Sias analysis. Its average is very close to zero, even
if positive in 7 out of 12 signicant quarters. When analyzing the
subperiods, we nd that again the dummy coe¢ cients decrease across
the groups, but it is never signicant on average. The F test on the
dummies interacted with the past returns, shows that the di¤erence in
correlation does not come from momentum strategies.
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Analysis per type and size of the investor
In the Informational-based herding model we added one variable that
could address the distinction between informational cascades and rep-
utational herding. However, the coe¢ cient of size*coverage is negative
for overall market and non-splitting companies, contrary to conjecture
3. For splitting stocks, the sign is conrming the conjecture, but it is
not signicant on average.
Therefore, before rejecting the presence of reputational herding,
we investigate it in more detail, looking at homogeneous groups of in-
vestors. We consider, as peers, investors with the same portfolio size
or belonging to the same institutional type.
Looking at the size of the investors, we classify three groups accord-
ing to the value of the managed portfolio. We distinguish between herd-
ing inter-group ("peer-herding") or extra-group ("general herding").
We see the presence of reputational herding when examining both the
di¤erence between general and peer herding and the di¤erence with
the Siasestimate for the overall sample of investors. In each group,
we separately regress the models specied with an interacted dummy
variable for splitting companies. Table 15 and Figure 3 report the av-
erage coe¢ cients from the specication which includes a dummy for
stock splits.15
The average betas clearly increase with the size of the investor, con-
rming that the biggest institutions are the ones who tend to herd more.
We nd that in any group, the estimated coe¢ cients are smaller than
the original beta estimates in the complete set of investors. This means
that herding increases when we consider all the interactions among
15 Therefore we restrain from considerations on the general level of herding, re-
porting only in regard to non-splitting versus splitting stocks.
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groups of investors, thus, there is a relevant part that cannot be ex-
plained by reputational concerns. Larger investors exhibit the lowest
di¤erences with the original average measure, conrming the presence
of reputational concerns for big investors rather than for smaller agents,
even if it cannot be the predominant explanation for this behavior.
However, for both large and small investors, a considerable part
of the imitative behavior comes from "peer herding", therefore reputa-
tional considerations seem to be a plausible explanation, but not the
only one. The di¤erence between the two specications appears higher
when observing medium size investors. These traders are inuenced
mainly by the decisions of their peers but also in part by their ob-
servations of other groups, as the di¤erence between general and peer
herding conrms.
Looking at the subperiods, the betas are only higher in the years
from 1998 to 2001 for the largest investors. Therefore, the higher in-
tensity of the herding phenomenon in the second subperiod seems to
be driven by reputational concerns among big investors.
With regards to the di¤erence between splitting and non-splitting
companies, we look at the dummy coe¢ cients. The average estimated
dummy coe¢ cient is negative (-0.992) and signicant for small in-
vestors, yet it is positive and signicant on average for bigger insti-
tutions (0.0513). Therefore, big investors tend to herd more on split-
ting stocks, while small investors tend to cluster more easily around
non-splitting companies.
Again, peer and general herding are very similar; therefore we can
conclude that the same type of herding is a¤ecting both splitting and
non-splitting companies, when we consider the size of the fund as an
indication of reputational concerns.
This pattern could partly motivate the di¤erences we observe in
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the three subperiods. In earlier years before 2002, the impact of big-
ger institutions is particularly strong and herding is slightly higher for
splitting companies. We can therefore explain the di¤erence, in part,
by the inuence of reputational considerations, as we have seen a ten-
dency for big investors to herd more as they imitate the actions of their
peers, and that they herd more on splitting companies.
In the third period, the dummy for smaller investors is particularly
negative and signicant. In this period the average negative di¤erence
we observe in the wide analysis is mainly driven by small investors, who
herd more intensively on non-splitting stocks.
Furthermore, the analysis per type of investor could bring to light
the presence of reputational herding. The investors with the highest
level of correlation are banks and institutions belonging to the residual
category of "not dened". This correlation is due to their observations
of the peer members of the group and from their observations of other
categories, as there is a quite distinct di¤erence between peer herding
and general herding among this type of investor. Instead, for investment
companies and independent advisors, most of the correlation is inter
group. This suggests that reputational considerations may be more
binding for mutual funds than for banks.
Considering the dummy coe¢ cients, we see that, on average, in-
vestors who herd the most cluster especially on non-splitting companies.
Therefore banks and "not dened" institutions show a negative and sig-
nicant di¤erence between splitting and non-splitting companies. This
is particularly the case when considering insurance companies. They
herd more on splitting companies when they observe the behavior of all
the previous investors, while they herd more on non-splitting compa-
nies according to their peers. This result shows a clear di¤erence in the
type of herding underlying the correlation. In particular, it reveals that
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reputational concerns are more binding for non-splitting companies.
Looking at the subperiods, the average results are dragged by the
most recent yearsdata. Earlier years show a di¤erent pattern. Between
1994 and 1997, insurance companies exhibit a highly positive and sig-
nicant di¤erence (0.1071), therefore herding on splitting companies is
one third of the overall correlation higher than in the alternative group.
The result is equally strong, but reversed in sign for the residual cate-
gory of investor (-0.1282). The average di¤erences are mainly negative,
apart from the one exception of mutual funds. Insurance companies
are still particular, and the dummies in both general herding and peer
herding are signicant, though of opposite sign. In the years 1998-
2001, four categories tend to herd more on the group under analysis.
Investment companies and "not dened" investors in particular, show a
higher and signicant di¤erence to herd on splitting companies (respec-
tively 0.1171 and 0.1186 higher than non-splitting companies). Only
banks still have a negative coe¢ cient, however this is not signicant.
This will motivate the results in the second subperiod, where split-
ting stocks exhibit a slightly higher level of herding, due particularly
to mutual funds. For the residual group, peer herding is still high for
splitting companies and highly signicant (at 1%), considering that the
main part of the di¤erence in herding for both subgroups comes from
herding with the peer members of the same class. The third subperiod
presents an inverted pattern. Four out of ve institutional classes ex-
hibit higher herding for non-splitting companies. The only exception
is independent advisors, who have a positive but not signicant dif-
ference. For mutual funds, we see that the dummy coe¢ cient has an
inverted sign between general and peer herding. Even if not signicant,
it conrms that investing in either splitting or non-splitting stocks has
di¤erent reputational concerns.
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Summarizing, we conrm the presence of reputational concerns,
but not their predominance over informational cascades. Banks tend
to herd more on non-splitting companies, with the data being especially
strong in the third period. Investment companies are among the insti-
tutions that herd the least, but they are more inuenced by their peer
decisions and tend to herd substantially on splitting companies, drag-
ging the results, especially in the second subperiod. Moreover, herding
on splitting companies versus non-splitting companies seems to be af-
fected di¤erently by reputational concerns in insurance companies and
mutual funds. In particular, they seem to be particularly careful in
observing their peers when trading non-splitting companies.
The stabilizing e¤ect of herding
We conclude by analyzing whether herding has a stabilizing e¤ect on
the future performance of the stocks and whether this e¤ect is di¤erent
between splitting and non-splitting companies.
Past literature exhibits a positive relation between institutional de-
mand and same quarter or previous quarter returns and is weakly pos-
itive when correlated with future returns (see for example Nofsinger
and Sias, 1999; Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995 and Sias, 2004).
A negative relation between demand and subsequent returns will be
consistent with a destabilizing e¤ect on prices due to herding.
Moreover, the evidence of a destabilizing role of herding on future
returns conrms the presence of intentional imitative behavior such as
irrational or positive feedback strategies. A reversal in the prices after
the herding measurement period will be consistent with this hypothe-
sis. Alternatively, either an intentional correlation due to informational
motivations or a fundamental-driven correlation will bring the prices
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closely and quickly towards the true value, bringing a stabilizing e¤ect
(Sias, 2004).
Therefore, we regress the institutional demand on the past quarter,
the same period, and on the two consecutive quarters returns after the
measurement period (as reported in Table 16).
Consistent with the literature, we observe a positive relationship
between institutional demand and past quarter and same quarter re-
turns for the overall market and for non-splitting companies. We do
not conclude for any similar relationship for the splitting companies.
Instead, interestingly, we observe a positive and highly signicant
relation between institutional demand and returns in the two following
quarters for splitting rms (0.3704 and 0.3692 respectively). This is
consistent with a stabilizing e¤ect on prices for splitting companies due
to herding. According to Sias (2004), such a positive relation is further
evidence of the presence of informational-based herding.
5.4 Conclusions
With this empirical paper we aim to contribute to the understanding
of stock splits and their market reaction, in the light of the impact of
herding, or correlated trading decisions among institutional investors.
We have found evidence of positive and signicant correlation in
each quarter of analysis. Also, cleaning for intentional correlation, we
have found that most of the correlation is not attributable to the four
factors, namely size, market return and book-to-market, that proxy for
unintentional or spurious herding.
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Distinguishing between herding in splitting and non-splitting com-
panies in the overall case, we do not evince a signicant di¤erence on
average. However, the di¤erence in correlation decreases over the three
four-year subperiods, going from a positive but not signicant average
in the subperiod 1994 - 1998, to a negative (but still not signicant)
average in 2002-2005.
This time pattern motivates more detailed analyses, and we can
see that the di¤erence in herding is negative and becomes increasingly
negative when we restrict the sample to high-traded stocks.
The presence of informational-based herding, especially for splitting
companies, is also conrmed by observing the relation between institu-
tional demand and future returns. Moreover, the positive relation we
nd between institutional demand for splitting rms and their future
returns in the following two quarters, is consistent with the stabilizing
e¤ect of herding. On the contrary, we do not report any signicant
relationship between institutional demand and future returns in the
non-splitting sample or in the overall market.
Our results are therefore consistent with the presence of informa-
tional content in the split event and to the underreaction of the mar-
ket. We should also note however, that this underreaction is a¤ected
by trading on herd.
Still a signicant part of the correlation among investors and of
the di¤erence between the subsamples is not explained by these four
types, suggesting that further studies should be carried out to better
understand other motivations, probably irrational, to the phenomenon.
Moreover, further development of this research will focus on investigat-
ing both the change in herding and its impact on the future performance
of the company on the days around the announcement of stock splits.
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5.A Appendix B
Table 1.
Number of Observations per quarter and Splitting/Nonsplitting Subsamples.
Splitting companies Nonsplitting companies
1994q1 39 931 Noumber of Splits 1,602
1994q2 22 950 Number of Companies 1,760
1994q3 20 950 Number of Investors 3,690
1994q4 23 960
1995q1 18 973 Number of Splits per quarter
1995q2 38 968 mean 39.05
1995q3 49 973 std. dev. 13.32
1995q4 43 1000 min 7
1996q1 41 1014 (in 2002-3)
1996q2 55 1022 max 65
1996q3 24 1063 (in 1998-2)
1996q4 39 1059 Q1 32
1997q1 42 1081 median 39
1997q2 23 1120 Q3 47
1997q3 64 1088
1997q4 35 1146 Number of  Splits per company
1998q1 25 1159 mean 2.39
1998q2 65 1148 std. dev. 1.27
1998q3 29 1196 min 1
1998q4 19 1214 max 8
1999q1 58 1190 Q1 1
1999q2 44 1230 median 2
1999q3 34 1252 Q3 3
1999q4 32 1263
2000q1 46 1258
2000q2 42 1285
2000q3 46 1283
2000q4 15 1335
2001q1 23 1328
2001q2 29 1334
2001q3 18 1350
2001q4 22 1365
2002q1 34 1364
2002q2 51 1366
2002q3 7* 1422
2002q4 8* 1428
2003q1 15 1423
2003q2 16 1431
2003q3 33 1419
2003q4 34 1423
2004q1 47 1416
2004q2 34 1439
2004q3 26 1455
2004q4 32 1458
2005q1 48 1444
2005q2 40 1454
2005q3 37 1464
2005q4 18 1486
Quarters
Number of companies per quarter
This table reports the number of observations per quarter for the two subsamples; splitting and nonsplitting
companies. We consider a splitting company to be any firm that has announced at least one stock split in the quarter
of analysis, subject to the availability of all the necessary data and with at least 5 traders per quarter.
We also reports some descriptive statististics of the number of splits per quarter and per company.
* quarters for which it is not possible to estimate the restricted theoretical models.
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Table 2.
Quarterly Number of Companies Traded per Investor and Number of Investors per Company.
Year
Nonsplitting
stocks
Splitting stocks Year
Nonsplitting
stocks
Splitting stocks
1994 80.40 127.37 1994 88.85 91.43
1995 86.34 119.85 1995 95.05 119.32
1996 87.95 130.52 1996 95.82 132.18
1997 96.55 132.19 1997 107.58 129.99
1998 97.77 143.41 1998 117.51 148.60
1999 116.24 150.86 1999 129.02 198.36
2000 117.99 168.19 2000 152.30 237.54
2001 111.86 221.00 2001 160.39 235.74
2002 119.13 255.66 2002 172.38 192.35
2003 159.53 180.73 2003 184.77 169.82
2004 163.50 150.06 2004 199.43 200.84
2005 157.04 173.10 2005 205.73 214.12
Overall period 126.96 159.49 Overall period 147.35 183.92
Mean 126.96 159.49 Mean 147.35 183.92
Std. dev. 219.69 214.35 Std. dev. 154.51 173.11
Min 1 1 Min 3 3
Max 1,495 1,459 Max 1,327 1,229
Q1 24 45 Q1 53 76
Median 55 80 Median 103 132
Q3 116 169 Q3 185 234
Average number of companies traded, Cnt Average number of active investors, Trdit
These tables report, for splitting and nonsplitting companies, the number of companies traded by
institutional investor in a quarter, C nt (table 2.1), and the number of institutions trading in a company per
quarter, Trd it (table 2.2). Computed per quarter, they are averaged per year or overall period. We also
report some descriptive statistics of the two variables for the overall period.
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Table 3.
Average Number of Investors per Institutional Type.
Year Banks
Insurance
companies
Investment
companies
Independent
advisors
Not defined All types
1994 221 78 68 815 78 1,260
1995 216 80 59 927 86 1,368
1996 201 76 97 979 79 1,432
1997 195 79 97 1,124 93 1,588
1998 204 82 95 1,227 128 1,736
1999 200 73 87 1,282 209 1,851
2000 193 67 88 1,310 350 2,008
2001 189 67 84 1,282 376 1,998
2002 173 61 78 1,209 570 2,091
2003 170 61 73 1,083 788 2,175
2004 163 58 71 1,080 984 2,356
2005 156 59 68 1,083 1,179 2,545
Overall 338 104 113 1,758 1,376 3,689
Year Banks
Insurance
companies
Investment
companies
Independent
advisors
Not defined All types
1994 215 73 64 702 69 1,123
1995 214 71 56 803 71 1,215
1996 199 69 91 856 74 1,289
1997 194 73 92 983 76 1,418
1998 203 76 91 1,088 100 1,558
1999 198 66 82 1,140 168 1,654
2000 191 64 84 1,147 234 1,720
2001 180 60 79 1,077 276 1,672
2002 160 52 72 942 352 1,578
2003 166 52 64 938 560 1,780
2004 159 53 66 970 734 1,982
2005 152 47 64 955 865 2,083
Overall 332 99 111 1,646 1,064 3,252
Year Banks
Insurance
companies
Investment
companies
Independent
advisors
Not defined All types
Overall 338 104 113 1,759 1,376 3,690
This table reports the average number of investors in a quarter for the splitting/ nonsplitting samples, per
year and per institutional type. The institutional type classification is adapted from the Thompson Financial
database, correcting from issues arising at the end of 1998. In particular, we do not consider as valid any
changes of classification from types 1 - 4 to type 5 that occurred at the end of 1998. In those cases, we
keep as fixed until 2005 the category to which the institution was assigned before 1998. Any other
changes are considered as valid.
Nonsplitting stocks
Splitting stocks
Overall market
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Table 4
Stocks Characteristics.
Mean
St. error of
the mean
Median
Number of
observations
Mean
St. error of
the mean
Median
Number of
observations
Size 5,866,644 86,358.30 1,044,035 60,291 9,363,908 788,877.00 1,587,120 1,642
Price 23.86 0.10 19.63 60,291 25.35 0.44 22.02 1,642
Shares outstanding 208,366 2,626.99 57,448 60,292 329,619 23,820.18 79,478 1,642
Volume 1,265,912 19,169.42 299,200 60,291 2,496,553 192,711.40 552,620 1,642
Turnover 7.30 0.05 4.30 60,291 9.93 0.37 5.62 1,642
Book-to-market 87.88 43.02 6.67 32,061 5.87 0.14 4.50 1,405
Dividends 0.11 0.00 0.03 60,292 0.05 0.00 0.01 1,642
Coverage 39.89 0.18 27.00 50,763 48.45 1.26 32.00 1,425
Dispersion among analysts 7,190 4,423.53 0.14 49,895 0.15 0.01 0.12 1,420
Institutional ownership 60.28% 0.00 61.77% 60,291 64.31% 0.01 65.03% 1,642
Quarterly returns 0.05 0.00 0.04 60,286 0.18 0.01 0.12 1,642
Standard deviation of returns 0.03 0.00 0.02 60,279 0.03 0.00 0.02 1,642
The table reports the main descriptives of the company variables we use in the following analysis. Size of company is measured as the
market capitalization at the end of the previous quarter; price-per-share, shares outstanding, volume, turnover, and book-to-market
are measured at the last day of the quarter. They are all extracted from the CRSP daily database. Coverage is the number of distinct
analysts that have published forecasts of the annual company's earnings in the quarter; and dispersion is the ration of standard error
to the absolute value of the mean of the analysts' earning forecasts, aggregated per quarter. They are extracted by the I/B/E/S
database. Institutional ownership is the ration of institutional holdings on the shares outstanding, as reported by Thompson database.
Returns are measured as compounded quarterly returns from the daily CRSP returns; standard deviation of returns is computed on the
daily returns in the quarter.
Variables
Nonsplitting companies Splitting companies
Table 5.
Covariance Matrix of the Regressors.
Nit Trdit Price Size Turnover Volume Returns Coverage Dispersion
Book-to-
market
Dividends
Nit 1
Trdit 0.9964 1
Price 0.4998 0.489 1
Size 0.7564 0.773 0.3157 1
Turnover -0.0618 -0.0464 -0.0117 -0.0642 1
Volume 0.4377 0.4563 0.0149 0.4563 0.2494 1
Returns -0.038 -0.0326 0.0879 0.0011 0.0388 -0.0065 1
Coverage 0.5221 0.5297 0.2126 0.3034 0.1576 0.3904 -0.0492 1
Dispersion -0.002 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0015 0.0107 0.0023 0.0272 0.0027 1
Book-to-market -0.0022 -0.0027 0.0088 -0.0024 -0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0074 -0.0072 -0.0001 1
Dividends 0.1049 0.0957 0.1117 0.0508 -0.0494 -0.0071 -0.0077 -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0067 1
The table reports the covariance matrix of the regressors we use in the last part of the analysis. N it is the number of institutions that hold
the company i in their portfolio in quarter t, Trd it is the number of active traders in stock i at quarter t, Size of company is measured as the
market capitalization at the end of the previous quarter; price-per-share, volume, turnover, and book-to-market are measured at the last
day of the quarter. They are all extracted from the CRSP daily database. Coverage is the number of distinct analysts that have published
forecasts of the annual company's earnings in the quarter; and dispersion is the ration of standard error to the absolute value of the mean
of the analysts' earning forecasts, aggregated per quarter. They are extracted by the I/B/E/S database. Returns are measured as
compounded quarterly returns from the daily CRSP returns.
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Figure 1.
Estimated coefficients of the lag institutional demand
Figure 1.1 Figure 1.2
Sias' Betas per Quarter Non-Informational Betas per Quarter
Figure 1.3 Figure 1.4
Non-Characteristic-based Betas per Quarter Non-Momentum Betas per Quarter
The graphs show the quarterly estimated coefficients of the institutional demand lag from the first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2005, in the four restricted models. Figure 1.1
reports the Sias's beta, as the institutional lag coefficient in the Sias's model, equation 5.2.1. Figure 1.2 reports the coefficients of the lag institutional demand in the Informatinal-
based model, equation 5.2.9. Figure 1.3 reports the estimated coefficients of the lag demand in the Characteristic based model, equation 5.2.16. Finally, Figure 1.4 reports the
estimates in the Momentum Herding model, equation 5.2.18. We distinguish the three samples: overall market, splitting stocks and non-splitting stocks and the regressions are run
separately in each subsample and in each quarter.
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Sias' models
1) Overall market: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 0.457 *** 0.008 56.66 0.447 0.346 0.562 0.417 0.498 48 0 0.448 *** 0.0079
2) Splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ S i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 0.467 *** 0.031 14.87 0.481 -0.095 0.894 0.318 0.590 36 0 0.506 *** 0.0302
3) Non-splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ NS i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 0.457 *** 0.008 55.97 0.448 0.348 0.564 0.417 0.499 48 0 0.447 *** 0.0080
Test: Beta S = Beta NS t= 0.2920 (0.7714) t= 1.8910 (0.0640)
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Beta Adjusted
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Mean
Beta Adjusted
Beta Adjusted
Significant
neg. qrts.
Q3
Mean
Mean Significant
pos. qrts.
Table 6.
t
Significant
pos. qrts.
median min max Q1
Q3
max Q1
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand (Sias' Betas) estimated in each quarter of analysis,
from 1994 to 2005, for the models based on Sias (2004). Institutional demand Δ i,t is the fraction of buyers of stock i at quarter t. It is firstly
regressed on the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 for the overall market (Model 1). Model 2 regresses the institutional demand computed on the
sample of splitting companies on the lag demand for all stocks. Analogously, Model 3 regresses the same model on the sample of nonsplitting
companies. The t- values reported are computed from the standard error of the estimates series. The numbers of significant quarters are
identified with a 10% of significance level. The last column considers the Beta adjusted, as the lag coefficients, once controlling for the four
factors à la Cahart (1997). We finanly report the statistic and the p-value of the test on difference between splitting and nonsplitting samples.
t
Significant
neg. qrts.
median min
t median min max Q1
Q3
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Table 7.
Average Sias' Beta Coefficients per Number of Traders.
Mean t Mean t Mean t Mean t
all periods >= 10 traders 0.510 *** 55.04 -0.041 -1.27 0.489 *** 56.01 -0.029 -0.95
>= 20 0.564 *** 47.22 -0.091 *** -2.86 0.508 *** 53.55 -0.060 *** -2.14
>= 50 0.600 *** 42.42 -0.102 *** -3.08 0.510 *** 49.55 -0.100 *** -2.99
>= 100 0.554 *** 32.49 -0.073 -1.61 0.518 *** 55.45 -0.155 *** -5.07
1994-1997 >= 10 traders 0.521 *** 37.59 0.005 0.12 0.493 *** 41.34 0.006 0.16
>= 20 0.624 *** 47.60 -0.093 * -1.91 0.539 *** 46.54 -0.070 ** -1.94
>= 50 0.653 *** 37.01 -0.137 *** -2.46 0.549 *** 43.78 -0.157 *** -2.87
>= 100 0.492 *** 14.72 0.014 0.13 0.538 *** 45.46 -0.118 *** -2.12
1998-2001 >= 10 traders 0.539 *** 35.13 -0.011 -0.28 0.517 *** 33.66 0.008 0.21
>= 20 0.588 *** 40.07 -0.058 -1.50 0.528 *** 33.32 0.001 0.03
>= 50 0.654 *** 39.95 -0.034 -0.80 0.536 *** 34.71 0.000 0.00
>= 100 0.634 *** 23.44 -0.042 -0.71 0.547 *** 33.92 -0.086 * -1.82
2002-2005 >= 10 traders 0.470 *** 32.40 -0.118 -1.53 0.456 *** 31.36 -0.102 -1.38
>= 20 0.481 *** 33.23 -0.121 * -1.64 0.457 *** 32.42 -0.110 * -1.63
>= 50 0.495 *** 35.81 -0.134 * -1.91 0.445 *** 34.43 -0.141 *** -2.18
>= 100 0.536 *** 40.60 -0.191 *** -3.14 0.468 *** 35.64 -0.260 *** -5.46
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
General- herding Peer- herding
The table reports the summary statistics of the quarterly coefficients of the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 (Sias's Betas)
and the splitting dummy coefficients estimated in subgroups based on the number of traders per company in the quarter.
Institutional demand Δ i,t (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) is regressed on the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 and
a dummy for splitting companies interacted with the lag demand itself. The t- values reported are computed from the
standard error of the estimates series.
Beta Splitting dummy Beta Splitting dummy
NO. TRADERS
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Figures 2.1 & 2.2
Splitting Dummies per Number of Traders.
Figure 2.1 Peer- herding
Figure 2.2. General- herding
The following graphs represent the average estimated coefficient of the dummy for split. Peer herding is
the correlation of the institutional demand for splitting (nonsplitting) stocks with the previous quarter
demand for the same portfolio. General herding is the correlation between the institutional demand for
splitting(nonsplitting) and the previous quarter demand for all stocks.
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Average Estimated Coefficients for all Models.
1) Overall market Dependent variable: Δi,t
mean t mean t mean t mean t mean t
Δi,t-1 0.4737 *** 57.01 0.4138 *** 29.60 0.3702 *** 18.84 0.4654 *** 57.57 0.3740 *** 15.95
Dispersion*t-1 -0.0132 -1.37 -0.0079 -0.96
Coverage*t-1 0.1071 *** 10.80 0.1014 *** 11.05
Size*Coverage*t-1 -0.0769 *** -6.42 -0.0706 *** -6.23
Size*i,t-1 0.1456 *** 12.16 0.0958 *** 16.02 0.1372 *** 11.44
Price*i,t-1 0.0701 *** 7.96 0.0520 *** 6.65
Turnover*i,t-1 0.0368 *** 3.90 0.0039 0.48
StDeviation of returns*i,t-1 -0.0181 -1.04 -0.0303 -1.48
Returns*i,t-4 0.0028 0.48 0.0052 1.01
Dividends*i,t-1 0.0116 ** 2.14 0.0210 *** 3.69
Returns*i,t-1 0.0510 *** 6.70 0.0498 *** 6.45
2) Splitting companies Dependent variable: ΔSi,t
mean t mean t mean t mean t mean t
Δi,t-1 0.4170 *** 14.63 -0.2413 -0.79 0.2405 1.63 0.4278 *** 13.02 0.2155 0.23
Dispersion*t-1 0.4378 ** 2.01 -2.1512 -0.96
Coverage*t-1 0.1728 1.30 0.3278 0.81
Size*Coverage*t-1 0.4031 0.97 -2.8701 -1.21
Size*i,t-1 -0.1744 -0.43 0.2979 *** 4.82 3.4335 1.23
Price*i,t-1 -0.1120 -1.16 -2.0436 -1.13
Turnover*i,t-1 -0.0514 -0.60 -0.5519 -1.27
StDeviation of returns*i,t-1 0.1340 1.25 3.3859 1.04
Returns*i,t-4 0.0172 0.46 -0.0276 -0.42
Dividends*i,t-1 -0.0218 -0.35 -0.0623 -0.28
Returns*i,t-1 -0.0283 -1.19 -0.0867 -1.12
3) Nonsplitting companies Dependent variable: ΔNSi,t
mean t mean t mean t mean t mean t
Δi,t-1 0.4749 *** 56.68 0.4155 *** 29.15 0.3721 *** 18.70 0.4660 *** 56.34 0.3759 *** 16.04
Dispersion*t-1 -0.0139 -1.40 0.1378 -1.02
Coverage*t-1 0.1071 *** 10.93 -0.0086 *** 11.13
Size*Coverage*t-1 -0.0801 *** -6.25 0.1010 *** -6.18
Size*i,t-1 0.1467 *** 11.65 0.0935 *** 15.23 -0.0732 *** 11.17
Price*i,t-1 0.0708 *** 7.92 0.0526 *** 6.81
Turnover*i,t-1 0.0392 *** 3.99 0.0082 0.94
StDeviation of returns*i,t-1 -0.0211 -1.19 -0.0336 * -1.64
Returns*i,t-4 0.0035 0.60 0.0056 1.09
Dividends*i,t-1 0.0115 ** 2.09 0.0214 *** 3.87
Returns*i,t-1 0.0530 *** 6.74 0.0522 *** 6.44
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Sias' model Informational- based Characteristic- based
The table reports the average standardized coefficients of all the variables used in the five models. (1) Sias' model regresses the institutional demand Δ i,t on its lag
Δ i,t-1 only. (2) Informational- based models regress the institutional demand on its lag and a set of proxies for the quality of information, such as size, dispersion,
coverage and size*coverage at the previous quarter. (3) The Characteristic- based model regresses the institutional demand on its lag and a set of company
characteristics, such as size, price, turnover, standard deviation, returns of stocks and quarterly dividends, measured at the previous quarter. (4) The Momentum
model regresses the institutional demand on its lag and the previous year returns. (5) The Unifying model regresses the institutional demand on all the previous
variables. The significance is attributed estimating the t statistics from the time series of the beta estimates.
Variables
Sias' model Informational- based Characteristic- based Momentum Unifying model
Table 8.
Informational- based
Variables
Variables
Momentum Unifying model
Characteristic- based Momentum Unifying modelSias' model
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Informational-based Models
1) Overall market: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 0.400 *** 0.014 29.40 0.397 0.145 0.641 0.334 0.466 48 0 0.379 *** 0.013
F test: informational herding p value: 0.0002 0.0000 0.4972 0.0000 0.0058 43 -
2) Splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ S i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 -0.195 0.332 -0.59 0.437 -10.786 3.398 -0.561 0.892 10 8 -0.473 0.324
F test: informational herding p value: 0.0750 0.0000 0.9963 0.0033 0.4242 24 -
3) Non-splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ NS i,t
Variables estimated se mean se
Δi,t-1 0.404 *** 0.014 28.85 0.401 0.143 0.648 0.330 0.470 48 0 0.382 *** 0.013
F test: informational herding p value: 0.0002 0.0000 0.4830 0.0000 0.0142 41 -
Test: Beta S = Beta NS t= -1.81 (0.0773) t= -2.63 (0.0114)
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Table 9.
t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
median max
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 estimated in each quarter of analysis, from 1994 to
2005, for four Informational-based Models. Model (1) regresses the institutional demand Δ i,t (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) on the lag
institutional demand for the overall market and the interacted variables that account for the lags of size, dispersion among analysts, coverage and
size*coverage. Model (2) is regressed only on splitting companies, while Model (3) is regressed on non-splitting companies. The t-values reported are
computed from the standard error of the estimates series. The numbers of significant quarters are identified with a 10% of significance level. For the F
tests of the theoretical types of herding we report statistics on the quarterly p-values.
t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
Q3
min max Q1
min
Beta Adjusted
median min max Q1
Q3
Significant
neg. qrts.
Significant
pos. qrts.
median
Q1 Q3
Mean
Mean
Mean
t
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Characteristic-based Models
1) Overall market: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 0.363 *** 0.019 18.74 0.379 -0.011 0.653 0.291 0.447 44 0 0.340 *** 0.017
F test: Characteristic herding p value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.1054 0.0000 0.0006 47 -
2) Splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ S i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 -0.303 0.541 -0.56 0.127 -24.108 4.168 -0.326 0.664 9 1 -0.295 0.499
F test: Characteristic herding p value: 0.0067 0.0000 0.7919 0.0001 0.2490 31 -
3) Non-splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ NS i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 0.368 *** 0.020 18.60 0.386 -0.023 0.660 0.285 0.453 43 0 0.341 *** 0.017
F test: Characteristic herding p value: 0.0000 0.0000 0.0924 0.0000 0.0008 48 -
Test: Beta S = Beta NS t= -1.24 (0.2210) t= -1.27 (0.2087)
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Table 10.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 estimated in each quarter of analysis, from 1994 to
2005, for four Characteristics Herding Models. Model (1) regresses the Institutional demand Δ i,t (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) on the lag
institutional demand for the overall market and the interacted variables that account for the lags of size, price, turnover, standard deviation of returns,
quarterly returns and annual dividend per quarter. Model (2) is regressed only on splitting companies, while Model (3) is regressed on nonsplitting
companies. The t- values reported are computed from the standard error of the estimates series. The numbers of significant quarters are identified as
having a 10% of significance level. For the F tests of the theoretical types of herding, we report statistics on the quarterly p-values.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
median min max Q1
Beta Adjusted
max Q1 Q3
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
min
Q3
median min max Q1 Q3
median
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Momentum Models
1) Overall market: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 0.445 *** 0.008 56.65 0.438 0.346 0.552 0.400 0.483 48 0 0.437 *** 0.008
F test: Momentum herding p value: 0.0214 0.0000 0.9951 0.0013 0.2857 28 -
2) Splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ S i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 0.475 *** 0.035 13.49 0.495 -0.197 0.901 0.311 0.645 34 0 0.535 *** 0.033
F test: Momentum herding p value: 0.4085 0.0001 0.9599 0.2300 0.6525 9 -
3) Non-splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ NS i,t
Variables estimated mean se
Δi,t-1 0.449 *** 0.008 56.05 0.443 0.353 0.557 0.404 0.491 48 0 0.440 *** 0.008
F test: Momentum herding p value: 0.0222 0.0000 0.9944 0.0005 0.3502 29 -
Test: Beta S = Beta NS t= 0.72 (0.4737) t= 2.81 (0.0070)
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Table 11.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 estimated in each quarter of analysis, from 1994 to
2005, for four Momentum Models. Model (1) regresses the Institutional demand Δ i,t (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) on the lag institutional
demand for the overall market and the interacted variables that account for the lags of quarterly returns. Model (2) is regressed only on splitting
companies, while Model (3) is regressed on nonsplitting companies. The t- values reported are computed from the standard error of the estimates
series. The numbers of significant quarters are identified as having a 10% of significance level. For the F tests of the theoretical types of herding, we
report statistics on the quarterly p-values.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Mean
se t
Significant
pos. qrts.
median min max Q1
Beta Adjusted
max Q1 Q3
Significant
neg. qrts.
Beta Adjusted
min
Q3
median min max Q1 Q3
median
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Table 12.
Unifying Model
1) Overall market with splitting dummy Dependent variable: Δ i,t
estimated
Δi,t-1 all quart. 0.363 *** 0.023 15.91 0.399 -0.004 0.705 0.243 0.454 41 0
1994-1997 0.375 *** 0.041 9.05 0.406 0.025 0.705 0.275 0.464 13 0
1998-2001 0.427 *** 0.036 11.92 0.431 0.176 0.657 0.360 0.531 14 0
2002-2005 0.286 *** 0.035 8.23 0.303 -0.004 0.463 0.190 0.417 14 0
δi,tΔi,t-1 all quart. 0.008 0.036 0.24 -0.024 -0.569 0.708 -0.151 0.107 4 5
1994-1997 0.061 0.071 0.86 -0.037 -0.211 0.708 -0.136 0.204 1 0
1998-2001 0.033 0.037 0.89 0.070 -0.257 0.299 -0.071 0.102 1 1
2002-2005 -0.069 0.070 -0.97 -0.106 -0.569 0.485 -0.255 0.067 2 4
F test: Informational herding p value: 0.0017
F test: Characteristic herding p value: 0.0026
F test: Momentum herding p value: 0.0331
F test: Splitting Informational herding p value: 0.1331
F test: Splitting Characteristic herding p value: 0.0094
F test: Splitting Momentum herding p value: 0.3925
F test: Splitting All motivations p value: 0.0006
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand Δ i,t-1 estimated in each quarter of
analysis, from 1994 to 2005, for the Unifying Model. It regresses the Institutional demand Δ i,t (as fraction of buyer of stock i at
quarter t) on the lag institutional demand for the overall market and the interacted variables that account for the lags of size,
dispersion among analysts, coverage, size*coverage, price, turnover, standard deviation of returns, quarterly returns, annual
dividend per quarter and past returns, and a set of splitting dummies interacted with all the previous regressors. The t- values
reported are computed from the standard error of the estimates series. The numbers of significant quarters are identified as
having a 10% of significance level. For the F tests of the theoretical types of herding, we report statistics on the quarterly p values.
min max Q1 Q3Variables median
Mean
se t
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Average Estimated Coefficients for all Models (dummy specifications)
Overall market with splitting dummies
mean t mean t mean t mean t mean t
Δi,t-1 0.4743 *** 56.79 0.4116 *** 28.68 0.3671 *** 18.52 0.4655 *** 56.47 0.3709 *** 15.66
Dispersion*t-1 -0.0134 -1.38 -0.0092 -1.07
Coverage*t-1 0.1095 *** 11.05 0.1035 *** 11.31
Size*Coverage*t-1 -0.0814 *** -6.05 -0.0768 *** -6.49
Size*i,t-1 0.1549 *** 11.67 0.1027 *** 17.80 0.1476 *** 12.09
Price*i,t-1 0.0726 *** 8.02 0.0550 *** 6.99
Turnover*i,t-1 0.0406 *** 4.26 0.0096 1.14
StDeviation of returns*i,t-1 -0.0174 -0.98 -0.0305 -1.51
Returns*i,t-4 0.0030 0.51 0.0075 1.51
Dividends*i,t-1 0.0109 ** 1.98 0.0196 *** 3.45
Returns*i,t-1 0.0534 *** 6.72 0.0514 *** 6.22
δi,tΔi,t-1 -0.0009 -0.19 -0.0034 -0.65 -0.0050 -1.03 0.0000 0.00 -0.0014 -0.26
δi,t*Dispersion*t-1 0.0262 *** 2.52 -0.0378 -0.73
δi,t*Coverage*t-1 -0.0090 -0.96 -0.0324 -1.26
δi,t*Size*Coverage*t-1 0.0798 1.30 -0.0989 -0.65
δi,t*Size*i,t-1 -0.0630 -1.04 0.0157 *** 2.74 0.1257 0.89
δi,t*Price*i,t-1 0.0031 0.31 0.0406 1.12
δi,t*Turnover*i,t-1 0.0013 0.19 0.0242 1.18
δi,t*StDeviation of returns*i,t-1 0.0139 * 1.93 0.0065 0.40
δi,t*Returns*i,t-4 0.0041 1.30 0.0055 1.26
δi,t*Dividends*i,t-1 -0.0109 * -1.83 -0.0200 *** -2.61
δi,t*Returns*i,t-1 -0.0124 *** -2.72 -0.0151 *** -2.45
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Table 13.
Dependent variable: Δi,t
The table reports the standardized coefficients of all the variables used in the five models. (1) Sias' model regresses the institutional demand Δ i,t
on its lag Δ i,t-1 only. (2) Informational- based models regress the institutional demand on the lag demand and a set of proxies for the quality of
information, such as size, dispersion, coverage and size*coverage at the previous quarter. (3) The Characteristic- based model regresses the
institutional demand on its lag and a set of company characteristics, such as size, price, turnover, standard deviation, returns of stocks and
quarterly dividends, measured at the previous quarter. (4) The Momentum model regresses the institutional demand on its lag and the previous
year returns. (5) The Unifying model regresses the institutional demand on all the previous variables. The significance is attributed estimating
the t statistics from the time series of the beta estimates.
Variables
Sias' model Informational- based Characteristic- based Momentum Unifying model
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Average Estimated Betas for All Models per Subperiod (dummy specifications)
Overall market with splitting dummies
mean t mean t mean t mean t mean t
Δi,t-1 all quart. 0.453 *** 55.36 0.398 *** 28.33 0.360 *** 18.42 0.445 *** 55.38 0.363 *** 15.91
1994-1997 0.438 *** 34.83 0.401 *** 18.63 0.369 *** 14.73 0.434 *** 34.10 0.375 *** 9.05
1998-2001 0.474 *** 33.13 0.435 *** 17.61 0.371 *** 8.64 0.462 *** 33.24 0.427 *** 11.92
2002-2005 0.447 *** 30.15 0.357 *** 14.85 0.342 *** 10.34 0.438 *** 29.53 0.286 *** 8.23
δi,tΔi,t-1 all quart. 0.001 0.04 -0.005 -0.15 -0.021 -0.64 0.006 0.17 0.008 0.24
1994-1997 0.048 1.09 0.037 0.67 0.035 0.59 0.047 0.81 0.061 0.86
1998-2001 0.047 1.34 0.013 0.30 0.042 1.08 0.055 1.58 0.033 0.89
2002-2005 -0.092 -1.23 -0.066 -0.87 -0.139 *** -2.32 -0.084 -1.18 -0.069 -0.97
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
The table reports the standardized coefficients of the lag institutional demand and the dummy interacted with such lag, in the five
models. (1) Sias' model regresses the institutional demand on its lag. (2) Informational- based models regress the institutional demand
on the lag demand and a set of proxies for the quality of information, such as size, dispersion, coverage and size*coverage at the
previous quarter. (3) The Characteristic- based model regresses the institutional demand on its lag and a set of company characteristics,
such as size, price, turnover, standard deviation, returns of stocks and quarterly dividends, measured at the previous quarter. (4) The
Momentum model regresses the institutional demand on its lag and the previous year returns. (5) The Unifying model regresses the
institutional demand on all the previous variables. The significance is attributed estimating the t statistics from the time series of the
beta estimates.
Table 14.
Dependent variable: Δ i,t
Variables
Sias' model Informational- based Characteristic- based Momentum Unifying model
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Table 15.
Average Beta Coefficients per Institutional Type and Size of Institutional Portfolio.
Mean t Mean t Mean t Mean t
all period banks 0.401 *** 32.99 -0.085 *** -2.44 0.334 *** 29.99 -0.090 *** -2.71
Insurance co. 0.241 *** 15.86 0.051 1.55 0.172 *** 12.02 -0.038 -1.22
Investment co. 0.209 *** 12.83 0.043 1.25 0.194 *** 13.32 0.031 0.80
indip. advisors 0.312 *** 24.60 0.011 0.36 0.272 *** 16.73 0.022 0.80
not defined 0.409 *** 30.46 -0.055 * -1.66 0.330 *** 20.90 -0.029 -0.85
1994-1997 banks 0.426 *** 22.82 -0.073 -1.32 0.342 *** 16.39 -0.074 -1.35
Insurance co. 0.226 *** 17.89 0.107 * 1.83 0.163 *** 9.93 -0.043 -0.74
Investment co. 0.195 *** 10.07 0.047 0.82 0.203 *** 13.43 -0.017 -0.25
indip. advisors 0.358 *** 37.62 0.011 0.22 0.339 *** 30.74 0.019 0.43
not defined 0.455 *** 21.69 -0.128 *** -2.33 0.379 *** 15.77 -0.058 -0.93
1998-2001 banks 0.435 *** 21.86 -0.018 -0.49 0.376 *** 30.51 -0.032 -0.59
Insurance co. 0.314 *** 10.16 0.047 1.05 0.215 *** 6.32 0.043 0.99
Investment co. 0.279 *** 10.58 0.117 *** 4.57 0.265 *** 13.50 0.038 0.68
indip. advisors 0.353 *** 26.87 0.008 0.13 0.311 *** 25.67 0.011 0.22
not defined 0.393 *** 17.51 0.119 *** 2.24 0.280 *** 11.38 0.124 *** 2.35
2002-2005 banks 0.341 *** 20.17 -0.163 *** -2.08 0.286 *** 16.37 -0.163 *** -2.65
Insurance co. 0.181 *** 8.66 -0.002 -0.03 0.140 *** 7.93 -0.114 *** -2.12
Investment co. 0.154 *** 5.15 -0.036 -0.45 0.114 *** 4.61 0.072 0.91
indip. advisors 0.224 *** 10.31 0.016 0.27 0.165 *** 5.10 0.036 0.69
not defined 0.379 *** 16.43 -0.157 *** -4.00 0.331 *** 11.44 -0.155 *** -3.50
Mean t Mean t Mean t Mean t
all period small investors 0.304 *** 42.12 -0.122 *** -3.22 0.311 *** 38.19 -0.099 *** -2.74
medium 0.388 *** 39.40 -0.009 -0.34 0.338 *** 32.33 0.010 0.37
big 0.391 *** 37.73 0.062 * 1.89 0.375 *** 34.98 0.051 1.46
1994-1997 small investors 0.312 *** 28.22 -0.007 -0.11 0.285 *** 27.30 -0.018 -0.31
medium 0.406 *** 33.04 -0.054 -1.16 0.353 *** 28.45 -0.073 *** -2.52
big 0.396 *** 26.28 0.103 * 2.00 0.375 *** 23.26 0.119 *** 2.25
1998-2001 small investors 0.297 *** 19.12 -0.118 *** -2.61 0.298 *** 24.17 -0.059 -1.48
medium 0.397 *** 19.36 0.073 1.60 0.352 *** 15.93 0.090 *** 2.26
big 0.428 *** 29.08 0.096 *** 2.61 0.415 *** 27.43 0.068 *** 2.35
2002-2005 small investors 0.301 *** 27.97 -0.241 *** -3.22 0.349 *** 24.20 -0.221 *** -2.85
medium 0.362 *** 22.10 -0.048 -0.96 0.310 *** 17.70 0.014 0.24
big 0.350 *** 18.42 -0.013 -0.17 0.335 *** 17.18 -0.033 -0.39
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
General- herding Peer- herding
Beta Splitting dummy Beta Splitting dummy
The table reports the summary statistics of the quarterly coefficients of the lag institutional demand (Sias's Betas)
estimated in subgroups based on investor type and size of the investor portfolio per company in the quarter. Institutional
demand (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) is regressed for each group on the lag institutional demand and a
dummy for splitting companies interacted with the lag demand itself. The t- values reported are computed from the
standard error of the estimates series.
Beta
INVESTOR TYPE
Splitting dummy Beta Splitting dummy
INVESTOR SIZE
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Splitting Dummy Coefficients per Investor Type and Portfolio Size.
Figure 3.1 Peer herding: by size of investor portfolio Figure 3.2 Peer herding: by type of investors
Figure 3.3 General herding: by size of investor portfolio Figure 3.4 General herding: by type of investors
The following graphs represent the average dummy coefficient per splitting stocks herding compared to nonsplitting firms by size and type of investors. Peer herding is the
correlation of institutional demand per splitting /nonsplitting stocks with the previous quarter demand for the same portfolio. General herding is the correlation between
the institutional demand for splitting / nonsplitting and the previous quarter demand for all stocks.
Figure 3.
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Table 16.
Stabilizying Effect Models
1) Overall market: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
estimated
Δi,t-1 0.4468 *** 0.0079 56.58 0.3671 0.5551 44 0
Rett-1 0.2271 *** 0.0382 5.95 -0.3108 0.7938 24 1
Rett 0.3402 *** 0.0357 9.54 -0.1692 0.8111 30 0
Rett+1 0.0028 0.0338 0.08 -0.5477 0.5919 9 6
Rett+2 0.0146 0.0303 0.48 -0.4089 0.4309 7 4
Rett+4 -0.0237 0.0277 -0.86 -0.4560 0.3506 3 5
2) With splitting dummy: Dependent variable: Δ i,t
estimated
Δi,t-1 0.4477 *** 0.0081 55.23 0.3664 0.5552 44 0
Rett-1 0.2292 *** 0.0383 5.98 -0.3110 0.7936 24 1
Rett 0.3418 *** 0.0358 9.54 -0.1520 0.8263 31 0
Rett+1 0.0034 0.0338 0.10 -0.5477 0.5925 9 6
Rett+2 0.0128 0.0303 0.42 -0.4056 0.4318 7 4
Rett+4 -0.0249 0.0280 -0.89 -0.4952 0.3502 3 5
δi,tΔi,t-1 -0.0160 0.0308 -0.52 -0.5032 0.4991 4 7
3) Splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ S i,t
estimated
Δi,t-1 0.4057 *** 0.0470 8.63 -0.3454 1.4248 26 0
Rett-1 0.0819 0.2240 0.37 -5.0132 3.2220 9 3
Rett 0.0035 0.2140 0.02 -5.2177 2.8125 8 1
Rett+1 0.3704 *** 0.1760 2.11 -1.8904 3.7678 8 2
Rett+2 0.3692 *** 0.1794 2.06 -3.5798 3.3968 7 1
Rett+4 0.1201 0.1904 0.63 -4.1861 3.9397 4 5
4) Non-splitting companies: Dependent variable: Δ NS i,t
estimated
Δi,t-1 0.4484 *** 0.0081 55.18 0.3633 0.5552 44 0
Rett-1 0.2212 *** 0.0395 5.61 -0.3450 0.8020 23 1
Rett 0.3420 *** 0.0369 9.27 -0.2119 0.8572 31 0
Rett+1 -0.0015 0.0342 -0.04 -0.5669 0.6303 10 6
Rett+2 0.0100 0.0301 0.33 -0.3770 0.4235 5 4
Rett+4 -0.0337 0.0289 -1.17 -0.4689 0.3463 3 5
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% of significance level.
Variables
Mean
Variables
Mean
Variables
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Mean
The table reports the summary statistics of the coefficients of the lag institutional demand
estimated in each quarter of analysis, from 1994 to 2005, for four Stabilizing Models. Model
(1) regresses the institutional demand (as fraction of buyer of stock i at quarter t) on the lag
institutional demand for the overall market and past quarter, same quarter, following two
quarters and following year returns. Model (2) regresses the institutional demand on its lag,
the previous set of investors and a set of splitting dummies interacted with all the regressors.
Models (3) and Model (4) regress the same as Model (1) in only the splitting sample and
nonsplitting sample respectively. The t- values reported are computed from the standard error
of the estimates series. The numbers of significant quarters are identified with a 10% of
significance level.
max
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
Variables
Mean
se
Significant
pos. qrts.
min
max
Significant
neg. qrts.
Significant
pos. qrts.
Significant
neg. qrts.
min
min
se t min
max
max
t
t
se t
se
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The present thesis consists of the analysis of stock splits and their
impact on the market. We analyze this peculiar event, connecting it
to changes in expectations of the market and to the level of herding
among institutional investors.
In Chapter 2, we review the main theories on stock splits. Among
them, we particularly focus on the empirical research on the Self-
Selection hypothesis from Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002). According
to the Self-Selection hypothesis, managers split their shares because
they have a preferred trading range price they wish to realign their
share price to, as it is costly for the company, the management and
investors to lie in a lower range. Therefore, managers will split their
shares if they are optimistic regarding the future growth performance
of the company, so as to reduce the risk of the price going below the
lower limit of the trading range. A positive market reaction to the
announcement of a stock split is consistent with this theory, as the
event conveys positive information. However, the split also conveys the
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optimism of the managers, which the market cannot perfectly evalu-
ate. Hence, we observe a timid reaction, extended in the long run with
increasing prices.
According to this theory and connecting it with the di¤erences of
opinion literature, in Chapter 3 we investigate the relation between the
announcement of a split, changes in market expectations and the mar-
ket reaction. In a sample of US stock splits from 1993 to 2005, we nd
evidence of signalling content in the announcement of the event. In
fact, we observe positive changes in average forecasts estimates, cov-
erage and decreases in the estimates error. However, we also observe
a tiny increase in dispersion, which is consistent with a higher level of
uncertainty in the market. An event study on the market reaction af-
ter the event suggests that the market reacts to positive informational
content hidden in the split announcement, in the days immediately fol-
lowing the event, and also in a window of 90 days afterwards. A nal
verication shows that there is a positive relation between CARs and
dispersion of beliefs, validating the hypothesis that dispersion of beliefs
can be considered as a proxy for the quality of information that reaches
the market.
The presence of informational content together with an increase
in dispersion motivates the hypothesis of a relationship between stock
splits and informational-based herding. According to the Self-Selection
hypothesis, the event, in fact, conveys positive information together
with the optimism of managers. This is an ideal condition for informational-
based herding to arise (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Av-
ery and Zemsky, 1998), as the event conveys positive information about
a change in value of the company but also uncertainty as to whether the
change has really occurred or is merely caused by the overcondence of
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the management. Chapter 4, therefore, proposes a review of the liter-
ature on herding, with particular focus on the empirical methodologies
to detect and measure herding, which are then used in the empirical
investigation of herding on splitting companies.
In Chapter 5, we analyze any abnormal level of herding in splitting
companies in the quarter of the event announcement. Using a sample of
US splits from 1993 to 2005, we investigate the presence of institutional
herding, applying the methodology developed by Sias (2004). Estimat-
ing the rst order serial correlation of the institutional demand for
splitting companies, we rst observe the potential presence of herding
among all types of institutional investors. In particular, splitting stocks
exhibit a slightly higher di¤erence in the correlation coe¢ cients in the
period from 1998 to 2001. The di¤erence in herding appears clearer
once we factor out the e¤ect of common market factors, such as the
four-factors of Carhart (1997). After detecting the presence of herding,
we impose and test specic hypotheses for informational-based herd-
ing (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992, Scharfstein and Stein,
1990) and positive-feedback herding (Gompers andMetrick, 2001, Grin-
blatt, Titman and Wermers, 1995). We observe the strong presence of
all theoretical motivations of herding. In particular though, we con-
rm that institutional investors tend be a¤ected by informational-based
herding when trading on splitting companies. Using the dispersion
of beliefs among analysts as a proxy for informational-based herding,
we observe that the di¤erence in imitative behaviour between the two
groups is mostly explained by informational content.
In conclusion, the results of the study conrm the presence of in-
formational content in the announcement of the event, together with
an additional source of uncertainty which originates from the optimism
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of managers. This two-dimensional uncertainty in the event causes the
level of herding among institutional investors to be slightly higher for
splitting companies in relation to the rest of the market, and in partic-
ular to be motivated by informational-content.
Besides the informative results of this study and the light we have
drawn on the relation between stock split, dispersion of beliefs and
herding, there are still some further improvements to be made, which
could help to rene the future research into the analysis and impact
of stock splits. In particular, a signicant and relevant part of insti-
tutional herding is still not explainable by the models that we have
applied in this research. This remaining unexplained imitative behav-
iour should be investigated in more depth to discern whether other, as
yet unspecied, motivations are involved.
Moreover, the methodology we have used presents some drawbacks
in its ability to distinguish between intentional and nonintentional herd-
ing. New methodologies would need to be considered and developed to
take into account these issues, so as to further rene our understanding
of the impact of this still puzzling cosmeticevent.
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